Central and Eastern European Socio-Political and Legal Transition Revisited by Fekete, Balázs & Gárdos Orosz, Fruzsina
Central and Eastern European Socio-Political and Legal Transition Revisited 
  
Central and Eastern European Forum for Legal, 
Political, and Social Theory Yearbook 
 
Edited by Jürgen Busch / Péter Cserne / Michael Hein / 


















Central and Eastern European Socio-
Political and Legal Transition Revisited 
 
 
Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication 
in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic 



















ISBN 978-3-631-72761-4 (Print) 
E-ISBN 978-3-631-72762-1 (E-PDF)  
E-ISBN 978-3-631-72763-8 (E-PUB) 
E-ISBN 978-3-631-72764-5 (Mobi) 
DOI 10.3726/b11406 
 
© Peter Lang GmbH 
Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften 
Frankfurt am Main 2017 
All rights reserved. 
 
Peter Lang – Frankfurt am Main ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ 
Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien 
 
All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any 
utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without 
the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to 
prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, 
translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in 
electronic retrieval systems. 
 





Preface  .......................................................................................................................... 7
Balázs Fekete- Fruzsina Gárdos- Orosz
Introduction  .............................................................................................................  13
Marie- Elisabeth Baudoin
Constitutional Law as a mirror of transition to liberal democracy and its 
backsliding in Eastern Europe  ...............................................................................  23
György Gajduschek
‘The Opposite is True … as Well.’ Inconsistent Values and Attitudes in 
Hungarian Legal Culture: Empirical Evidence from and Speculation 
over Hungarian Survey Data  .................................................................................  41
Maciej Dybowski
Transition to Democracy and Determinacy of Legal Concepts.  
A Brandomian Semantics View  .............................................................................  57
Jan Bazyli Klakla
The Rebirth of Customary Law in a Time of Transition. The Case of Albania  ... 75
Petra Burai
Transitioning Boundaries Between Law and Social Practice: Corruption 
in Hungary Before and After 1989  ........................................................................  89
Rafał Mańko
Law, Politics and the Economy in Poland’s Post- Socialist 
Transformation: Preliminary Notes Towards an Investigation  .......................  105
Dario Čepo
Between Path Dependence and Political Elite Capture: The Second 
Chambers in Central and Eastern European Unitary States Explained  .........  121
Ketrina Çabiri Mijo and Adela Danaj
Explaining the Trajectories of Post- Communist Democratization.  





The Hollowing Out of Institutions: Law- and Policymaking in 
Contemporary Serbia ............................................................................................  155
Miroslaw Sadowski
Collective Memory and Historical Determinacy:  
The Shaping of the Polish Transition  ..................................................................  175
Axelle Reiter
Justice (Lost) in Transition: Assessing the ICTY Legacy ..................................  193
Martin Belov
The Opening of the Constitutional Order of Democracy in Transition 
towards Supranational Constitutionalism: the Bulgarian case  ........................  213
Ferenc Hörcher
The V4 Cooperation and the European schism over the migration crisis: 
The history of political thought in the service of political analysis  ................  231
Ivan Szelényi
Preface
William Graham Sumner Emeritus Professor of Sociology and Political Science, Yale 
University; Max Weber Professor of Social Sciences and Foundation Dean of Social Sci-
ences at NYU Abu Dhabi. He is a Fellow of American Academy of Arts and Sciences and 
an ordinary member of the Hungarian National Academy of Sciences.
25 Years After the Transition – is the title of the 8th CEE Forum. This is a great 
topic: such an anniversary is a great opportunity to confront the illusions we 
harboured 25 years ago and celebrate the achievements of societies which drifted 
away from communism in the direction promised to be liberal capitalist democ-
racy. The 13 papers presented in this volume offer cool- headed analysis. Most of 
the papers belong to legal scholarship, while some of them touch upon social, 
economic, cultural and political processes. I identify myself as a sociologist – 
with some stretch I may call myself as a political scientist – but I certainly am 
no scholar of law. Therefore, I am not really competent to act as a commentator 
on this work. Nevertheless, the legal issues discussed at this conference not only 
have far reaching implications for the social, political and economic processes 
the post- communist world is struggling with, but they are questions I have been 
confronted with in my work on the nature of ‘varieties of post- communist capi-
talisms’. I believe I am competent enough to raise some central questions about 
issues like the rule of law, constitutionalism, the separation of powers, the present 
and future of liberalism, the struggle to establish private property rights, the na-
ture of legitimacy under post- communism.1
Constitutionalism, constitution making
Let me begin with one of the most urgent and difficult tasks during the transition 
ex- communist countries had to deal with: the pressing problem of establishing 
the rule of law and the making of liberal (bourgeois) constitutions.
Communist states were not cases of ‘rule of law’ in the conventional sense. 
Nevertheless, they felt a need to create constitutions, following the Stalinist 
Constitution of the USSR. There was commitment to law actually, but that was 





supposed to be ‘substantive’ rather than ‘formal’. Inspired by Lukács’s theory of 
‘reified bourgeois consciousness’ (1923) Pashukanis (1929) criticized formal law 
as being ‘bourgeois law’ (interestingly this criticism of formal law re- emerged in 
the West during the 1970s and‘80s in ‘critical legal studies’; so whether the law is 
‘substantive’ or ‘formal’ is not a trivial question).
During the transition the major task was to transit from a constitution based on 
substantive legal thinking to formal law. Could it be achieved by readjusting the 
existing constitution or was there a substantial reason to create a new constitution? 
In the 1990s in Hungary the Constitutional Court conceptualized an ‘invisible 
constitution’. This idea worked well, but the court was occasionally accused of 
‘creating’ rather than ‘administering’ the constitution. What is the appropriate 
mechanism to pass a constitution? Shall the source of the constitution be the 
democratically elected legislative branch of the government (shall it be by simple 
or qualified majority?), or shall it be the ‘will of the people’, hence approved by 
referenda? Who are the people and in what way can their will be implemented? 
The US constitution set the standard for over two centuries by clearly identifying 
the sovereign: ‘We the people’.
The Hungarian ‘Basic Law’ passed in 2011 is more qualified, it states ‘We the 
members of the Hungarian nation’, by using an ethno- cultural definition of the 
sovereign (and consciously not identifying it as, ‘we the citizens of the Hungarian 
Republic’). Furthermore this basic law was approved by the two- thirds majority 
of the parliament, hence by the elected representatives of the citizens (at that time 
residents in Hungary), which, given the moderate participation rate at elections 
and the electoral law rewarding the winners of elections, did not mean the ap-
proval of the basic law by the majority of Hungarian citizenry.
Separation of powers
Post- communist countries were committed to the principle of the separation of 
powers. In classical political theory (Montesquieu) the executive branch is the 
monarch and the legislative branch is ‘properly constituted’ and, of course, the 
judiciary is independent from both.
Hence, the idea of the ‘separation of powers’ was advocated by constitutional 
monarchies and it is more easily applicable to strong presidential systems (like 
the US system) than to parliamentary democracies where the executive is elected 
by the legislature, so the separation of these two branches is not quite that clear. 
In addition, if a party once attains (qualified – if necessary) majority, the separa-
tion of the two major branches (legislative and executive) of government does 
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not exist any more (like Hungary in 2010–2014 and for a few months after the 
2014 elections).
In transitional societies there are strong arguments for a strong executive (es-
pecially to facilitate efficient privatization of public goods – while this brings 
along the dangers of ‘corruption’ or what Bálint Magyar has recently called the 
‘mafia state’).
So, the separation of powers is highly contested nowadays.
There is a great deal of controversy about the role of constitutional courts, too. 
Is the court making the law? Already Yeltsin attacked the constitutional court, the 
Orbán government has limited its powers, so does the Kaczynski regime and – 
like it has been attempted a number of times in the US, though without definite 
success – stacks the court with their loyal followers.
There is also intense struggle about the independence of the courts and pros-
ecution.
How much independence the prosecution shall have is also controversial. After 
all, the prosecution can be seen as an arm of the executive. But is it? If the prosecu-
tion – what seems to be the case in Hungary – is just an arm of the executive that 
can lead to the ‘selective criminalization’ of the political enemy (is this happening 
in Romania?). How independent can the courts be if the prosecution is just an 
arm of the executive? How far can the courts go to criticize rulings by the court?
Liberalism, illiberalism
One reason to limit the autonomy of courts and try to create solid majorities in 
the legislative is to break the deadlock of legislature, what happens for instance 
all the time in the US.
Liberalism can be interpreted as excessive defence of individual interest and the 
executive may want to increase its discretion. In the US, the president attempts 
to rule by decree to overrule the particularisms of unbreakable conflicts in the 
legislature. The Polish, Hungarian and Russian state moves towards ‘illiberalism’, 
hence a strong executive which, if needed, can push legislation through the legisla-
tive bodies within hours or days.
Property rights
One important component of illiberalism is the limitation of property rights. This 
is especially important in post- communist states, particularly in times when the 
privatization of massive property is at stake. The legislature and, with parliamen-
tary majority, the executive may limit property rights by imposing extra taxes or 
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even reallocating property from ‘oligarchs’, hence from the new rich with opposi-
tion political agenda and reallocating it to new clients. This is a typical practice of 
Russia under Putin (forcing Berezovsky into exile – eventually into what appears 
to be suicide – and putting Khodorkovsky in jail, while reallocating their proper-
ties to new loyal clients (Abramovich) are the most often cited examples). This 
may be an emergent trend in other post- communist countries where the recruit-
ment of political clients through privatization is exhausted, so new a clients can 
only be found by the reallocation of property. An interesting example is the so 
called Orbán- Simicska war in Hungary. The disobedient – and politically ambi-
tious – Simicska is excluded from competitions or from public auctions and new 
loyal followers, like Vajna and Habony have been richly rewarded. A lot of what 
Simicska lost has been won by Vajna and Habony. Despite transition to capitalism, 
ironically in post- communist capitalisms politics often ‘remains in command’ 
what Mao – in a smart way – used to define as the essence of communism. Post- 
communist capitalism, of course, is not communism, but it is a unique form of 
new capitalism, for sure.
The question of legitimacy and hegemonic ideology
What was the legitimacy of communist regimes can also be debated. Some regard 
communism as illegitimate, others tended to think about major communist lead-
ers as charismatic leaders. Some even called communism traditional authority, 
Fehér and Rigby coined the interesting term: goal rational authority.
Post- communism has to find its legitimacy and new dominant ideology. In 
Weberian terms it was assumed that post- communism will merely mean a transi-
tion to legal- rational authority (liberal socio- political order).
But we have seen a creeping- in of illiberalism and an important role of some 
kind of paternalistic, neo- traditional order. Liberalism as an ideology is fighting an 
intense (and in some cases apparently losing) battle against traditionalism. Anti- 
communism (lustration is an important weapon in the anti- communist struggle), 
patriotism, the emphasis on national sovereignty against federalist tendencies in 
the EU, emphasis on patriotism, fear of foreigners and anti- immigrants feelings 
are increasingly the dominant features of post- communist culture.
During the past 25 years former communist societies have faced many legal, so-
cial, political and economic challenges. After a quarter of a century these countries 
and their political elites can be proud of significant achievements: there is indefi-
nitely more law and order than there was under communism; courts have become 
more autonomous than they used to be; the importance of liberal democracy 
has been established, reasonably free elections have been held and the freedom 
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of the press has functioned, though was not uncontested; private property has 
been legalized. But this success is burdened by contradiction. Many, if not most, 
communist countries have drifted from rule of law to rule by law; the autonomy 
of constitutional courts has been restricted by political pressure; government has 
often tried to use public radio and TV channels as instruments of government 
propaganda; parties in government have often attempted to change electoral rules 
to preserve their political power; even the very ideals of liberalism are questioned 
and instead the need for strong leadership is emphasized.
This volume is a work- in- progress report of countries half- way between com-
munism and liberal democratic capitalism. The road ahead of these countries will 
probably be long, curvy and rocky.
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Introduction
The concept
This new Yearbook of the Central and Eastern European Forum of Young Legal, 
Political and Social Theorists is devoted to the analysis of the Central- and Eastern 
European transition. We have continued the traditions of the Forum in studying 
the region’s social, political and legal challenges. Nation- wide, region- wide and 
global changes remind us of thinking together on interpreting and shaping our 
environment. We have focused in this volume on understanding the constantly 
evolving process of democratization. Following the collapse of the Soviet- Union 
democratic transitions took place all over this region and the new democracies 
had different shapes. However, all states wished to become a western- type democ-
racy and almost all of them are now members of the European Union, the Council 
of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What one may be able to 
learn from this book is the ongoing struggle almost everywhere in the region 
to understand and to make others understand the peculiarities of these seem-
ingly western- type, but essentially quite different democratic regimes. Reading 
the chapters of this book, we recognize the particular problems of our countries 
in the mirror of the analyses about the neighbors.
We observe that our world, being in a constant state of transition, is a de-
manding field to study, and we hope that this new volume, which brings inspired 
authors together, will help the readers to orientate themselves in Central and 
Eastern European society, politics and law. Our aim was to better understand 
and to make others better understand this region. We invite the readers to study 
what the major reasons could be behind the contemporary controversies and what 
kind of deficiencies and what kind of specialties we see in these national ways 
of developments. We emphasize that almost all authors of this book are insiders. 
In addition, they articulate their observations with the aim to explain the conse-
quences of the democratic transition. We recognize that although the countries 
of the post- soviet region are very different as to their language, as to their history 
and culture, there still is something fundamentally similar in their approaches to 
law, politics, and society. In 2017, these similarities are partly embedded in the 
difficulties of the democratic transitions. All of the countries we deal with in this 
volume suffer from the heritage of dictatorial regimes. This is clear when we look 
at the law, the politics and the society from theoretical angles.
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This selection of papers we offer here is, therefore, focused strictly on the dis-
cussion and reassessment of the Central and Eastern European transition that 
started in 1989 and apparently has not finished yet. Since more than twenty- five 
years have passed, the historical distance necessary for the formulation of schol-
arly insights on either the transition process as such or its several dimensions has 
been reached. Therefore, the time has come for a critical reconsideration of the 
earlier scholarly findings or commonplaces and the formulation of more nuanced 
and refined conclusions. Accordingly, contributions come from the fields of legal, 
social or political theory related to this complex issue. Special emphasis is placed 
on the impact of the European- integration, on the historical determinacy of the 
transition process with regard to unique historical, political, social or cultural fac-
tors; on the role of law, legal bodies and legal thinking in the process of transition; 
on theoretical and practical problems of lustration; on the surviving components 
of the former official Marxist- Leninist socio- political thinking and the effects of 
this legacy; and on the phenomenon of legal and political transplants either from 
Western Europe or of an intra- regional nature.
Most of the authors are younger researchers either working in Central and 
Eastern Europe or studying topics with Central and Eastern European dimen-
sions, but the reader will find contributions from widely acknowledged professors 
in law, philosophy and sociology as well.
About the contributions
Our starting point in this book is, what Iván Szelényi suggests in his preface, 
that ‘post- communism has to find its legitimacy in a new dominant ideology’. 
Many of us believed that post- communism would bring a transition from a dic-
tatorial regime to a legal- rational authority based statehood, called the liberal 
socio- political order. Contrary to this illusion, illiberalism has spread in many 
countries and we observe the presence of different paternalistic, neo- traditional 
orders. Liberalism, as the new ideology of the post- transition period, is fighting 
a battle against traditionalism, nationalism and other competing ideas. Although 
Szelényi concludes that liberalism seems to be fading away in this region, the 
authors of this volume argue that, in spite of the pitfalls, there are significant ef-
forts to construct liberal democratic regimes and find the ways to adhere to the 
common European heritage.
Significant achievements have been reached since the transitions, but in the 
past few years the difficulties have captured the states in certain crises and locked 
the ongoing democratisation process. Marie- Elisabeth Baudoin observes that 
most of the Central and Eastern European countries were able, during the 1990s, 
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to change their political and legal systems, without using any violence. More 
than 25 years after the pacific revolutions, when a backsliding of democracy can 
be observed, especially in Hungary or in Poland, what is really at stake is the 
choice that was made in 1989–1990 to adopt the so- called European model of 
democracy. The recent crises in Central and Eastern Europe are symptomatic of 
an identity crisis and disenchantment with the liberal constitutional democratic 
values. This uncertainty in the political sphere has important effects on the ways 
in which societies function.
Further, the rule of law concept loses its relevance: many authors in this book 
examine this phenomenon from different angles. György Gajduschek explains 
in his chapter that surveys of Hungarian legal culture have detected a high level 
of inconsistency of beliefs and values regarding basic questions related to the 
rule of law (i.e. human rights, dealing with unfair laws) of a modern legal sys-
tem. Gajduschek proposes a few possible, mutually non- exclusive explanations. 
The most interesting interpretation is – with the argument that also appears in 
Danilo Vukovic’s chapter –, that the legal institutions after 1990 were imported 
and adopted from the West. This happened within a few months, based on the 
strange – though probably very typical – belief that the law has the power to 
change both the political and the social settings. However, culture, unlike the law 
in the continental legal systems, tends to change only slowly. Maciej Dybowski 
agrees with Gajduschek by saying that the content of legal concepts, as applied 
by legal professionals, is highly debatable as far their determinacy is concerned. 
Political, economic and cultural change, all of which have to do with transition, 
have an impact on any discursive practice. Dybowski argues that in determining 
the content of legal concepts, a non- legal concept of the common good could be 
useful. The controversial experiences of the transitions may have alienated people 
from the law and the democratic institutions. As a consequence, several layers 
of highly contradicting normative systems are present. From different perspec-
tives, Jan Bazyl Klakla focuses on the role of the customary law in maintaining 
social order in the times of transition. His argument is also based on the notion 
of uncertainty that a transition generates. This may undermine the reliance on 
state institutions and it may sometimes result in some sort of social anomy. When 
the previous social order is already gone and the future one is not fully developed 
yet, this normative gap needs to be filled. In certain circumstances by the custom-
ary law. Social rules are, however, not always positive ones: corruption is also a 
symptom of the irrelevance of applicable rules. Petra Burai points out that when 
social structures and the legal system are in constant flux, turning away from 
the normative order and focusing on personal values instead is particularly ef-
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fective but not always fruitful. Rafal Manko also argues that the dynamics of the 
interaction between law and economics with regard to the privatisation of state 
property is still significant in this region. The introduction of economic freedom, 
the dismantlement of central economic planning, the transformation of the co-
operative sector needed new legal foundations. He concludes that, in spite of all 
the deficiencies, the law should be an autonomous player within the dynamics 
of socio- economic and political transformation. A closer examination, however, 
reveals that despite the aspirations of the legal community, at least in the Polish 
case of post- communist transformation, the law was nothing but a form, always 
one step behind the dynamics of socio- economic and political change.
Turning from the instability of law towards the instability of the institutions, 
we refer to the chapters of Dario Cepo, Danilo Vukovic and Ketrina Cabiri Mijo 
and Adela Danaj. All deal with the difficulties of establishing and maintaining 
the due operation of democratic institutions. Dario Cepo reviews the reasons 
for the establishment as well as the necessity of maintaining upper houses in 
Central and Eastern European countries after the transition, and investigates 
how upper houses should be abolished or reformed in order to cope with new 
democratic challenges. Ketrina Cabiri Mijo and Adela Danaj argue that the tra-
jectories of the democratic transitions were manifold in this region. In Albania, 
for example, given that it embraced a specific communist regime, communist 
legacies still harshly impact the democratization process. The model starts from 
the communist repression as the independent variable responsible for the lack 
of political culture and the lack of opponents to the regime. The lack of the 
historical embeddedness of these components is reflected in the new leaders’ 
mentality, thus in the institutional choices they make, as well. Danilo Vukovic’s 
claim is very much in line with this. When analysing the changes of law- and 
policymaking institutions in contemporary Serbia, he observes that a process of 
‘the hollowing out’ of institutions is taking place. The processes of post- socialist 
transformation and globalization have influenced institutions on two levels: 
the post- socialist transformation has led to the dissolution of old institutions, 
connected to a controlled economy and a political system, accompanied by 
the gradual creation of new ones. However, many of these institutions found 
themselves in an institutional vacuum that has increased the power of informal 
institutions, networks, and actors.
And finally, three papers deal specifically with those internal and external chal-
lenges which might lead to the present state of the democratic transitions in 
Central and Eastern Europe. According to Miroslaw Michal Sadowski, collective 
memory and historical determinacy will be important elements of understand-
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ing the legal regime change. He discusses the historical factors which shaped 
the Polish transformation. The author also ponders on the recurrent question of 
lustration and looks into the collective memories of the time of the Polish People’s 
Republic, which, 26 years after its downfall, seem more divergent than ever. The 
transition to democracy, unfortunately, was not so peaceful everywhere in this 
region. Axelle Reiter assesses the role that international criminal law plays in the 
transition process, focusing on the penalisation of violence in the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in front of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The International law relies on criminal avenues 
to deal with wartime violence and human rights abuses in post- conflict societies. 
Reiter points out the appropriateness of this approach, because it is not grounded 
in the actual assessment of its benefits, and does not take into consideration al-
ternative means of conflict management. The critical conclusions find an echo in 
the local population’s scepticism towards the institution and towards criminal 
justice provided by international organizations. On the other hand, the trust in the 
European Union was very high at least at the moments of the accessions. Martin 
Belov points out that many states transformed their constitutional orders in or-
der to adhere to all EU requirements. Hoping for the stability of wealth, security 
and freedom, the flow of legal transplants emerged without much debate and 
in- depth consideration. Martin Belov takes the example of Bulgaria and claims 
that Europeanisation was regarded as a form of civilization. Thus, Europe has 
served as a cultural code and a hallmark of high civilization standards which 
were automatically and uncritically transplanted into the Bulgarian legal system 
and legal cultural context.
All contributions agree in one major observation. Right after the democratic 
transition, there was enthusiasm towards adopting the Western- type liberal 
democracies operated by democratic institutions on the basis of the rule of law. 
Freedom, wealth, and security were expected from joining the European Union 
and the NATO, from being a part of the European community. All contributions 
agree that at national levels and finally at a regional level the trajectories are 
clear and unambiguous. However, from a regional perspective, Ferenc Hörcher, 
when shedding light on the antecedents and background of the V4 cooperation, 
points out that discourses of political philosophy and the history of political 
thought always aim at understanding the real political motivations of actors. 
While he looks at two particular contexts of the history of the V4 cooperation 
from medieval times to the recent challenges, he emphasizes that if we make 
sense of the ideological issues of the given period, we shall more easily under-
stand these countries.
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The validity of the regional approach
What we may learn from these contributions is that constitutional democracies 
are slightly different in this region to the western patterns, transitional political 
traditions have significant impacts on the political sphere, on the law, on institu-
tions and finally on societies. Similar observations have already been made by 
many great authors, political and social theory has always been strongly engaged 
in conceptualizing the similarities and differences between these countries and 
either Western Europe or Russia and the East. After the Second World War, István 
Bibó (1911–1979), a Hungarian historian, political philosopher, and politician 
had a significant influence on the legal, political and social thinking in many CEE 
countries. In line with Bibó, László Péter (1929–2008), historian and political 
theorist, found that there is something essentially Central and Eastern European 
in legal and political traditions (in English, Bibó in Dénes 2015, Bibó in Nagy 1991, 
Péter in Lojkó 2012). Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans have always 
belonged to Europe but on the other hand have always been different from the 
West. Modernity meant to be understood as being similar to Western democracies. 
(Péter 38.) This region is special because many different cultures have traditionally 
an effect on it. (Péter 39.) As to the society, Western Europe has been in a different 
position since the Second World War, which might cause that Central and Eastern 
European societies are less tolerant today (Bibó in Huszár- Vida Vol 1. 297–300). 
Replying to István Bibó, we could say, that the uncertainty that all the chapters 
of this book touch upon has always been a significant feature of this region. One 
historical reason might be the uncertainty of the national frameworks (Bibó in 
Huszár- Vida, Vol 1. 295–304.). The Central and Eastern European nations often 
experience ‘collective hysteria’, the societies are often strongly over- politicized as 
compared to Western European countries. The states in this region always want to 
achieve something as a nation. Defining the nation and the allies of nations have 
always been contentious issues since the second world war (Bibó in Huszár- Vida 
Vol 2. 187–191). On the other hand, nationalism has always been the soil to build 
autocracy upon. Péter László suggests that without having this history where the 
autocratic approach to power was quite usual, the history of the Soviet influence 
could have been different. (Péter 49–53).
What we learn from Bibó and Péter is still valid today. Although many years 
have gone by and all the countries in this region have been transformed from 
dictatorial regimes to constitutional democracies, everything that constitutional 
democracies mean is slightly different here. As endangered liberties and threat-
ened autonomies have become the rule, in an atmosphere of constant uncertainty 
state actions and individual behaviours become divergent from the adopted and 
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settled Western patterns, modernization, as understood by Bibó and Péter, is filled 
with conflicts as the actors cannot truly and unconditionally believe in the success 
of Western models of constitutional democracy.
What we intended here in this volume is to provide an insider view on these 
struggles of the uncompleted transitions. We believe that there is much to un-
derstand in law, political sciences or sociology concerning the successes and the 
pitfalls of the Central and Eastern European countries.
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Constitutional Law as a mirror of transition 
to liberal democracy and its backsliding in 
Eastern Europe
Abstract: Eastern European countries were able, during the 1990s, to change their politi-
cal and legal systems, without using any violence. More than 25 years after the peaceful 
revolutions, it is important to have a closer look at the constitutional evolutions in Eastern 
Europe. Constitutional Law mirrors not only the peaceful transition to democracy but also 
the obstacles faced by new democracies. Recently, constitutional crises have been observed 
in Hungary and Poland, raising the question of what is really at stake: a backsliding of de-
mocracy or a backsliding of liberal democracy? If we look back into the past and the 1980s’ 
transition to democracy, the choice was made to adopt a liberal model of democracy, the 
European model of democracy. This paper argues that more than mirroring a backsliding 
of democracy, the recent crises in Eastern Europe mirror an identity crisis and disenchant-
ment with the idea of liberal constitutional democracy.
Introduction
Twenty- eight years after the so- called ‘Velvet’, ‘peaceful’ or ‘constitutional revolu-
tions’ in Eastern Europe, time has come to look back into the past and analyse the 
democratic changes. The recent constitutional crisis that happened in Poland in 
2015–2016, as well as the constitutional evolution in Hungary since 2010, could 
lead us to a quite pessimistic and dark picture of the consequences of the so- called 
transition to democracy. In 2011, Hungary adopted a new Constitution replacing 
the 1949 amended ‘socialist’ Constitution. The new Hungarian Basic Law entered 
into force in January 2012 and was then amended five times within a 20-month 
period by the governing party (Fidesz) that possessed a constitution- making ma-
jority in Parliament. These constitutional developments led to significant criticism 
domestically and abroad denouncing an elimination of checks and balances and 
guarantees of fundamental rights. In Poland, in December 2015, the Constitu-
tional Court was at the heart of a major political crisis because of the appointment 
of the ‘October judges’;1 the newly elected Sejm (with a Law and Justice majority) 
1 The Polish episode has a lot in common with the American episode of the ‘Midnight 
judges’ that were appointed by President Adams in 1801, leading to the famous decision 
Marbury v. Madison adopted by the US Supreme Court in 1803.
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drafted amendments to the Act on the Constitutional Court that were adopted on 
19 November 2015. These amendments were assessed by the Venice Commission 
of the Council of Europe on March 11, 2016, as ‘hamper[ing] the effectiveness of 
the Constitutional Tribunal’ and undermining democracy, human rights and the 
rule of Law.2 Apart from these two examples, the international ranking institu-
tions have shown similar worrying tendencies of the regression of democracy in 
all new democracies.3
But denouncing a backsliding of democracy is not sufficient. The situation re-
quires a deeper analysis and a search for explanations. After the collapse of the au-
thoritarian regimes in the late 1980s, the Eastern European populations expected, 
under the label of democracy, a Western welfare state. Despite the achievements 
of democratization and Europeanization during the 1990s, their controversial 
and ambiguous character led to a tremendous disappointment. To observe this 
malaise in the new democracies, the legal aspect – though it is just one aspect of 
the changes – merits being taken into account. Transition to democracy is first and 
foremost a political phenomenon, but it is also a legal one. Constitutional law is a 
‘laboratory’, which helps in analysing the transitional period. It is an indicator of 
the changes over time: the transformation of the State or the end of the transition 
period can be observed through the adoption of a new Fundamental Law, through 
the amendments introduced in the Constitution, and also through the applica-
tion of the newly adopted Constitution. Studying those mechanisms enables us 
to assess if the constitutional transition is over and when the consolidation era 
starts. At the same time, Constitutional Law is also an indicator of the changes 
in values as the Constitution bears an axiological dimension and reflects the new 
democratic values adopted by the post- socialist States.
This paper argues that Constitutional law is a mirror reflecting the democratic 
and State evolutions. The term ‘Constitutional law’ means the principles guaran-
teed by the Constitution but also the constitution- making process and the deci-
sions of the Constitutional Courts as guardians of the Constitution. Nevertheless, 
such an analysis cannot be done solely from an internal perspective. We need to 
add an external or supra- national, i.e. European perspective. The admissions of 
Central European countries to the European Union in 2004 (in the case of Czech 
2 Opinion n°833/2015 of the European Commission for Democracy through Law on 
Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland 
(Venice, 11–12 March 2016), CDL- AD(2016)001, p. 16.
3 ‘A deep- seated political malaise in east- central Europe has led to disappointment and 
widespread questioning of the strength of the region’s democratic transition’. See The 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2015, Democracy in an age of anxiety. 10.
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Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) 
or in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania), as well as the membership of the Council of 
Europe in the 1990s, have strongly influenced the constitutional changes. Such an 
influence can be witnessed at the level of the constitution- making process, during 
the first period, in the late 1980s, as well as on the consolidation of democracy 
itself during the second period.
Transition to democracy and democracy itself do not stand as a quiet long river. 
The adoption of new democratic values is not enough. Democratization requires 
a change in behaviours from the political elites as well as from the society. It also 
requires a change in political culture and an acceptance of the new rules of the 
democratic game. Democracy is more about the journey than the destination. 
And the journey is sometimes paved with obstacles. As a result, constitutional 
law in Eastern Europe reflects a paradox: used in the late 1980’s as an instrument 
of departure from the authoritarian regime, it mirrored the peaceful transition to 
democracy (I). Once democracy was established, Constitutional law mirrored the 
tribulations of democracy, which are, to some extent, rooted in the transitional 
process itself (II).
I.  Constitutional Law, as a mirror of a peaceful transition to 
democracy
Ending the ‘third wave of democratization’ according to the Samuel Huntington 
(1991) analysis, Eastern European countries departed from the authoritarian re-
gime without using any violence, and in a pacific manner, through the adoption 
of legal rules. Apart from some exceptions, such as in Romania, law in general and 
constitutional law in particular was the instrument of revolutionary changes (A). 
As a result, the revised or newly adopted Constitutions had a common tendency 
to adopt traditional democratic principles developed by Western constitutional-
ism (B).
A.  The constitutional decision- making process as an instrument of 
transition to democracy
During the late 1980s, in Central Eastern Europe, the constitutional decision- 
making process reflected a specific – peaceful – dynamic, very different from the 
logic of conflict that existed in some post- Soviet States, such as Russia.
Such a peaceful dynamic took place in most of the countries, as the transi-
tion was the result of negotiation and compromise. It was the case in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Hungary and Bulgaria where Round Table talks were 
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held to discuss the transitional steps (see Elster 1996). In 1989, the Round Table 
agreements in Poland and Hungary enabled a smooth transition, without political 
chaos, as they were the results of negotiations between the Communist govern-
ment and the oppositionist forces. They set up the agenda for democratic elections 
but also for the constitution- making process.
In Poland, these negotiations started on February 6, 1989 and lasted until April 
5, 1989. The April agreement decided several important political changes. First, 
the Sejm would be dissolved and new elections would be held in June 1989. Sec-
ondly, a second chamber of Parliament, called the Senate, as well as a powerful 
presidential institution would be created. On April 7, 1989, the ‘April Amendment’ 
began to transform the structure of the government. Several other Acts amending 
the 1952 Constitution followed it, that were no longer based on compromise and 
that introduced the new foundations of the Polish constitutional order. But, at 
the same time, very early on, the decision was taken to replace the 1952 ‘Stalin-
ist’ Constitution by a new Constitution. Some constitutional preparatory works 
started in the fall of 1989, but were stopped in 1991. The majority of the MPs 
considered that the Parliament born from the 1989 elections (that were partially 
free according to the Round Table agreements4) has no legitimacy to adopt the 
new Fundamental Law and that this mission should be devolved to the new Par-
liament democratically elected in October 1991. Looking back to the first years of 
the Polish transition, the 1989 April Agreement was, according to Lech Garlicki 
and Zofia Garlicka (2010, 402), ‘the best example of a constitutional change that 
was closely related to the “peace negotiations” – that is, the Round Table talks’.
In Hungary, the political transition started in March 1989 when the Round Table 
of the Opposition (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal) was established, gathering all movements 
opposing the communist regime. Shortly afterwards, on June 10, 1989, the leaders 
of the Communist Party accepted to start political negotiations on a constitutional 
reform (Sonnevend et al., 2015, 39–40). And on June 13, 1989, the National Round 
Table (Nemzeti Kerekasztal) was established, gathering the participants of the Round 
Table of the Opposition, the representatives of the Communist Party and the mem-
bers of trade unions and civil society organization. Contrary to Poland, the deci-
sion was taken not to adopt a new Constitution but to amend the 1949 socialist 
Constitution. Such a choice could not only be explained by a fear to create a new 
constitution that had no connection with the communist regime, but also because it 
soon appeared that there was no consensus among the former opposition on a new 
Fundamental Law. As a result, Act XXXI of October 23, 1989 was adopted by the 
4 It was agreed that the opposition could gain no more than 35% of seats at the Sejm.
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Parliament, establishing a new constitutional order, based on the negotiations of the 
National Round Table, which agreed on the text of the 1989 constitutional reform 
on September 18, 1989. However, the 1949 amended Constitution was considered 
as a temporary Constitution. As in Poland, the Round Table talks opened the road 
to a smooth transition based on compromises.
Apart from their peacefulness, time and temporality seem to be a key point in 
transitional processes and in constitution- making processes. Whereas in Poland, 
a temporary Constitution was adopted in 1992 and in Hungary, the 1949 socialist 
Constitution was substantially amended, other States quickly adopted a new Con-
stitution (in 1991 in Romania or Bulgaria and in 1992 in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia). Often, especially when new constitutions emerged very rapidly, some 
solutions were mechanically imported from the Western experience, in the context 
of the general euphoria that accompanied the early 1990s. These constitutional 
transplants led sometimes to some severe difficulties, because of the gap existing 
between the domestic realities and the imported rules. As Bogdan Iancu explains, 
in Romania, if a few clear political options predetermined the broader features 
of the new fundamental law, ‘the many more technical decisions, including the 
crucial choices on the actual institutional settings and the checks- and- balances 
configuration, were the result of a rather haphazard form of bricolage, a jigsaw 
puzzle of Western constitutional templates’ (2015, 157).
In Hungary, the amended 1949 Constitution also seemed to be vulnerable. As the 
constitutional reform of 1989 was prepared within just a few months, the Hungarian 
Constitution contained some contradictions and inconsistencies. It became a sort 
of a ‘patchwork document’ (Arato et al. 2010, 369). In such a context, the Constitu-
tional Court that was established by the new Constitution developed a very activist 
attitude, becoming more than a simple guardian of the Constitution, rather a real 
constitution maker. At that time, the Chief Justice of the Court, Lászlo Sólyom, 
developed the theory of the ‘invisible constitution’, created by the Constitutional 
Court itself in order to formulate a coherent system (Sajó 1995, 253). The Consti-
tutional Court played to some extent a quite ambiguous role, sometimes usurping 
the constituent sovereignty belonging to the Parliament. The judicial activism of the 
Constitutional Court that was observed at the beginning of the Hungarian transition 
raised the question of the legitimacy of the Court in this very specific ‘constitution- 
making process’. And such a question was one of the arguments that the Orbán 
government used to support the idea of adopting a new Constitution in 2010.
The ‘long Polish way’ to the new Constitution was maybe a more adequate solu-
tion, because the legislature could identify some mistakes made at the beginning 
of the transformation. Indeed, in Poland, on April 23, 1992, the Constitutional Law 
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on the Procedure for Preparing and Enacting of the Constitution was adopted. It 
provided for the establishment of a constitutional committee composed of forty- 
six Sejm members and ten Senate members (Garlicki et al. 2010, 395). But as the 
constitution- making process appeared to be a heated debate between Parliament 
and the President, a ‘Small Constitution’ was adopted on October 17, 1992, as a 
temporary Constitution. This constitutional amendment set up the rules concern-
ing the legislative and executive branches, replacing most provisions of the 1989 
April Amendment and limiting the powers of the President of the Republic. After 
several years of debate – nearly eight years –, the full Constitution was finally 
adopted by referendum on May 25, 1997 and entered into force on October 17, 
1997. And this Constitution was regarded as ‘an instrument of stabilization and 
normalization’ (ibid, 410), that intends to last longer.
The constitution- making process is therefore a key element that needs to be 
taken into account for a better understanding of the democratization process and 
its further obstacles.
B.  The adoption of the standard Western liberal democratic model
Apart from the formal process, another important aspect is the content itself of 
the ‘new’ democratic Constitutions (either brand new or amended Constitutions). 
Their drafting was clearly a reaction against socialist constitutionalism and a move 
towards the Western European model of liberal democracy. As a reaction against 
the socialist regime, the new democracies (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Romania) adopted, in the late 1980s, the traditional democratic prin-
ciples developed by Western constitutionalism, i.e. the principle of separation of 
powers, guarantees of human rights and freedoms based on human dignity, rule 
of law, independence of the judiciary and political pluralism. As an example, the 
Hungarian Constitution of 1989–1990 included a new provision that stated: ‘The 
Republic of Hungary is an independent democratic constitutional state where all 
power belongs to the people’ (Article 2, Section (1) and (2)).
In such a context, the newly created Constitutional Courts played a great role 
by defining the new rules of State action and also by educating the stakeholders 
and the society through their interpretation of the constitutional principles. They 
had to explain how powers were to be shared and exercised in a democratic man-
ner, to define the role of new institutions such as the presidency or an independ-
ent judiciary and to settle conflicts of competence between the institutions. Such 
a regulatory role was particularly important at the beginning of the transition, 
when the final Constitutions were not yet adopted. As an example, in Poland, 
the principle of the separation of powers was not implemented by the April 1989 
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amendments. Therefore, the creation of the presidency was inconsistent with the 
still existing principle of the unity of state power. Also, the Sejm was still defined 
as the ‘highest organ of state authority’. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal had, 
therefore, to deal with inconsistencies within the Constitution.
Regulation of the past was also a major challenge of the transition. Most of 
the Constitutional Courts had to deal with the lustration issue as well as crimi-
nal prosecution of former communist officials responsible for crimes against the 
people. Ruling on the right to prosecute serious criminal offences not previously 
prosecuted for political reasons, the Hungarian Constitutional Court stated its 
famous theory according to which: ‘A State under the rule of law cannot be cre-
ated by undermining the rule of law’.5 As a consequence, the Court ruled that 
the law was unconstitutional. It held that in a constitutional state, the violation of 
rights can only be remedied by upholding the rule of the law. The legal system of 
a constitutional state cannot deprive anyone of legal guarantees. […] Justice and 
moral argument may, of course, motivate penal sanction, but its legal foundation 
must be constitutional.
During the transition period, Constitutional Courts had also to guarantee the 
enforcement of rights and freedoms. They played a crucial role, particularly when 
the Constitution was not completely amended. The Polish example is once more 
relevant, as the constitutional changes that followed the collapse of communism 
in 1989 did not contain changes to the existing framework of individual rights 
and freedoms. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Tribunal was able to enhance 
individual rights using the ‘rule of law’ principle. By guaranteeing freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly, fair trial and abolishing death penalty,6 the case law 
of the Constitutional Courts marked a clear departure from the socialist past.
Constitutional law also explicitly reflected the democratic aspirations of the 
Central Eastern countries and their will to ‘return to Europe’. Such an aspiration 
was clearly mentioned in the Preamble of the Constitution of the Czech Republic 
of 16 December 1992: ‘We, the citizens of the Czech Republic […], determined 
to build, protect and develop the Czech Republic in the spirit of the inalienable 
values of human dignity and freedom […] as a member of the family of European 
and world democracies…’ Whereas the socialist Constitutions focused on collec-
tive rights or social rights, the Western European tradition was centred around the 
definition of the status of the individual. As a result of this evolution, the concept 
5 Decision 11/1992, 5 March 1992, on the retroactive prosecution of serious criminal 
offences.
6 Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, n°23/1990.
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of human dignity, together with the concept of freedom, became an integral ele-
ment of political relations. The influence of the German Basic Law led to prohibi-
tions of any legal restrictions to the contents of these fundamental human rights.
The Constitutional Courts supported this Westernization or Europeaniza-
tion of domestic law. As the former Chairman of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, László Sólyom, pointed out, ‘the ideology of “Returning to Europe”’ after 
40 years was powerful’ (2015, 13). According to him, the Constitutional Court 
wanted to demonstrate that the country has not lost connections to Europe. At 
that time, there was no fear of losing national sovereignty or moving away from 
the national heritage. This is why the Hungarian Constitutional Court was able 
to introduce the European standards in its case law without facing political or 
popular scepticism or blame. A similar dynamic was observed in Poland, where 
the Constitutional Tribunal modernized the amended 1952 Constitution, us-
ing the European Convention on Human Rights (even before its ratification by 
Poland) and the case law of the Strasbourg’s Court. Apart from importing legal 
techniques borrowed from other European Courts or from the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Eastern European Constitutional Courts also imported 
ideas and specific interpretations of rights and freedoms. It is no secret that the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court imported from German constitutional law the 
right to human dignity (Dupré 2003), although ‘importing’ did not necessarily 
mean ‘imitating’.
At the same time, the Constitutional Courts encountered specific difficul-
ties while protecting social rights against the market economy policy. Applying 
the legal security principle, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was able to give 
a better protection to social rights. The Hungarian Constitutional Court did the 
same in 1995, when it annulled a governmental package of economic measures, 
interpreting social services as acquired rights.7 Its legal position was analysed as 
a way to protect welfare rights inherited from state socialism and was criticized 
for playing an ‘obstructionist role, preventing changes to the inherited welfare 
system’ (Sajó 1996, 31).
Therefore twenty- eight years after the collapse of the socialist regime, many 
questions arise, such as the following: how deeply these new constitutional provi-
sions, based on the individualistic approach and separation of powers, have taken 
root in the new democracies? To what extent were they really accepted and desired 
by the Eastern European populations? The answer to these questions could help 
us understand, at least to some extent, the scepticism towards liberal democracy 
7 Hungarian Constitutional Court, decision n°43/1995.
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which is growing in Eastern European countries and which is also reflected by 
constitutional law.
II.  Constitutional Law, as a mirror of the tribulations of 
democracy
Constitutional Law also mirrors the obstacles faced by new democracies. In-
ternational and European organizations have recently denounced a decline of 
democracy in Hungary and in Poland, countries that were so far considered as 
trendsetters. In this second part, we will argue that more than mirroring a back-
sliding of democracy, the recent crises in Eastern Europe mirror an identity cri-
sis and a disenchantment with the liberal constitutional democracy. This might 
be explained because, firstly, the Constitution is, in essence, a political or social 
pact (A) and secondly, because the post- communist Constitutions were strongly 
shaped by the European model which is currently facing an ontological crisis (B).
A.  The Constitution, at the crossroads of law and politics
Eastern European countries are facing a challenge that is common to all States. 
Being a political instrument and bearing a political worldview, the Constitution 
might be easily used and misused or abused by governments to reinforce their 
power. Such a phenomenon was recently observed in Hungary and in Poland 
where the Fidesz and PiS parties attempted to strengthen their power by amending 
the Constitution (in Hungary) or by an Act of Parliament on the Constitutional 
Court (in Poland), in order to diminish the role of the minority or the role of the 
guardian of the minority, i.e. the Constitutional Court.
In Hungary, the 2012 Constitution and the five packages of constitutional 
amendments adopted under Viktor Orbán’s government were criticized by Eu-
ropean and international experts for driving Hungary away from European de-
mocracy. Among these amendments, the Fourth amendment (adopted on March 
11, 2013) was the most controversial.8 Indeed the scope of the Fourth amendment 
is very broad: including, as examples, the protection of marriage, as the union of 
a man and a woman, and the family (article 1), the condemnation of the com-
8 According to the Venice Commission, ‘the Fourth Amendment perpetuates the prob-
lematic position of the President of the National Judicial Office, seriously undermines 
the possibilities of constitutional review in Hungary and endangers the constitutional 
system of checks and balances’. See CDL- AD(2013)012, Opinion n°720 / 2013 on the 
Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, June 17, 2013.32.
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munist past of Hungary (article 3), the recognition of churches (article 4), the 
limitation of the freedom of speech (article 5.2), or the role of the Constitutional 
Court (articles 12.1, 12.3, 17.1, 19).
In fact, most of the provisions which were introduced in the Fundamental Law 
by the Fourth Amendment had been previously annulled by the Constitutional 
Court: the Transitional Provisions about the possibility to reduce pensions of 
former communist leaders or about the suspension of the statute of limitations 
for crimes not prosecuted for political reasons in the communist regime had 
been annulled by decision 45/2012 (XII.29) AB; the narrow concept of a family 
enclosed in the Act on the Protection of Families had been annulled by deci-
sion 43/2012 (XII.20) AB; in its decision 6/2013 (III.1) AB, the Constitutional 
Court had decided, that on the ground of freedom of religion, Parliament cannot 
be authorized to grant church status; for twenty years, the Constitutional Court 
declared unconstitutional several laws that aimed to penalize hate speech. As a 
consequence, the long Fourth Amendment was analysed as the revenge of the 
Parliament and the Fidesz majority over the Constitutional Court. According to 
Attila Vincze, ‘the Parliament did everything in order to housetrain the formerly 
widely acknowledged Constitutional Court: cut back its powers, filled the bench 
with rather loyal justices and blocked the critical decisions’ (2014, 86). To give a 
full picture of this battle between the Parliament, acting as the Constituent power, 
and the Constitutional Court, the Hungarian context needs to be reviewed, as it 
is very specific.
In 2012, after the entry into force of the new Fundamental Law, the Constitu-
tional Court decided to exercise a substantive review of constitutional amend-
ment, without any legal basis to exercise such a competence. It established the 
rules of this substantive review in its 45/2012 decision, when it declared that the 
Transitory Provisions of the Basic Law were unconstitutional. Such a position by 
the Constitutional Court can be explained by the moral authority and charisma 
that the Court gained in the country during the transitional period in the 1990s. 
Once the new Fundamental Law was adopted in 2011, the Court continued to 
act as a constituent power. The former President of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, László Sólyom defended this approach, considering that Constitutional 
Courts can declare the unconstitutionality of some constitutional amendments, 
‘when amending the constitution runs the risk of altering the identity of the con-
stitution’ (2015, 28).
One might agree with such an approach, but it is not the only existing legal 
theory. One could also oppose this approach with the formal Kelsenian theory, 
according to which any amendment is valid if it has been adopted according to 
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the proper procedural rules. Nevertheless, if one agrees with this substantive ap-
proach of the Constitution based on its fundamental hard core, and if one agrees 
with the role of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the Constitution, one 
question remains open: who is the guardian of the guardian of the Constitution? 
What other institution might have legitimacy to override the decision adopted by 
the Constitutional Court, apart from the Sovereign himself, i.e. the constituent 
power? Such an answer refers to the famous doctrine of the ‘lit de justice’ devel-
oped in France by Dean Vedel.9
As a consequence, the Fourth Amendment might also be interpreted as a re-
action of the Sovereign against the guardian of the Constitution overstepping 
its boundaries. According to constitutional theory, the Constitution, being the 
political pact, is the work of the constituent power. And the Hungarian Sovereign 
was able to reverse the Constitutional Court’s decisions thanks to its absolute 
majority at the National Assembly, the Fidesz having 263 seats out of the 386. 
This also explains why the constituent power deprived the Court of the right to 
review the substance of constitutional amendments, according to new article 24.5 
of the Fundamental Law.
This being said, the main problem in the Hungarian context is not the fact that 
a supermajority was able to amend the Constitution. It lies in the abuse by this 
majority of its right to substantially transform the Constitution in order to get rid 
of the checks and balances and to gag the guardian of the Constitution. Indeed by 
creating ’procedural hurdles’ (Sonnevend et al. 2015, 60), the Rule of Law can be 
rendered fragile. The new provision of point 5 of the Closing and Miscellaneous 
Provisions of the Hungarian Fundamental Law, according to which the ‘Consti-
tutional Court rulings given prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law 
are hereby repealed’, is one example of such fragilization of the Guardian of the 
Constitution. To that extent, the polish situation leads to similar consequences: 
the weakening of the Constitutional Court and the violation of the separation of 
powers. But looking closer at the context helps understanding that the situation 
is very different in Poland where there is a harsh political conflict and a misun-
derstanding by the executive power of the meaning of Rule of Law. In Poland, 
contrary to Hungary, the executive and legislative branches tried to change the 
political system without changing the Constitution and without appealing to the 
constituent power.
9 Dean Vedel used this expression for the first time in his article ‘Schengen and Maas-
tricht’, RFD adm. 1992, 8 (2):173. Under the Ancien Régime, ‘Lit de justice’ referred 
initially to a particular formal session of the Parliament of Paris, under the presidency 
of the king.
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In Poland, the crisis started with the appointment of the ‘October judges’ and 
the refusal by the President of the Republic to accept their oath of office and this 
led to a severe constitutional crisis and stalemate. On December 3, 2015, the Con-
stitutional Court ruled that article 137 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of 
June 25, 2015 was a constitutional basis for the election of three judges (the ones 
replacing the judges whose term ended on November 6th), but was found uncon-
stitutional with respect to two judges whose term ended on December 2 and 8.10 
On December 9, 2015, the Constitutional Court reviewed the Act of November 19, 
2015 amending the Act on the Constitutional Court.11 It confirmed that the Sejm 
of 7th legislature was entitled to elect three judges, and the Sejm of 8th legislature 
only two judges. The Court also held that the challenged provision constitutes un-
authorized interference in the realm of the judiciary by the legislator and under-
mines the principle that the Constitutional Tribunal is independent of the other 
branches of government. A second Act amending the Act on the Constitutional 
Court was adopted by the Parliament and signed by the President on December 
28, 2015. According to the new Act, the Tribunal had to adjudicate in full bench 
as a general rule and was only competent to render judgments with a two- thirds 
majority. The Polish Constitutional Court replied by stating in a March 9, 2016 
decision that the Act of Parliament from December 2015 was unconstitutional.12
Though the European Commission launched the rule of law inquiry against 
Poland in January 12, 2016, the Polish Court is still in a stalemate, and at the heart 
of a severe political crisis. Since March 2016, it has functioned on the basis of the 
Act on the Constitutional Tribunal of June 2015. During this time, the judges 
have adopted more than 20 judgments concerning the compliance of various legal 
acts with the Constitution. Until August, none of them had been published.13 On 
July 30, 2016, President Duda signed a new Act on the Constitutional Court and 
on August 11, 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the Act was partially 
unconstitutional. The crisis is not over yet and is definitely rooted in a political 
struggle between the former majority and the newly re- elected PiS majority. As a 
consequence, the Rule of Law became, in Poland, a victim of a political struggle.
The Constitution lies at the crossroads of law and politics and cannot therefore 
avoid being a political document. This is why Constitutional Courts are often 
caught in political conflicts and their action is under scrutiny of the executive and 
10 Judgment n° K 34/15.
11 Judgment n° K 35/15.
12 Judgment n° K 47/15.
13 The constitutional crisis in Poland 2015–2016, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, 
2016. 34.
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legislative power. The balance of powers between the executive, the legislative and 
the Constitutional Court has to be maintained and pacified, otherwise the Rule of 
Law might be endangered. But the real question which has remained unanswered 
so far is why did the Hungarian people renew its confidence to the Fidesz party 
during the 2014 elections and why did the Polish people re- elect a PiS majority at 
Parliament in 2015, supporting the idea of illiberal democracy after twenty years 
of democratization?
B.  A matter of choice in terms of democratic models
Do the constitutional crises observed in Hungary and in Poland mirror a decline 
of democracy or disenchantment with a specific model of liberal democracy? 
Rather than a backsliding of democracy, they reflect a strong disappointment 
with the Europeanization process and a rejection of liberal democracy borrowed 
from Europe.
Regarding the Hungarian situation, the Venice Commission denounced the 
‘instrumental use of the Constitution’, considering that the ‘Constitution and 
ordinary politics need to be clearly separated because the Constitution is not part 
of the “political game”, but sets the rules for this game’.14 And in another opinion 
on Romania, the Commission stated that ‘the underlying idea may have been 
that the majority can do whatever it wants to do because it is the majority. This is 
obviously a misconception of democracy.’15 As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, de-
mocracy does not mean the tyranny of a majority. Nevertheless democracy is not 
at stake in Hungary, as there is a difference between the action of the Parliament, 
as ordinary legislator, and the action of the Parliament, as constituent power. The 
adoption of the 2013 constitutional changes was possible as the Fidesz party had 
in 2010 a ‘supermajority’ in Parliament, which is no longer the case since 2014. 
Therefore, what is currently at stake in the Hungarian constitutional context is 
rather the debate on the choice of democracy: liberal or not.
As we already pointed out, the Eastern European Constitutions that were 
adopted in the 90s have been tailored under the influence of Western constitu-
tionalism. At that time, the choice was made to adopt the European liberal model 
of democracy, which focuses on procedures and formal mechanisms, instead of 
14 CDL- AD(2013)012, Opinion n°720 / 2013 on the Fourth Amendment to the Funda-
mental Law of Hungary, June 17, 2013. 30.
15 CDL- AD(2012)026, Opinion n°685/2012 on the compatibility with Constitutional 
principles and the Rule of Law of actions taken by the Government and the Parliament 
of Romania in respect of other institutions, 17 December 2012. 16.
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promoting a substantive democracy based on social rights. According to Jiri Prib-
an, ‘the constitution- making process in the 1990s was heavily influenced by the 
political motivation to accede to the European Union’ (2006, 194). The accession 
negotiation took place simultaneously with the consolidation of the democratic 
changes. As being again united with Western Europe appeared to be the main pri-
ority for most Eastern European States, meeting the Copenhagen criteria became 
as well the only ‘game in town’. At that time the ‘democratic goal’ was superposed 
to the ‘EU accession goal’. National parliaments opted for a quite smooth integra-
tive process without much political debate. In the course of accession to the EU, 
the compliance with the EU pre- requirements and the harmonization of domestic 
laws with the EU legal framework was done without asking for people’s consent. 
Following the fall of communism, Eastern European countries had almost no time 
to reconstruct their national sovereignty; they were already engaged in a dynamics 
of building the supra- national sovereignty of the European Union.
Furthermore, the European integration played a neutralizing role regarding 
ethnical tensions and nationalist policies. If this influence had positive effects at 
the earlier stages of the transition, in a context of general euphoria based on the 
‘return to Europe’, it turned out to be less efficient once Euroscepticism gained 
importance. The impact of the economic recession and social disintegration be-
came one of the main drivers behind the political crises in Eastern Europe. As 
the European demos is not easy to find and define and did not really participate 
in the foundation of the European legal order, national identities resurfaced and 
nationalist rhetoric was instrumentalised by politicians.
The EU membership and the EU legal order supremacy on national legal orders 
also had some consequences on the content of the Constitutions and on consti-
tutional law. As in Western European States, Eastern European constitutions had 
to be amended in order to conform to European Union treaties or to ratify them. 
In Hungary, the Constitution was amended in 2003 to expressly allow Hungary 
to join the European Union (article 2A). In Poland, the 1997 Constitution did not 
refer to the European Union but contained a general provision recognizing the 
possibility for the State to delegate, by treaty, its sovereignty to an international 
organization or international institution (article 90.1). And though several Consti-
tutional Courts, such as the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, adopted an interpreta-
tion of domestic law ‘in a manner that is favourable to EU law’, the relationships 
between the EU legal order and the national legal orders also raised the question 
of constitutional pluralism with the threat of tensions and conflicts between the 
EU legal orders and national orders (Baudoin 2010). The Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal in its May 11, 2005 decision on the constitutionality of the Accession 
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Treaty highlighted such a possibility.16 The Constitutional Tribunal considered 
that the accession of Poland to the EU did not undermine the supremacy of the 
Constitution over the whole legal order. Being the supreme act and the expression 
of the Nation’s will, the Constitution would not lose its binding force even in a 
case of inconsistency with an EU norm. The Constitutional Tribunal pointed out 
very clearly that the concept and model of European Law created a new situation, 
wherein, within each Member State, ‘autonomous legal orders co- exist and are 
simultaneously operative’. As a consequence, the traditional concepts of monism 
and dualism regarding the relationship between domestic and international law 
failed to shed light on this new type of relationship. The existence of the relative 
autonomy of national and Community legal orders did not mean an absence of 
interaction between them.
The complex interaction between legal orders has not just been regulated by 
the judiciary and by Constitutional Courts. Some political answers have also been 
given, some of them radical, as the Brexit option in the United Kingdom, some 
of them less radical with the negotiation of ‘opt- outs’ from the EU Charter of 
Fundamental rights in the case of Poland and the Czech Republic. Generally 
speaking, within Europe, the Europeanization of State constitutions provoked 
a certain malaise that raised the question of the sovereignty of States and of the 
supremacy of domestic Fundamental Laws. The influence of EU Law combined 
with the ‘supervision’ by the Council of Europe organs, including the European 
Court of Human Rights or the Venice Commission, sometimes led to a certain 
form of protectionism through the Constitution.
The 2012 Hungarian Constitution is a good illustration of this type of pro-
tectionism. Its adoption gave birth to a rhetoric developed by Viktor Orbán and 
based on national values and on the promotion of illiberal democracy.17 By liberal 
democracy, the Hungarian Prime Minister denounced a specific ideology based 
on liberalism. Indeed Hungarian constitutional law is certainly less liberal, but 
it is not undemocratic. As explained by Catherine Dupré (2015, 353), ‘the Euro- 
constitutionalism is born out of a commitment to establish and enhance liberal 
democracy’. It is, therefore, a prescriptive doctrine and ideology that associates 
16 Judgment n° K 18/04.
17 In a famous speech of July 26, 2014, given at Băile Tuşnad, Viktor Orbán claimed: ‘[…] 
The Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs 
to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state that we 
are building is an illiberal state, a non- liberal state. It does not deny foundational values 
of liberalism, as freedom, etc. But it does not make this ideology a central element of 
state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead’.
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democracy with human rights. Legal theory teaches us to distinguish democracy 
and the Rule of Law. Democracy is based on the Nation’s will and votes; Rule of 
Law is based on the judiciary and the protection of Human Rights. If, ideally, one 
might expect that States are built on both pillars – democracy and the Rule of 
Law –, imposing a liberal democracy from above itself constitutes a breach of de-
mocracy and leads to a negative protectionist reaction that might be very danger-
ous. The Polish example illustrates such a move backwards. On January 19, 2016, 
Beata Szydło, the polish Prime Minister, stated during the debate in the European 
Parliament: ‘I think that Poland does not deserve to undergo examination by the 
European Commission because human rights are not violated, nor is the rule of 
law […]. We should deal with our Polish matters within our Polish boarders.’18
Isolationism is a major threat to European unity, but conversely the loss of 
national identity also represents a danger for European diversity. Democracy im-
plies respecting the will of the Nation. To what extent can European organizations 
impose on its Member States its ideological conception of democracy? Imposing 
liberal Democracy cannot be successful without the Nation’s consent… at least if 
the European Union and the Council of Europe intend to play by the same rules, 
i.e. democratic rules.
Conclusion
Since the 1980s and the collapse of communism, Central Eastern European coun-
tries have gone a long way towards democracy. As any other State, their con-
stitutional law reflected steps forwards as well as steps backwards. Being at the 
crossroads of Law and Politics, the Constitution is a fragile compromise, always 
under the threat of an instrumentalisation by the executive or legislative power. 
The current constitutional and political tensions that are ongoing in Eastern Eu-
rope do not reflect the failure of the transition to democracy or a regression of 
democracy. They reflect the conflicting conceptions of what democracy is and 
also illustrates the fact that democracy entails a permanent struggle to make it a 
living reality.
This article did not intend to assess the quality of democracy in Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, nor in Europe in general. Legal theory does not have the mis-
sion to assess democracy, nor to prescribe what the right type of political regime 
is. Lawyers have the duty to shed light on the epistemological framework. As 
such, there is no single approach to democracy, there are different approaches to 
18 January 19, 2016, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/plenary/
video?debate=1453218960960
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democracy, which are based on an ideological choice. Nevertheless, democracy 
implies one condition: the taking into account of the people’s voice. Observing 
the constitutional changes in Eastern Europe is a task rendered difficult when 
the only model of reference which is taken into account is the European one. 
Though there is surely a European constitutional heritage, based on principles 
and standards which are shared by European States, this heritage is based on the 
constitutional traditions of the States. The construction of the European Union 
or the Council of Europe is a dynamic that is legitimate as it is anchored in the 
States’ consent. Conversely, the supra- national organizations have no legitimacy to 
impose a chosen type of democracy on their member States. Adopting or amend-
ing a Constitution is an act of sovereignty. A Constitution is a political project that 
is born in a historical context and draws the future of a State, in other words, the 
Constitution reflects the State’s identity. A plug- and- play imposed Constitution, 
drafted according to the European standards, is, just as imposed democracy, as 
hazardous an option as being deaf to the people’s voice…
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György Gajduschek
‘The Opposite is True … as Well.’ Inconsistent 
Values and Attitudes in Hungarian Legal 
Culture: Empirical Evidence from and 
Speculation over Hungarian Survey Data
Abstract: Researchers working with survey data on legal culture in Hungary regularly 
encounter citizens’ highly inconsistent values and attitudes towards the legal system and 
its institutions. Three hypothetical explanations for these extreme inconsistencies are pro-
posed below, all of which refer to history: (1) The government and the public sphere were 
occupied by aliens (foreign suppressors) for five centuries. This has generated an especially 
high level of alienation from the public sphere and a sharp distinction between formal 
(theirs) and informal (ours) institutions. (2) Ideological components of previous regimes 
are typically unconsciously inculcated into citizens’ minds (e.g. via school education), and 
these ideologies are highly contradictory. (3) The legal order of transition has mostly been 
created on the basis of legal transplants, rather than via an organic historical evolution; 
thus neither tradition nor the social memory of successful problem- solving legitimizes 
these rules among citizens.
Introduction
This paper addresses certain specificities of Hungarian ‘legal culture’. The term 
‘legal culture’ is conceived in this paper as the general predisposition of the people 
in a society toward the ‘law’.1 Legal culture (and culture more generally) embraces 
cognitive, evaluative (moral) and affective elements. In another approach, using 
earlier scholarly concepts, namely the so- called Knowledge and Opinion about 
the Law studies (Podgorecki and Kurczewski 1974), legal culture is composed of 
1 It would be inappropriate and even impossible here to discuss the scholarly debates 
about the meaning and usefulness of the term. For instance, Cotterell (2013), quite 
harshly argues that legal culture is a vague and useless term as, most importantly, no 
modern society shares the same cultural elements. This paper, however, is based on 
the presumption that not only a country but a whole region, namely the Central and 
East European (CEE) region shares similar legal- cultural attributes. These similarities 
may stem from a common historical experience in the Habsburg Monarchy and under 
the Russian- Soviet rule. On a more general level, this region may be interpreted as one 
stack in between the West and the East as Jenő Szűcs (1983) described it.
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knowledge and opinions about the law including attitudes towards the law. ‘Legal 
culture’ is also used by comparative scholars to describe the overall characteristics 
of a country’s legal system, similar – in terms of the function of usage – to Rene 
David’s ‘legal systems’ or ‘legal styles’. (Zweigert and Kötz 1998, 67–68) Naturally, 
this way of understanding is very different from the one presented in this paper. 
However, the distinction offered by Friedman (1975, 193–222) between internal 
legal culture referring to the culture of the legal professionals (which is, presum-
ably, in a strong interactive relationship with the legal culture used by comparative 
legal scholars – the overall characteristics of the legal system) and external legal 
culture (that is the culture of the wider public) seems to be useful. This paper 
focuses on the latter. It is also necessary to emphasize that legal culture does not 
stand alone but it is strongly interrelated with other elements (e.g. political cul-
ture) and, finally, the general culture of a society.
The 1970s and 1980s were the heydays of empirical studies of Hungarian legal 
culture, or ‘legal consciousness’ according to the terminology of that time, char-
acterised by the work of two exceptional and internationally known scholars, 
Kálmán Kulcsár and András Sajó. The first two decades after 1990, however, may 
reasonably be pictured as a low tide in this research interest both in quantitative 
(the number of empirical research studies) and qualitative terms (e.g. no repre-
sentative survey had been carried out on the Hungarian population for about two 
decades). From a practical point of view, this is quite natural due to the process 
of transition, the uncertainty in and the devaluation of academic activities and 
the enormous changes in the legal system that provided sufficient practical work 
to keep lawyers occupied. On the other hand, the lack of this kind of research 
is quite frustrating as this period could have provided an exceptionally quasi- 
experimental arrangement for research in legal culture, with a dominant inde-
pendent variable: the transformed legal system.
In recent years, however, increasing interest can be detected. Quite a few sur-
veys have been administered to a representative sample of the Hungarian popu-
lation and other research activities, such as interviews, case studies have been 
carried out. Some of the findings have been already published. Perhaps the most 
important publication in this regard is a volume relying on a socio- psychological 
approach to law and containing fourteen well- elaborated studies (Hunyady and 
Berkics 2015). Most chapters address directly the topic of legal culture, based 
on intensive empirical research, including two questionnaire surveys on repre-
sentative samples of the adult Hungarian population and another survey on the 
population holding a university degree, half of them having a law degree (lawyers’ 
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sub- sample). The author of this chapter and his colleagues2 also worked with a 
questionnaire survey administered by Szonda- Ipsos on a representative sample 
of the Hungarian adult population carried out by personal interviews (CAPI) in 
2015, November. The empirical evidence presented below stems from these two 
research projects.
The problem: inconsistent values regarding law and legal 
culture
One of the recurrent findings of empirical research on Hungarian legal culture is 
that respondents tend to give highly contradictory answers to questions raised in 
various questionnaire surveys. On a more general level, people do not seem to have 
a relatively stable and/or consistent system of values regarding issues of the legal 
system. The most obvious example is provided by Berkics (Berkics 2015, 144–47), 
who found that 75% of the respondents of the population sample and 66% of the 
university sample (!) agreed with both of the following statements: ‘Certain hu-
man rights must not be denied anyone irrespective of their behaviour’ and ‘Only 
those who fulfil their obligations should have rights’. These questions were raised 
at distant points of the questionnaire. At another point of the questionnaire, the 
two very similarly phrased but clearly contradicting statements (‘It is better to 
acquit a hundred guilty then to sentence one innocent person’ and ‘It is better 
to sentence an innocent person than to acquit one who is guilty’) were raised in 
the very same question set. In this case, 7% of the total population and 6% of the 
university sample agreed with both statements, whereas 36% and 22% agreed with 
neither of them – indicating the lack of a steady view on this simple and basic issue 
(aside from the 9% and 6% of those who expressed that they could not answer the 
question). Similar contradictions were detected by most research projects in the 
field. For instance, Krekó (2015), when analysing the causes of distrust towards 
the legal order, generally identifies three major types of attitudes in the Hungar-
ian society. The first one may be translated as the ‘traditional- national- resistance’ 
attitude. This attitude that seems to be most widely present in the Hungarian 
society may be described as genuine distrust towards the government and the law, 
the latter being conceived as a product of the government. Krekó explains this as 
a heritage of times when the country was ruled, its government held by foreign 
powers, ‘the Turks, Habsburgs, and the Soviets’ (422). In this frame, legal norms 
2 Zsolt Boda, Balázs Fekete, György Gajduschek, István H. Szilágyi, Péter Róbert, the 
team of the research project (OTKA 105552) on the Legal Culture of the Hungarian 
Population – A Theoretical and Empirical Study.
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are to be neglected or evaded whenever possible. Doing so is not simply a utility 
maximizing behavior or a necessity for individual success, but in a way it is also a 
heroic or at least a positive, patriotic act. The second attitude was named as ‘respect 
for rule of law’ referring to the agreement with such statements as ‘laws represent 
the public interest’, ‘laws safeguard everyone’s interest equally’, ‘the government 
effectively regulates and thus makes our life easier’ etc. One may reasonably expect 
that if these two views are present in a society, they are expressed by different social 
groups or strata. Some approach law as a hostile phenomenon to be handled with 
neglect and resistance, whereas others believe that law must be accepted, respected 
and followed. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, both attitudes are 
detected within a large portion of the same respondents.
Berkics also asked for a set of five responses based on contradictory state-
ments – e.g. ‘laws must be followed even if the result is against the majority will’ 
vs. ‘the will of the people trumps even the laws’ or ‘leaders should not break the law 
even if they try to serve justice’ vs. ‘if a leader tries to serve justice it is acceptable 
if s/he breaks the law’ and three others, including the above- mentioned questions 
(about acquitting guilty and innocent and if right should be assured only if obliga-
tions fulfilled) now set explicitly into contradicting pairs. The respondents had to 
position themselves between these pairs of statements. Berkics ran a factor analy-
sis to identify deeper values that direct respondents in their answers to specific 
questions. Based on previous international research he expected two main factors 
that may be identified roughly with Weber’s distinction between the formal and 
substantial rationality of law (Weber and Roth 1978, 656–57). However, Berkics 
did not observe these two or any other meaningful factors.3
Several other findings that reveal an extremely high level of inconsistency of 
values and attitudes referring to the law could be enlisted from this book. Our 
survey results reinforce the findings of the above- mentioned publications. Fac-
tor analysis that, as the international academic literature argues, provides robust 
factors depicting a certain consistent set of general values and attitudes towards 
the law yields no such results in Hungary. We applied an eight- question set used 
in a previous study. (Gibson and Caldeira 1996) The authors of that comparative 
study, which was carried out in countries of the EU 15 (at that time predominantly 
West- European countries), reported that they identified the factors of those three 
variables that they originally intended to measure. When we repeated this exercise, 
3 The KMO value was 0.489, and if one factor was generated, that could explain only 
25% of the total variance.
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we could not identify the expected factors, or any other factor set that could be 
meaningfully interpreted.
Seemingly we face a society without clear and coherent values towards the 
legal system. This is not to argue that the society is polarised on certain issues; 
i.e. different social groups follow contradicting values, which is quite typical in 
most modern societies. It is the individuals who – in a kind of schizophrenic 
manner – do not have a relatively consistent set of values; therefore, their answers 
are highly volatile; further, they react to the same question differently in a slightly 
different context, or they simply provide contradicting answers.
Another attribute that may be related to the above is the sharp contrast between 
values revealed by respondents in a questionnaire and the actual behaviour de-
tected on the aggregate level of the society. For instance, as World Value Survey 
shows, Hungarians are quite high on condemning tax evasion. The Hungarian 
response rate is higher than those of the UK or Germany and roughly equal to 
the US. Nonetheless, almost everyone who can do so evades tax payment (Boda 
and Bartha 2016). A similar discrepancy was detected in our survey. A question 
asked what people should do if the Parliament adopts a law that people feel unfair. 
Sixty percent of the respondents answered that people should publicly protest 
against that law. This answer is in some contrast with the fact that 92% said they 
have never participated in any public protest.4
Taking all these into account, three potential, hypothetical explanations for 
these findings may be proposed. For this purpose history as such will be used 
as a reference point, as the culture of a group is frequently understood as an 
upshot of previous events, an outcome of unconscious learning processes.5 The 
4 Of course, if there has never been an unfair law adopted then there is no discrepancy.
 During the pilot of the survey, the author carried out about a dozen interviews contain-
ing this question, in a town some 50 kilometres from Budapest, mostly with respond-
ents with secondary education or below. It was quite typical that respondents said 
something like ‘naturally, they should protest’ and refused such alternative that ‘they 
should try to silently neglect’ the law. When, however, around the end of the interview, 
the question regarding participation in public protest was raised, the same respondents 
said ‘No’, accompanied by mimics and gestures telling that ‘I am not such a person / I 
am not a troublemaker.’
5 Strangely, this view appears most lucidly in the work of Schein, the leading scholar of 
organizational culture, who explains the phenomenon solely from the history of the 
organization (Schein 2010). Among historians, Arnold Toynbee expressed this view 
most characteristically (Toynbee and Somervell 1987). Though Toynbee has been criti-
cised for several reasons (Hughes- Warrington 2008), his challenge- response approach 
to history is still accepted and widely applied. Furthermore, as Posner explains, the 
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three hypothetical explanations differ in their time span. The first refers to a half- 
millennium- long historical experience, which is a common experience of most of 
CEE countries. The second is based on a somewhat shorter, about a century- long, 
historical overview, whereas the third refers most of all to the experience of the 
transition.
Proposed explanation 1: Long- term historical experience: 
‘The public’ as an alien field
Since the early ages of European civilization, the relationship between ‘power- 
holders’, the ‘elite’ or the ‘establishment’, and society at large has always been am-
biguous (Dahrendorf 1990). Their power has always been challenged by some, 
whereas strong legitimizing ideologies, shared by the majority or at least a large 
part of society have always been present. It is also clear that there is a certain 
cultural divide between the upper and lower strata of all societies. (Bourdieu 
and Johnson 1993; Rouse 2005) The culture of the lower strata may be a cause of 
hostility towards the elite. However, the very same culture, surreptitiously influ-
enced by the elite, may also contain unreflected elements that reinforce (legiti-
mise in a sociological way) the position of power- holders.6 In Western societies 
this – undoubtedly ambiguous – relationship between the elite and the masses 
has typically been an internal affair in the given society. The Hungarians, and 
for that matter most of the CEE countries, have a different historical experience. 
In these countries, for about half a millennium, the tension between the power- 
holders and subjects was not an internal social issue and, was not ambiguous in 
that sense either.
In most of the cases, rulers of various CEE countries were ‘aliens’, in all respect. 
Hungary, for instance, was occupied by the Turks after the 1526 battle at Mohács 
development of moral ideas relevant to the law may also be explained this way. (Posner 
2002) (An excellent summary of the challenge- response theory for the legal systems 
is provided by Jakab (2016).
 The view of ‘historical learning’ theory also explains the change in culture (as an out-
come of historical change), and at the same time, the persistence of several cultural 
features, as this learning is unconscious, similar to the socialization of children in their 
early years on an individual level. Both of them function as mechanisms to regulate 
human behaviour effectively and steadily.
6 This idea appears in Gramsci’s writings (Gramsci, Nowell- Smith, and Hoare 1971, 
206–76) and his idea of cultural hegemony; or from a perfectly different perspec-
tive, this is also Foucault’s central idea regarding the relationship between power and 
knowledge. See on this: (Schulzke 2016).
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was lost, the battle that is still a symbol of national tragedy. The basic facts: Turks 
spoke the Turkish language in Hungary; they were Muslims in a Christian country 
in an age, when religion played a central role in peoples’ lives. They were alien in 
all respects. Turks ran their own administrative- governmental system, collected 
taxes and ruled the country. The Turks were ousted by the Habsburg army. Hab-
sburgs spoke German and used German as an official language of administration 
and government. Habsburgs were Roman Catholics in Hungary, which at that 
time was predominantly Lutheran, and soon started a cruel re- Catholicization 
campaign. Habsburgs ruled Hungary for more than two centuries. Later, Russian- 
Soviet rule came from the East in a country that tended to follow Western models; 
Soviets required atheism in a still relatively religious country and the Russian 
language was the obligatory foreign language in schools, where, for most people, 
the second language was German.
In brief, rulers were aliens, or rather the enemies of the country / the nation / 
the ‘people of Hungary’ as they got into power by force, by occupying the country. 
It is not that the government and government elite was ’alienated from the masses’, 
to use the Marxist terminology; they were indeed aliens. As these rulers created 
their own governmental system, they practically occupied the centre of the public 
sphere, too. There appears a sharp distinction between US and THEM, which is 
otherwise a typical distinction in all human communities (Allport 1979). It is also 
usual that this distinction appears between the masses and the elite, as we know 
from sociology or the conflict theory from Marx to Dahrendorf. However, in the 
case of Hungary (and the region) the US and THEM divide sharply separates 
‘those in the public sphere’ from ‘us in the private sphere’. The public is not ours; 
the public is alien.
This distinction also divides the formal and informal,7 the ‘system’ and the ‘life-
world’ as Habermas uses the latter term. (Habermas 1985) There appears an un-
bridgeable abyss between people living their everyday lives and the public sphere, 
with special regard to the government. There is a different set of values and beliefs 
7 On the distinction between formal and informal institutions see: (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004) On the dominance of informal over formal in the everyday practice of CEE societies 
see for instance: (Dimitrova 2010); more explicitly: (Gajduschek 2012). More generally, 
(Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998) indicate that transition countries fail to build stable formal 
institutions. All these items, however, refer to the transition setting of post- communist 
countries. Inability to build formal institutions may stem either from the heritage of the 
communist regime or the chaotic situation of transition. However, I argue here that the 
inability to create formal institutions that are backed by the majority of the society and 
able to coordinate social behaviour is a much more chronic feature of these societies.
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about THEM and US. The communication between the two – at least honest and 
effective communication – is impossible.8 But those aliens running the government, 
controlling the public sphere and setting up the formal institutions have the power.
Historical analyses could best support the above statement. Identifying relevant 
studies, especially ones that are available in English, requires further research. 
Jenő Szűcs’s famous piece (1983) could be a highly relevant item in this regard. 
Another, internationally less known, though in Hungary highly appreciated author 
is István Bibó, who in fact could be quoted with regard to all three hypotheses. 
Bibó’s starting point in analysing the – distorted – political culture in the region 
is also the fact that ‘…East European nations were always overshadowed by alien, 
rootless state powers…’ (Bibó and Dénes 2015, 149). Bibó explains from this fact 
hysterical social reactions and the readiness to accept symbolic political solu-
tions instead of real ones, most importantly the openness to an extreme form of 
nationalism. Nevertheless, on a more general level, Bibó’s conclusion is similar: 
CEE nations had no chance to form and practice their own political community 
deciding public issues and carrying out public decisions jointly; a feeling that deci-
sions made in the political sphere, and formal institutions created by US indeed 
serve OUR interest, is expressed in the following excerpt:
[The] nations in this region lacked what was self- evidently, clearly, circumscribably, 
and graspably present in both the reality and the consciousnesses of West European 
communities— the reality of their own national and state frameworks, their capital cities, 
their being politically and economically accustomed to one another, a single social elite, 
etc. (Bibó and Dénes 2015, 149).
In the CEE countries, where US and THEM, the private and public is so distinct, 
ordinary people try to avoid any relationship with the public sphere, politics, 
or the government. As this is not possible, people need to pretend, to hide their 
real thoughts and feelings. There must be a set of fake values, statements to be 
presented if one meets THEM in formal situations.
There are at least two logical consequences of this reconstruction of typical 
habits of average Hungarians. First, from an ontological point of view, they could 
not form a relatively stable and consistent set of approaches to public issues (like 
 Still, further research is needed to identify academic works that address the issue of the 
sharp divide between formal and informal social institutions in a long- term historical 
context in the region.
8 In contrast to Offe’s theory, according to which late capitalist societies are based on mass 
loyalty building rather that real legitimacy, i.e. the elite uses dishonest communication 
towards the masses (PR, marketing techniques), in this case, the masses also systemati-
cally use dishonest communication towards the representatives of the government.
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the law or government) because they could not have knowledge and experience 
about the public, as that was occupied by others, moreover, by aliens. It has been an 
unknown, dangerous territory for ordinary Hungarians for five centuries. Second, 
from an epistemological or methodological point of view, the survey situation 
presumably brings out the formal, pretended set of values from some or most of 
the respondents. A stranger, usually a formally dressed person, asks strange and 
strangely formulated questions and makes notes on the answers, quite similar to 
a government official. This may activate the respondents ‘OUR answer to THEM’ 
communication mode, while she desperately strives to provide the appropriate an-
swer, though – of course – she cannot be sure what the right answer to THEM is.9
Proposed explanation 2: Mid- term historical experience: The 
footprint of regimes in the minds of the people
Six different political regimes have dominated in Hungary in the past century, as 
shown in the figure below, with two short periods omitted: the few months of com-
munist revolution in 1918 and the few years of relative, Western- style democracy 
(in the shadow of the Soviet army) between 1945–1947.
9 Naturally, the problem of distorted communication, i.e. that the interviewee attempts 
to provide answers that she thinks the interviewer is satisfied with, or at least does 
not offend her, stems from human nature and is a general phenomenon discussed by 
basic social science methodology books. (Babbie 2013, 262–64) I argue here that in 
Hungary the motivation of the respondent in a typical survey situation is different that 
leads to higher level of distortion and potentially a different type of distortion as well. 
See, for instance, the above- quoted example on the extreme difference between actual 
behaviour and pledged values about taxes.
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There are some similarities among most of these regimes. The most obvious, though 
paradoxical, similarity is that their legitimizing ideology was always founded on the 
harsh denial of the previous one. It is self- evident in the case of the two communist 
periods. The Horthy- regime established a strong anti- communist narrative and ide-
ology, while it also refused the legacy of the Habsburg Monarchy and the monarch. 
The subsequent communist rule during the post- World War II era condemned the 
Horthy regime as a fascist and deviant one in all respects. The new liberal consti-
tutional arrangement in 1990 was designed as a perfect opposite of the communist 
political setting with an extremely diluted executive power, with a Constitutional 
Court among the world’s strongest, with four separate ombudsmen, with practically 
uncontrolled municipalities and judiciary, and with an extreme level of protection of 
fundamental rights,10 etc. Finally, the Orbán regime refused most of the values of the 
previous regime, evaluated the 1990–2010 period as a chaotic era and proclaimed a 
so- called illiberal democracy that denies most of the values on which the political- 
legal system was based (e.g. checks and balances) in the previous two decades.
Most of these regimes, except for the 1990–2010 period, had authoritarian 
features or had a totalitarian nature. The legitimacy of each regime was mostly 
not based on free elections, on a democratic arrangement, or on a high level of 
welfare for the people. Instead, these regimes relied on actively spread ideologies 
that proclaimed the superiority of the given regime in various respects and served 
as major legitimizing forces. (Haugaard 2000) These ideologies were broadcast 
in print and later in electronic media (mostly or completely controlled by the 
government), but also in several other ways, for instance, through centrally cre-
ated pseudo- civic organizations (GONGOs) and, in certain periods, the Church 
actively cooperated with the government, too. Most importantly, schools were 
crucial channels for disseminating ideology. Education is especially effective, as in 
the early age of human life influences are more easily accepted (especially if they 
come from respected persons, like teachers) and thus may influence belief- systems 
unconsciously, and in that way most effectively. Naturally, young people, not in-
fected by the ideology of the previous regimes, are also more open to these ideas.
One may reasonably expect that the parents at home may correct or balance 
the propaganda conveyed to their children in the school. However, parents take 
substantial risk doing this,11 as children may not understand that they cannot 
10 For example, the President of the Constitutional Court, later the President of the Re-
public publicly rebuked the US and the UK government for insufficient protection of 
freedom of information.
11 E.g. the statement that communism was good in 1944, or bad in 1949, just five years 
later, may turn out to be lethal.
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say in public what they hear at home, or even if they understand, they may not 
be able to keep that secret, or they may not even realise that they have disclosed 
something that should be kept secret. This fact prevents most parents from sharing 
their views with their children, where those views differ from the official ideol-
ogy. Still, children may meet some different views, especially if, as is frequently 
the case, the teacher herself does not believe what she needs to teach. A few years 
later the same child may learn that his parents’ real views and also other people’s 
views are sharply different from the official ideology. (This, in turn, could aggra-
vate the sharp divide between the US/informal life – the THEM/formal, official 
sphere.) Still, certain fragments of this ideology, especially the ones that were not 
challenged directly by other, more convincing views, are presumably still there, 
existing silently and unconsciously in people’s belief systems. These fragments 
may be activated by an external event. Let us add that allegedly the belief system 
of the parents and the peers have been formed in a similar process; i.e., they are 
already chaotic.
The end- result is that footprints of official ideologies have continuously been 
present in citizens’ mind. However, these ideologies have been inherently contra-
dicting. As they were inculcated in an unconscious and unreflective manner, the 
contradictions do not cause mental problems in everyday life. Especially, as eve-
ryday life normally does not and should not systematically activate values that are 
related to the formal political world, where law belongs to. Nevertheless, the end 
result of this mindset is what researchers may detect as legal culture in a survey.
Proposed explanation 3: The problem of legal transplants
The communist regime adopted the Soviet legal system without much adaptation 
(Ajani 1995). The transition introduced within a year a brand new legal system, 
designed mostly by law professors borrowing solutions from foreign political and 
legal systems, predominantly from the U.S. and West- Germany. These professors, 
who typically spent their whole lives in an academic (i.e. highly atypical) envi-
ronment, far away from the life of ordinary people, picked up the best pieces of 
legal institutions – the best ones from the aspect of legal doctrine, not of real life.
The idea that laws should not and cannot be too distinct from the Volksgeist, 
or as we would call it today, national culture, is attributed to Savigny (von Savigny 
1828). The problem of legal transplants, the questionable nature of the import of 
formal legal rules from other countries and allegedly from other social, cultural, 
political, etc. circumstances, as a research topic, is relatively new (Legrand 1997; 
Legrand 2001; Watson 1974). Unfortunately, not much research was done dur-
ing the 1990s to test the social embeddedness of the completely new legal system 
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which was introduced (exchanging the socialist legal system). Evidently, it was 
either the socialist legal system before 1990 or the rule of law introduced in 1990 
or both of them that did not fit the Volksgeist of Hungarians.12
Legal transplants bring in solutions that have no roots in national culture. 
Consequently, these legal systems, per se, will not have the backing of the belief 
and value system of the country. Furthermore, the evolution of legal systems, as 
indicated above, is frequently conceived as a result of a historical learning process 
of challenges and trial- error type answers where the successful solutions have 
been petrified into law. These laws may be legitimised by a nation’s historical 
memory (of being solutions to real problems) and also with the age and maturity 
(with which laws became quasi- customs). Legal transplants do not have any of 
these qualities.
Conclusion
Three potential reasons have been submitted in this brief paper that may properly 
explain the extremely inconsistent, contradictory values and attitudes regard-
ing the law in Hungary. Solely hypotheses have been formulated here. Perhaps 
there is no need to support the factuality of the three historical statements with 
much evidence. However, the suggested relationship between history and legal 
culture requires more research and much more evidence to achieve the status of 
a scholarly statement instead of a mere hypothesis. Further research is needed 
to establish this logical and empirical relationship or to falsify it. This is a major 
methodological challenge since typical social science methods (e.g. questionnaire 
surveys) do not seem appropriate to find evidence in this regard. Most likely, 
unstructured interviews or psychological experiments may be appropriate means 
to test the second and third hypotheses, whereas the first one may be too general 
to be operationalised.
Furthermore, one may also raise the question how the three proposed effects 
influence one another, i.e. whether they have an intertwined impact on legal cul-
ture.
Last but not least, not only the influence of independent variables is in question 
but the interpretation of the dependent one as well: are the inconsistencies we 
faced in the questionnaire surveys indeed extreme? Possibly the Hungarian legal 
professional’s expectations are too (or unrealistically) high, and the consistency 
12 As several research reports, including studies in Hunyady and Berkics (2015) and Giczi 
and Sik (2009), suggest the third presumption is most likely right, though the socialist 
law may have been somewhat closer to the Hungarian Volksgeist.
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of Hungarian peoples’ legal consciousness is not significantly worse than that of 
other nations. Possibly people in Western countries have similarly inconsistent 
ideas about law as well. Luckily, it is relatively easy to test this issue by asking the 
same survey questions in a few Western countries.
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Maciej Dybowski
Transition to Democracy and Determinacy of 
Legal Concepts.  
A Brandomian Semantics View
Abstract: The content of legal concepts as applied by legal professionals is highly debatable 
as far their determinacy is concerned. It requires particular attention if additional circum-
stances occur in a given discursive practice, i.e., the practice of using concepts. Political, 
economic and cultural changes, all of which have to do with transition, have an impact 
on any discursive practice. Assuming that legal discursive practice forms part of universal 
discursive practice, the subjects of analysis are those legal concepts which have remained 
in legal practice throughout a given political transformation. This is illustrated by the use 
of the legal term ‘freedom of conscience and religion’. This analysis is built on the model of 
responsibility for the content inherited from past users, and responsibility towards future 
users, based on Brandom’s inferential semantics.
Introduction
Transition, as applied to legal matters, is a broad and interdisciplinary concept. 
Here it is applied as referring to the changes involved in a democratic transition, 
taking place in a legal system under circumstances which occur in the political, 
economic and cultural setting of that system. Intuitively, from the recent histori-
cal perspective of Central and Eastern Europe, a transition can be understood as 
‘an interval between two political regimes, such as a period between the fall of an 
old, undemocratic regime and the consolidation of a new, democratic political 
system’ (Maldini 2007, 7). During such a period, many transformation processes 
usually take place. This paper is concerned with only one of them: the legal trans-
formation. A useful point of view from which one could grasp what happens in 
the functioning of a legal system undergoing transition can be provided by the 
model of what institutional legal practitioners – and judges in particular – do 
when they use legal concepts (which is what I believe to be constitutive of law as 
practice). First, I will introduce the philosophical terminology applied; second, I 
will provide some illustrations of what I have in mind, taken from Polish legal 
history as revealed through case- law; and third, I will try to put the model to work 
in an account of what happens to legal concepts in periods of transition.
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Concept Determinacy in Law
Law is essentially articulated as a discursive practice, i.e., the practice of using 
concepts. This claim and the account that follows is inspired by characteristics of 
universal discursive practice introduced and developed in the writings of Robert 
B. Brandom. I attempt to refine it with regard to similarities and dissimilari-
ties between general practice and legal discursive practices. I follow Brandom in 
holding that expressions come to mean what they mean by being used as they 
are in practice (…). Content is understood in terms of proprieties of inferences, 
and those are understood in terms of the norm- instituting attitudes of taking or 
treating moves as appropriate or inappropriate in practice. (Brandom 1994, 134)
Accordingly, if one wants to understand what concepts – legal concepts includ-
ed – are, or if one seeks to establish the contents of intentional states and expres-
sions employed in legal practice (that practice being part of a universal practice 
of deploying concepts), one is in need of a pragmatic theory of that practice. One 
needs to take a theoretical route from what participants of discursive legal practice 
do to what they mean, rather than the other way ‘round. The explanatory strategy 
adopted here leads from pragmatics to semantics.1
What people do in order to express, and hence to understand, themselves and 
one another is – according to Brandomian inferential semantics – treating some 
inferences as materially correct. This approach to semantics seems to underline 
the essential rationality of humans. According to Brandom, ‘what is distinctive 
about the conceptual is its specifically inferential articulation’. An application of 
a concept ‘must be available as a premise for drawing further conclusions, and be 
liable to challenge by inferences from premises with incompatible consequences.’ 
(Brandom 2009, 184).
In the big inferentialist picture, both our beliefs and our actions have specific 
propositional contents: they are about something, and in that sense they are inten-
tional. But our beliefs and actions also have a normative dimension as far as they 
can be ascribed to agents and believers, either correctly or incorrectly. The moves 
in the game of applying concepts must follow the criteria of appropriateness.2
1 Alternative, and traditional, accounts of expressions’ meanings would ascribe primacy 
to semantics. This may be the case in artificial languages, but not in natural ones. For 
more criticism of the traditional account of semantics, see Brandom 1994.
2 Unlike later Wittgenstein who introduced the game- based account of linguistic prac-
tices, Brandom does not share his ultimate scepticism stemming from the possibility of 
infinite number of different language games. On the contrary, he believes that language 
does have a downtown, or that there are certain core practices, such as asserting which 
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Normativity and propositional content — and, respectively, the pragmatics of 
normative statuses (such as commitment and entitlement) instituted by practical 
attitudes, and the semantics of intentional content — turn out to be two sides of 
the same story. Semantics, however, is founded on pragmatics, because, for Bran-
dom, it is eventually the conditions for correct material inferences that function as 
semantic primitives. Judging the correctness of propositionally contentful actions 
and beliefs can be described by the model of ‘deontic score- keeping’ – keeping 
track of one’s own and others’ commitments – developed in Making It Explicit. By 
using concepts, participants of discursive practice adopt discursive commitments 
for specific conceptual contents. Such commitments result in the entitlements of 
other participants to verify them and demand justification (see Brandom 1994, 
172). In standard cases, commitments are inherited from premises, because be-
ing committed to premises in material inferences leads to being committed to 
conclusions. Being committed to certain contents may exclude commitments to 
other contents. Public acts of speech or actions are treated as assertions by those 
who can assess their inferential significance in the light of their own discursive 
commitments. Assertions can be supplemented by other acts of speech such as 
deferral, disavowal, query or challenge. Such discursive moves are normative 
precisely because they produce the normative statuses of those who participate 
in discursive practice; not because of some antecedent rules.
Law fits into this broadly inferentialist picture of semantics, if one considers 
as essential several characteristics of what legal practitioners do when they use 
legal concepts (e.g., ‘freedom of conscience’): when they engage in legal discursive 
practice (LDP). To animate our thoughts on what happens to legal concepts in a 
legal system under transition, I will endorse some general ideas concerning the 
relationship between any autonomous discursive practice in a natural language 
(ADP), which can be characterised as above, and an LDP functioning within 
such an ADP.
The first idea is the rejection of methodological scepticism concerning the 
possibility of identifying central cases of linguistic moves in LDP. The practice of 
deploying legal concepts in anything that assumes the name of law in our socie-
ties is a language game with a downtown. Marginal or exceptional uses of legal 
concepts can be conceived of only if it is assumed that there are some discursive 
skills or abilities that are conditiones sine qua non for LDP to occur.
make a general pragmatist account of language possible. Justification or the attribution 
of responsibility for Wittgenstein could be just another language game, whereas for 
Brandom it is implicit in natural language discursive practice.
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The second idea is that there have to be some competent participants of LDP 
whose discursive skills and abilities extend in some respect beyond those of any 
participant of ADP; such an extension assumes that the skills and abilities exer-
cised by those who can use a natural language are necessary (but not sufficient) 
to engage in LDP in that natural language. It is adequate to assume that such 
practitioners hold certain institutional positions in given legal systems and have 
a special role to play in LDP. Legislatures, administrative bodies, courts, solicitors, 
counsels, prosecutors, and so on, are all institutional users in the sense that their 
discursive moves in that practice count only in so far as they take place when such 
users act in their official, status- related, capacity.
The third idea is that practitioners are reasonable in LDP, just as they are in 
ADP. This may seem trivial, but the ability to act on reasons is presumed when 
acting on specifically legal reasons. LDP is built on the ability to use legal concepts 
in order to form beliefs and/or actions which can be treated by other participants 
of that LPD as having determinate content. One can easily associate law with LDP, 
since it is inconceivable without linguistic utterances of different kinds, legal rules 
or norms having pride of place among them. However, if law is reduced to such 
utterances, we are left with a distorted and unconvincing picture, according to 
which people lawfully act or abstain from acting, ultimately, in virtue of utter-
ances, which is as unconvincing as an alternative image, wherein people perform 
such acts under threat. The central case of human action is acting on reasons, and 
we would not have developed our ability to prescribe and assess our own conduct 
and the conduct of other people unless we were first able to treat at least some of 
our behaviour as prompted by reasons.
The fourth idea concerns the distinction between deontic statuses, which can 
occur exclusively with regard to LDP. Deontic statuses in ADP must not be con-
fused with deontic statuses in LDP (commitment to legal content), and those LDP 
statuses must not be confounded with specifically legal deontic statuses (commit-
ment to legal action). There is, to be sure, a close relationship between LDP sta-
tuses and legal statuses, just as there is one that holds between statuses established 
in ADP and inferential roles, expressed by those discursive commitments (and 
entitlements). This point may be lost from sight in the general practice of using a 
language, but it is crucial in explaining law where, apart from discursive authority 
and responsibility, there have to be social structures of specifically legal authority 
and legal responsibility. One could be discursively committed to a certain legal 
meaning of a linguistic expression (e.g., as a legal historian of an ancient legal 
system), and thereby ‘picture’ assuming one’s deontic status, within that LDP, 
but this is not identical with one’s treating it as a legal reason for action. For the 
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purpose of the present discussion, I am focusing on LDP, yet a broader scheme 
of our practices must be preserved.
Engaging in LDP (acquiring and ascribing deontic statuses) presupposes 
a more primitive ability to engage in legal practical reasoning, understood as 
being able to give and ask for specifically legal reasons. This ability has to do 
with differential reactions to reasons available in practical reasoning. Yet, just 
like the general ability to speak is acquired and exercised in a particular local 
language, so the general ability to differentiate between legal and non- legal 
reasons for action can only develop in a given local language in a particular 
socio- legal setting.3 In short, LDP is about concepts which articulate the law. At 
the same time, that discursive practice, with all that it has to articulate, makes 
sense only if legal concepts play a role in giving and asking for distinct legal 
reasons for acting.
The fifth idea is that, typically, legal reasons for acting are related to the insti-
tutional status of an agent. Brandom identifies three types of practical reasons, 
exemplified by preferences or desires, social statuses and unconditional duties. 
What follows are three types of practical inferences: instrumental, institutional 
and unconditional. Each of these can be expressed in the form of a rule or 
norm. Yet, according to Brandom, a proposition expressing that norm does 
not prescribe conduct in the first place, but rather explicitly endorses material 
proprieties of practical reasons (see Brandom 2000, 89). In other words, norma-
tive or evaluative vocabulary is to practice as conditionals are to theory. While 
instrumental inferences are based on preferences acknowledged or attributed to 
the agent,4 unconditional inferences, on Brandom’s account, are characterised 
by agent- neutral moral reasons.5 In the case of institutional inferences, however, 
premises are articulated by recognizing a particular institutional status of an 
agent – that status serving as main premise. Alternative institutional inferences 
3 Such an ability remains universal as long as that given language is a natural one.
4 A given preference or desire is only a prima facie reason for a given action, because 
different preferences may compete, and many alternative actions can be chosen as 
conclusions of instrumental inferences. E.g. if one’s desire is to stay dry when the rain 
sets in, one shall open an umbrella, find shelter under a tree, etc.
5 This account seems to be closely modelled on Kantian categorical imperative, although 
a Kantian would probably assimilate all three types of reasoning to that pattern. An 
agent performing unconditional inference has reasons for action which are expressed 
in a different rational ‘ought’ than the prudential or institutional one. E.g. if it is wrong 
to harm anyone to no purpose, and repeating the gossip would harm someone to no 
purpose, one shall not repeat the gossip (Brandom 2000, 84–85).
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are usually not available, because it is from a given social status that particular 
practical conclusions follow. For instance, if one has the status of a bank clerk, 
and one is going to work, one is required to wear a tie. A deontic scorekeeper 
would consider it a good institutional inference not only for an individual agent, 
but also for any other agent who occupies the same status. Thus, the status- based 
premise should be considered as objective (whether based on further factual 
or normative premises), because – if the scorekeeper is committed to the other 
agent’s occupying that status – such a commitment would correspond to a good 
reason for action for that agent (see Brandom 2000, 91). Moreover, the ‘goodness’ 
of institutional inferences is not licensed by the norm implicit in such inferences 
but ‘by others associated with the same social institutional status’ (ibid.). Legal 
reasoning can be assimilated to the institutional pattern of reasoning, for obvi-
ous reasons: (1) it saves the realm of law from being confused with instrumental 
or unconditional reasoning without leaving it totally disconnected with either; 
(2) it affirms the connection of law with social world through institutional legal 
statuses, being essentially social constructs; (3) it grounds law’s claims both to 
rationality and objectivity.
The same story can be told in a language that is more familiar to legal theorists, 
but will only prove the validity of the lesson they can learn from pragmatists: legal 
theorists’ interest in utterances is partly understandable. The post- Hartian phi-
losophy of law is generally linked to the problem of language, but that should not 
impede us from digging deeper beneath the surface of those linguistic practices. 
It is true that law is immediately available to us through words. LDP consists of 
words and expressions. In legal theory, particular attention is paid to explicitly 
normative statements which prescribe conduct (legal rules or norms, depending 
on convention), and theories of legal interpretation have developed methods of 
elaborating more or less unambiguous prescriptive statements from legal texts. 
What is usually lost from sight, however, is the fact that the ability to generate 
such prescriptions – whether by legislators or by law- applying agents – presup-
poses the ability to deploy their content in practical reasoning. To be precise, 
much of contemporary legal theory is about language,6 pragmatics included,7 and 
6 In a sense Dworkin rightly argued that Hart suffered from a ‘semantic sting’, because 
he thought that lawyers follow certain linguistic criteria for evaluating propositions of 
law (see Dworkin 1986, 45). Jerzy Wróblewski might also have ‘suffered’ from it, since 
his interest in language led him to developing a ‘semantic conception of a legal norm’ 
(see Wróblewski 1983).
7 Much work in the pragmatics of legal language continues to focus on Gricean and 
post- Gricean pragmatics (see e.g. Soames 2008; Solum 2013, Marmor 2014).
Transition to Democracy and Determinacy of Legal Concepts 63
about practical reasoning.8 Yet seldom are these problems connected. Semantic 
pragmatism, in my view, offers a connection to law by setting an order of explana-
tion which does not proceed from words (refined in LDP into prescriptive legal 
statements) to actions, but from practices of finding specifically legal reasons for 
actions to statements which codify such practices by licensing certain inferences 
as distinctly legal. The content of legal concepts is ultimately established within 
the overall aim of law’s practice, i.e., prescribing the right conduct (by providing 
reasons for acting).
The last set of remarks, concerning the model of legal concepts’ determinacy 
for the purpose of present paper, serves to refine the account of legal practice 
articulated in the five ideas developed in preceding paragraphs. All of them 
are of importance as far as the application of law by courts within LDP is con-
cerned. One of the features of law’s dimension as discursive practice, different 
from universal ADP, is applying and forming reasons, which are explicit rather 
than implicit, striving for both precision and flexibility. This feature is due to 
justification being required and pertinent to judicial decisions. As Brandom 
notes, the idea that there is a difference between exercising normative author-
ity by appeal to law and simply exercising power in its name depends on the 
possibility of distinguishing applications of the law that are rationally justifiable 
in virtue of the meanings of the concepts that articulate the law and those that 
are not (Brandom 2014, 20).
Another property of institutional moves in LDP is the existence of special rules 
for ascribing meaning, particularly through applying legal definitions and deci-
sions of other institutional bodies, with regard to identifying conceptual content 
through the decisions of courts or legal doctrine. While using legal concepts, 
‘judges are responsible for the law, and (…) judges are responsible to the law’ 
(ibid. 32). The sense in which judges are responsible for the law has to do with the 
fact that there is much to that law (more in common law than in civil law) that is 
the cumulative result of judicial decisions to apply or not to apply the concepts 
(e.g. ‘freedom of conscience’) in particular cases.
In selecting the prior uses of such concepts and conceptualizing current facts, 
the judge both further determines (in the sense of sharpening) the content of the 
legal concepts involved, and provides precedents and rationales to which future 
judges are at least potentially responsible. In this way, the deciding judge exercises 
8 Interestingly, Hart’s successors, J. Finnis and J. Raz, each in his respective way of ei-
ther New School of Natural Law or Legal Positivism, seem to be focused on practical 
reasoning at the expense of language (see notably Finnis 1990; Finnis 2011, Raz 2009).
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authority over both the content of the legal concepts being applied and, thereby, 
over the decisions of future judges (Brandom 2014, 32).
Any deciding judge is also responsible to the content of the concept which 
is inherited from the tradition of prior users and which includes justifications, 
precedents and considerations. This is because ‘the justification of a judge’s deci-
sion can appeal only to the authority of prior decisions, and so to the conceptual 
content those decisions have conferred on or discovered in the legal term in 
question’ (ibid.).9
A further distinct feature of legal discursive practice is the restraint of the us-
ers in changing the conceptual content hastily.10 Nevertheless, instituting legal 
norms – including semantic, i.e., content- fixing norms – and applying them, are 
reciprocally dependent rather than being two different phases of one sequential 
process. In an uninterrupted practice of adopting discursive commitments and re-
sponsibility, that is, the practice taking place under external circumstances where 
there are no changes amounting to transition, the determinacy of legal concepts 
seems to be relatively secure and stable. The normal practice of applying concepts 
is bound by proprieties adopted by legal professionals and officials. Such proprie-
ties, as far as legal concepts’ determinacy is concerned, can be called internal, to 
the extent that the functioning of such proprieties is not affected by states of affairs 
that occur in the broadly social (political, economic and/or cultural, etc.) setting 
of that legal practice. This is not to claim that the determinacy of legal concepts 
in the normal practice remains absolutely secure or stable.
Freedom of Conscience as Legal Concept: When Uses Differ
To characterize the changes that the content of legal concepts may undergo, it 
is useful to focus on one of such concepts, and to try to trace the developments 
in the meaning ascribed to it by legal practitioners, that is, judges. In the follow-
ing paragraphs the meaning associated with ‘freedom of conscience and religion’ 
by legal practitioners will be taken under scrutiny through the lenses of Polish 
legislation and case- law. In order to examine the relationships between the use 
of this legal expression and its changing content, on the one hand, and political 
and economic transition symbolically initiated in Poland in 1989 on the other, 
9 This statement may require some qualification, especially in civil law systems, where 
‘prior decisions’ should be understood, e.g. in case of newly enacted statutes, as legisla-
tor’s decisions.
10 This is particularly true as far as judges rather than e.g. legislators are concerned, but 
there can be some quite radical changes, especially in higher courts.
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the most obvious periodization – ‘prior to 1989’ (early use) and ‘after 1989’ (con-
temporary use) will be adopted as a general timeframe for the examination. As a 
result of the particular focus on transition and the research done, another period 
(labelled ‘middle use’) will be added.
Freedom of conscience and religion in Polish legislation.  
An overview
In 1944, a group of Polish communists was established by the Soviet Union as the 
de facto government of Poland, despite the existence of constitutional government 
operating in exile. The communist coup d’état sought, apart from the terrorist 
methods adopted, to find legitimacy in selective reliance on the provisions of the 
Polish Constitution of 1921. The Constitutional Law of 19 February 1947 declared 
that institutions of the state shall act on the legal basis of ‘basic foundations of the 
Constitution of 17 March 1921 and principles of Polish Committee of National 
Liberation (PKWN) of 22 July 1944’.11 It must be noted that the former constitu-
tion was neither to be applied directly, nor entirely, since referring to its ‘basic 
foundations’ explicitly called for a selective approach to that ‘bourgeois’ document.
The specific law on freedom of conscience was adopted in 1949.12 In that de-
cree, a new type of crime – the abuse of freedom of religion and conscience for 
any purposes adverse to the political system of the Republic of Poland – was 
defined and sanctioned with imprisonment.13 This was a decisive moment for the 
LDP, because the former concept of ‘freedom of conscience’ had been modified 
by Communist legislators. From that moment on, freedom of conscience was 
no longer something to be exercised and protected by state authority to the full 
extent, but in fact, it became a risky enterprise whose enjoyment was threatened 
by punishment and burdened with the need to take precautions.
A similarly worded provision was included in the 1952 Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of Poland. The last paragraph (3) of article 70, following general 
guarantees for freedom of conscience and religion, as well as the separation of 
church and state, slightly extended the limitation clause in comparison with the 
1949 Decree. The constitutional formula reads, ‘abusing freedom of conscience 
11 Constitutional Law of 19 February 1947, Art. 1, Official Journal (Dz.U.) 1947, 18, 71.
12 See Decree of 5 August 1949 on the protection of freedom of conscience and religion, 
Dz.U. 45. 334.
13 See ibid., art. 8; see also art. 10–13, where related offenses such as preparations, forming 
agreements aimed at abusing the freedom of conscience or enhancing other people to 
do so were subject to punishment.
Maciej Dybowski66
and religion for any purposes hostile to the interests of People’s Republic of Po-
land shall be punished.’ The decree was annulled in 1969,14 along with the new 
Criminal Code’s entry into force. However, the constitutional provision retained 
its wording until it was removed in 1976,15 when communist Poland was finally 
under obligation to implement the UN International Covenant on Civil, Political 
and Cultural Rights. Following the constitutional revision in 1976, the provision 
on the freedom of conscience was numbered article 82, and as such it remained 
there, without the limitation clause referring to ‘abuse,’ until new a constitution 
was adopted in 1997.
Early Use: 1944–1976
In a 1951, the judgment of the Supreme Court (SC) declared that one may be 
subject to punishment ‘when the exercise of that freedom [of conscience and 
religion] degenerates into an abuse which collides with the interest of the State, 
or with personal interests of individuals, or with interests of individuals or groups 
of other religion or persuasion.’16
In 1953, a district court upheld a sentence17 for imprisonment, directly apply-
ing art. 8 of the 1949 Decree, for a person who ‘abused the freedom of religion 
and conscience’ by mere attempts at persuading his fellow members of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses not to sign a 1950 Stockholm Address, which was a product of Soviet- 
sponsored propaganda against the war in Korea.
In 1963, a SC panel of seven judges adopted a resolution in which a new 
principle of law was introduced.18 That principle concerned the limitation of the 
freedom of religion and conscience with respect to the activities of Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, who were not at that time an officially recognized religion in communist 
Poland. The SC held:
taking part in a religious association of Jehovah’s Witnesses, to whom legal status was 
denied by the state authority and whose true organisation and activity remains a secret to 
the said authority, fulfils the criteria of a crime set out in article 36 of the Shorter Criminal 
Code. (…) By ‘taking part’ in an association of the kind one must understand partici-
pating, with the awareness of its conspiratorial character, in its organisational activities, 
14 Law of 19 April 1969. Introductory provisions for Criminal Code, Dz. U. 13, 95.
15 Law of 10 February 1976 on amending the Constitution of People’s Republic of Poland, 
Dz.U. 1976, 5.29
16 SC Judgment of 10 April 1951, (I K 82/51).
17 District Court in W. Judgment of 17 April 1953 (107/52); nullified by SC Judgment of 
4 December 2007 (II KK 88/05).
18 See SC Resolution of 31 May 1963 r. VI KO 48/60.
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and particularly in meetings, drafting instructions and work plans, giving instructions 
and orders, preparing reports, distributing illegal writings, etc. (…) Mere distribution of 
writings (…) without their prior submission to control by proper authorities results in 
criminal responsibility (…).19
That ruling followed the same court’s decision of a case of two individual Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who were accused of distribution of illegal printed materials.20 It also 
served the SC as an opportunity to express itself on the subject of the freedoms 
of religion and conscience, and more specifically on art. 8 of the 1949 Decree. Ac-
cording to the SC, its provision ‘protects all citizens, and protects the People’s State 
against the abuse of freedom of conscience and religion by criminal individuals for 
political purposes hostile to the political system of People’s Poland and its social 
order.’ Many judgments of communist Poland’s courts contain other restrictions 
against the exercise of freedom of conscience and religion.21 Jehovah’s Witnesses 
would also face criminal charges for their refusal to perform military service.
For the present purpose, however, it should suffice to show how key official 
practitioners of LDP used to deploy the legal concept of freedom of conscience 
in the early period. For almost half a century, there seemed to have prevailed a 
certain understanding of that concept in which two constitutive content determi-
nants would be assumed. First, that once acts undertaken in exercising freedom of 
conscience enter into conflict with values ascribed to practically any aspect of the 
wellbeing of the Communist State, such a conflict would have to be solved against 
the claims of conscience or religious obligations. Second, the concept of freedom 
of conscience and religion was treated as dependent upon the legal status of the 
religious community to which belonged the individuals who exercised such a free-
dom. The case- law does not record any hesitation among judges in asserting such 
a determinate meaning of the concepts of freedom of conscience and religion.
Middle Use: 1976–1989
Between 1976 and 1989, in the years preceding the fall of Communism in Po-
land, marked by the Solidarity movement in 1980 and 1981, followed by the last 
totalitarian spasm of Martial Law, the overall legislative context for the protection 
of freedom of conscience and religion remained unchanged, with one exception. 
Following the constitutional revision in 1976, the provision regarding the freedom 
19 Ibid.
20 See SC Judgment of 23 May 1963, OSNKW 1963/10/180.
21 See, among others, the following SC judgments: of 22  June  1965,  III KR 106/65, 
OSNKW 1965/11/137; of 14 April 1962, IV K 132/62, OSNPG 1962/1–6/63)
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of conscience no longer contained the limitation clause referring to the ‘abuse’ 
of that freedom. The constitution, however, was not to be applied directly, and 
there were no legislative/statutory factors to affect the legal concept of freedom of 
conscience. It will be shown in the following part of this chapter that, as expected, 
the changes which were formally initiated in 1989 had their direct impact on the 
practice of ascribing, by the judiciary, a new content to freedom of conscience. 
Much more important a task for the present analysis, however, is to examine any 
changes in the discursive practices of the Polish judiciary occurring before the 
political milestones set in 1989.
A case, testing my claim that the change in ascribing content to the legal con-
cept of freedom of conscience took place before any legislative changes in substan-
tive law, was decided by the Supreme Administrative Court in Wroclaw in 1984.22 
In March 1983, Józef B. applied to local authorities for an exemption from the 
requirement to be employed, which was one of the oddities of communist Poland 
stemming from Martial Law legislation.23 The applicant grounded his application 
by the fact that he was a full- time preacher of the Jehovah’s Witnesses commu-
nity, and that he was financially supported by his family and fellow believers. The 
exemption was not granted and he was presented with several work offers, all of 
which he declined for the reasons pertaining to his religious duties. Subsequently, 
the man was registered as a ‘person who persistently refuses to work.’ The preacher 
appealed to higher administrative authorities, but the decision to register him was 
reaffirmed on the grounds that the Jehovah’s Witnesses, as in the earlier cases 
discussed, did not enjoy the status of an officially recognized religion in Poland. 
As his last resort, the man launched a complaint before the Supreme Administra-
tive Court. The Court supported his claim not only by stating that the preacher 
did have an employment, but, more importantly, by relying on legal guarantees 
of freedom of conscience and religion. The Court also noted that the fact of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses not being an officially recognized religion should not impede 
their members from enjoying the right to freedom of conscience and religion. 
Surprisingly, the Court relied directly on art. 82 of the Constitution, which read 
in paragraph 1: ‘The Polish People’s Republic guarantees freedom of conscience 
and religion to citizens. (…)’. The wording of this provision remained more or 
less unchanged under Communism and afterwards. The novelty of the Court’s 
approach can rather be seen in passing over statutory regulation (or the lack of 
22 Judgment of Supreme Administrative Court in Wrocław of 13 January 1984, SA/Wr 
701/83.
23 Law of 26 October 1982 on proceedings against persons refusing to work, Dz. U. 35, 
229.
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it) and applying the Constitution directly. This move was made possible by the 
Court’s interpretation of paragraph 2 of the same art. 82: ‘The principles of the 
relationship between Church and State are, together with the legal and patrimo-
nial position of religious bodies, determined by law.’ The Court concluded that 
‘such law may only specify or elaborate the constitutional principle of freedom of 
conscience and religion, but not eliminate it or subject to limitation’.
In other words, the Court expressed its grasp of the concept of freedom of con-
science and religion as entirely independent of the legal status of a religious com-
munity to which belong the individuals who exercise such a freedom. This marks 
a decisive step from a position previously held by Polish courts that freedom of 
conscience is a legal situation, a construct tailored tightly by legal provisions, and 
moreover, as something that could be abused under certain conditions specified 
by statutory regulations. Formal recognition of a religious community by the state, 
according to the Court, may result in additional privileges, but it may not affect 
the essence of religious freedom. The Court added a lengthy passage in which Je-
hovah’s Witnesses are described as model socialist citizens. This, perhaps contrary 
to the Court’s intention, sounds patronizing, but may also be typical of a transition 
period, where formerly recognized values (in this case – socialist ones) can no 
longer be treated as obvious and requiring no additional justification. And so, for 
instance, one could learn that ‘both convictions and practices concerning work as 
an essential value for that community [i.e. Jehovah’s Witnesses] greatly surpass 
the current level of social consciousness’, and that the members of that religious 
group ‘in recent years [i.e. during the Martial Law] (…) despite their doctrinal 
“fundamentalism”, have shown greater understanding for the pre- eminent values 
of the state’s integrity than many ministers of recognized churches’.
Under virtually the same axiology of the legal system as in the early period, 
the Court seems to be ascribing a completely different content to the concept 
of freedom of conscience and religion. Its interpretation is clearly heading in 
favorem libertatis, although some of the early use connection between individual 
freedom and institutional status of one’s religion is echoed in assessing Jehovah’s 
Witnesses attitude towards the communist state for purposes of justification. It is 
even more interesting, considering the fact that the Court could have upheld all 
the administrative measures adopted against the preacher with some statutory 
justification. Therefore, the 1984 case seems to reflect the judges’ hesitation in 
asserting an established meaning of the concept of freedom of conscience and 
religion by balancing between constitutional, statutory and extra- legal considera-
tions. In fact, in order to assert a determinate concept, the judges had to challenge 
the established meaning.
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Contemporary Use: 1989 – Present
An entirely new content was ascribed to the concept of freedom of conscience 
by judges during the period of political and economic transformation after 1989. 
The Constitutional Tribunal, still referring to the provisions of the communist 
constitution of 1952, in a 1991 judgment explained the new content of the con-
cept of freedom of conscience: it is ‘not just a right to represent a certain set of 
opinions, but most of all a right to act according to one’s own conscience.’24 It is 
also noted in the contemporary legal literature that ‘the lack of right to express 
one’s convictions in public life renders the freedom of conscience and religion 
illusory, while partiality of public authorities is annulling unrestricted freedom of 
expressing one’s beliefs by [creating] the fear of discrimination’(Ożóg 2015, 101).
Moreover, a series of revision trials took place before the SC. In 1995 it declared 
that ‘deeds contravening criminal rules which are contrary to the constitutional 
rule, and disable free exercise of religious practices within the scope of freedom 
of conscience and religion, guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution, as an 
expression of justified disobedience to the law, cannot be treated as a crime’.25 
Even certain acts of violence (attacking a police station, for example) committed in 
1959 as reaction to intervening in exercising freedom of conscience and religion, 
were retrospectively justified by the SC in 2006, and its previous qualification as ‘a 
threat to society’ was removed on the grounds that ‘the behaviour of the defend-
ants expressed commonly- held social sentiments, and as such it could not have 
been qualified as a threat to that society.’26
In 2007, while reversing the sentence imposed in 1953 for a person who had 
‘abused the freedom of religion and conscience’ simply by attempts at persuad-
ing his fellow members of the organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses not to sign a 
1950 Stockholm Address, the SC noted that even according to the criminal law 
which was then in force, there were no grounds for the criminalization of such 
an innocent act as merely expressing an opinion on an issue of public interest and 
communicating it to other members of one’s own religious community.27
The contemporary judicial use of the same legal concept of freedom of con-
science and religion after 1989 seemed to belong to the tradition of middle use, at 
least in its initial stage where the old constitutional provisions have to be given a 
24 Constitutional Court Judgment of 15 January 1991, U 8/90.
25 See SC Judgment of 10 November 1995, II KRN 137/95.
26 See SC Judgment of 7 June 2006, III KK 394/05.
27 See SC Judgment of 4 December 2007 r. II KK 88/05.
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new meaning. Apart from the possibility of adopting new justification strategies 
with reliance on democratic axiology, the content ascribed to that concept is not 
significantly different from that of 1984. In the mid-1990’s, however, a new trend 
can be observed. Revisions and reversals of prior (early use) content ascriptions 
are clear marks of the fact that new content of the concept has been fixed to the 
extent that the early use is not only definitely abandoned, but it even has to be 
corrected in contemporary LDP.
Conclusions
Drawing conclusions from the developments illustrated by the changes in the 
use of the concept of freedom of conscience and religion in the Polish case- law 
requires being able to substantiate two interconnected claims. First, related to the 
field of transition studies, that the periodization of transition in law, or precisely 
in the practical grasp of legal concepts, might not be identical with the periodiza-
tion adopted in political or economic studies. Second, and more important for the 
accuracy of Brandom- inspired theory, that it is indeed pragmatics that precedes 
semantics in the job of generating the meaning of legal concepts.
As far as the first claim is concerned, one could examine whether what happens 
in LPD with regard to the freedom of conscience and religion meets the criteria 
of transitivity. A transitive relation is the one that holds between a and c if it also 
holds between a and b and between b and c. This move, based on elementary 
logic, can serve to elaborate the notion of transition that connects the institutional 
practices of judges’ use of legal concepts with the time- frame. The relationship 
holds between the expression ‘freedom of conscience and religion’ in its early, 
middle and contemporary use, but is the same true about the conceptual content? 
It was taken from Brandom that while using legal concepts judges are responsible 
for the law and to the law. If we consider the responsibility for the legal concept, 
the transitivity seems to hold since judges in any period of use have a sense of 
exercising authority over both the content of the legal concepts being applied and, 
consequently, over the decisions of future judges. Yet, in transition, this is not the 
case as far as responsibility to the legal concept is concerned. The transition of law 
in the dimension of legal concepts is marked by an interruption in the scope of 
responsibility to the content of the concept which is inherited from the tradition 
of prior users and which includes justifications, precedents and considerations.
From this perspective, two types – or stages, in this case – of transition can be 
identified. The first transition type, characterized by slow change, illustrated by 
the middle use of “freedom of conscience and religion’ and extending to the initial 
stage of contemporary use, and the second transition type, which is marked by an 
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abrupt change and denial of prior use, and which is typical of contemporary use. 
What distinguishes the two types of transition is the users’ (that is, the judges’) 
approach to the responsibility model. In the slow change transition, the judges 
remain responsible both to and for the law, whereas, in the abrupt change stage 
the judges who adopted the early use decisions are no longer treated as exercising 
their authority over the content their decisions had conferred on the legal terms in 
question. Such a distinction may help to clarify the periodization of the transition 
of a given legal system. In the case of Polish law, one could continue the research 
focused on particular legal concepts in order to argue that there was a ‘transition 
before the transition’ or that, in the middle use, some important changes in the 
responsibility model can be detected. To substantiate the claim made in this paper, 
further legal concepts should be examined to see if changes in their use overlap 
with those described here – and perhaps other actors’ usage could be examined, 
too. It is clear, however, that a political transition as defined in my Introductory 
Remarks is different from the legal transition described in this paper.
Brandom’s pragmatic semantics can be particularly helpful in elaborating the 
slow transition type by supplementing four auxiliary speech acts associated with 
the semantic content of assertions. In any discursive practice – LPD included – as-
sertion is a key move in the language game. One could imagine an uninterrupted 
practice of using legal concepts based primarily on asserting, whereby ascribing 
certain content to legal concepts by previous users serves as a premise for future 
users’ commitment to such inherited content. Slow transition, however, is charac-
terised by a growing hesitance about the content of legal concepts. Auxiliary acts 
may facilitate score- keeping, but they also seem to be typical of transition. One 
of these auxiliary moves can be a deferral, which occurs if an asserter removes his 
responsibility to vindicate his assertion to a third party. This is what happened in 
a 1984 case, where the court decided to bypass the statute- based understanding 
of freedom of conscience and religion, and proceed directly to constitutional 
considerations. Another auxiliary procedure would be a challenge, which may 
consist of making an incompatible assertion. Similarly, a disavowal may take place 
if the asserter repudiates his previously acknowledged commitment. Such a move 
would be more typical of an abrupt change type of transition, but, in slow transi-
tion, it could be preceded by an act of query, used by scorekeepers (judges) to 
elicit avowal or disavowal of certain claims.
All of these special procedures serve the purpose of protecting the responsibil-
ity model, but the responsibility model as applied to judicial practices of using 
legal concepts has no built- in mechanisms for preserving conceptual content. Ac-
cording to this model, any use is possible at any time, as long as it is justified. If all 
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means of justification fall short, i.e., if all available auxiliary moves are exhausted, 
we can no longer speak of transition, and so pragmatic semantics can also account 
for revolutionary change in legal systems.
I conclude with a general remark addressed to those who may claim that em-
ploying Brandomian semantics to the transition of a legal concept, such as free-
dom of conscience and religion, is an undertaking akin to using quantum physics 
to prepare a cup of tea. At the end of the day, is not analysing the change in the 
meaning of a legal term something that analytic legal theory does all the time? 
In my view, semantic pragmatism provides legal theorists and philosophers with 
great tools to extend that classical project of analysis. The key to that extension is 
developing ways of articulating what one must be able to do in order to say what 
one means, lawyers included.
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The Rebirth of Customary Law in a Time of 
Transition. The Case of Albania
Abstract: The rapid disintegration of the socialist order in Albania in the 1990s and the 
lack of a functioning new administration led to the breakdown of state authority. During 
that time, the majority of people in the north of the country once again began to practice 
the ancient customary law called the Kanun. They adapted the customary rules to a post- 
socialist context. This article addresses the issue of the renaissance of customary law and 
its role in maintaining a social order in a time of transition. In the article, the most visible 
manifestations of customary law in society are pointed out. The emphasis is placed on 
the institution of blood feud, the decollectivisation of the land and exercising rights in 
the forests.
Introduction
In the 1990s, Central and Eastern Europe experienced sudden and profound social 
changes which had an impact on almost every aspect of social life. The foundations 
of the social order based on socialist ideology collapsed and the new ones were 
slowly emerging. This article addresses the issue of customary law and its role in 
maintaining social order in a time of transition.
In the beginning, such a transition generates a lack of legal certainty. It may 
often undermine the reliance on state institutions and it may sometimes result in 
some sort of social anomie (which was originally described by Emile Durkheim), 
i.e. the lack of norms which may be applied by an individual in specific social 
situations. The previous social order is already gone and the future one is not fully 
developed yet. This normative gap needs to be filled. In certain circumstances, 
customary law, which was a normative base for the society before the socialist 
period, can take the same place again, providing clear, simple and deeply- rooted 
rules for people looking for safety, certainty, and predictability. Customary law 
then becomes an important historical and cultural factor affecting the process of 
change and providing a stable and internally consistent normative guidance for 
the members of society who have been marginalized by the transition process.
In Europe, the model example of such a process is Albania in the 1990s. The 
rapid disintegration of the socialist order in Albania in 1991 and the lack of a 
functioning new administration led to the breakdown of state authority. During 
that time, the majority of the people in the north of the country once again began 
Jan Bazyli Klakla
The Rebirth of Customary Law in a Time of Transition. 
The Case of Albania
Jan Bazyli Klakla76
to practise the ancient customary law called the Kanun. They adapted the rules 
coming from the middle ages to a post- socialist context and turned them into the 
foundation of a social order.
Transformation in Albania
To fully understand this paper, the knowledge of some basic historical background 
will be needed. The gradually introduced economic reforms started in Albania 
in 1985 when Ramiz Alia took over the leading position in the Party of Labour 
of Albania after the death of Enver Hoxha, who had ruled the Socialist People’s 
Republic of Albania for four decades. Despite his effort to open diplomatic ties 
with Western Countries, Albania as a state and the Albanian society were still in 
deep isolation. The first major demonstrations started in January 1990 in Skhoder 
and later spread to other cities. The protests intensified in December 1990 which 
led to the first democratic general election in Albania’s history in March 1991.
Although they may appear to be the results of a quick and relatively peaceful 
process, the 1991 March elections were just the beginning of a long period of 
political instability. They were won by the Communists, due to the votes of rural 
inhabitants constituting 64 percent of the Albanian population. The new govern-
ment had lasted only three months before it was forced to resign as mass strikes, 
demonstrations and riots seriously threatened the country’s economy.
After the fall of the communist government, a committee of ‘national salva-
tion’ was established, i.e. an interim coalition government including communists, 
democrats and three other smaller parties. Although it lasted only six months and 
then collapsed, it was able to introduce land reforms to which special attention 
will be given in the next parts (de Waal 2015, 21). President Ramiz Alia resigned 
from office in April 1992 and was succeeded by Sali Berisha, the leader of the 
Democratic Party and a former member of Party of Labour of Albania.
The Democratic Party government managed to function until the next sched-
uled elections in 1996 despite the fact that Sali Berisha was often accused of au-
thoritarian inclinations, including exercising pressure on the opposition, media 
and civil society (see Human Rights Watch 1996). In the general elections of June 
1996, the Democratic Party manipulated the results, which was noted in the report 
of the Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (1996). Nonetheless, 
the government collapsed one year after the elections due to widespread corrup-
tion which had caused disorder throughout the country.
The international mediation led by OSCE resulted in the agreement that the 
ruling party and the opposition would form a Reconciliation Government and 
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hold the new elections. As a result, in June 1997 the Socialist Party was brought 
to power and it managed to rule under various prime ministers until 2005.
A more detailed insight into the political history of Albania is not the aim of 
this paper and the background presented above is more than sufficient for the 
understanding of my further deliberations. The bottom line is that Albania in 
the 1990s was a highly unstable country in terms of state organization and state 
authorities, which were perceived as very unreliable.
The Kanun before 1991
Another concept that needs to be introduced to understand this paper properly 
is the concept of the Kanun. The Kanun is the system of customary law that 
regulated everyday life in Albania from the Middle Ages (or even before) until the 
20th century. It is important to note that the Kanun still has a considerable impact 
on the society of modern Albania. Margaret Hasluck writes that the Kanun was 
created in the mountains of Northern Albania to ensure equal access to pastures, 
farmlands, and irrigation for everyone regardless their economic status (Hasluck 
1954, 9). Likewise, geographical conditions had a huge impact on the creation and 
preservation of customary law. The tribes of Northern Albania were basically iso-
lated from the rest of the country for centuries. The mountainous terrain kept this 
area independent of any kind of state power for most of the year. The suzerainty 
of Turkish or Austro- Hungarian Empire was only theoretical. The first road that 
allowed reaching the north of the country regardless of weather conditions was 
built in 1916 (Grzymała- Moszczyńska 2011, 272).
The lack of strong and unified state authority in this area led to the primacy of 
customary law over any other normative system (especially the state law) which 
persisted until the Second World War. Describing the details of the Kanun is not 
the aim of this paper (see Klakla 2014, Klakla 2015), but some of the main con-
cepts should be noted. The Kanun is based on equality before the rule of blood 
feud, the primacy of the value of honour, hospitality (seen as both right and 
responsibility), and eternal character of the world of honour (besa) (Czekalski 
1998, 20).
During the communist period, the Kanun was banned because one of its key 
concepts is the inviolate nature of private property as opposed to the ideology 
promoted by the ruling Party of Labour of Albania. Customary law was also as-
sociated with those parts of the country that had been resistant to the Communist 
movement. It was called ‘a black spider of backwardness‘. Any reference to the 
Kanun was made a punishable offence and customary law practice was officially 
banned (de Waal 2004, 25). Blood feuds and customary marriages were defined 
Jan Bazyli Klakla78
as legacies of feudalism and strong propaganda aimed at eliminating the habits 
related to the customary law was implemented. The criminal codes of 1952 and 
1977 introduced the death penalty for the perpetrators and the deportation of the 
families of those involved in blood feuds. Although the communists’ fight against 
the Kanun was not entirely successful, the role of customary law decreased. It can 
be observed for example in the statistics regarding the percentage of blood feud 
killings compared to total murders which dropped from almost eighteen percent 
in 1946–1950 to zero in the mid-1980s (Sadiku 2014, 91).
The fight which the communist government led against the Kanun distinguish-
es the situation of customary law in a time of transition in post- socialist countries 
from the situation in post- colonial areas, for example in Africa. Customary law 
was used there as a tool of domination or control; therefore it was not challenged 
and fought by state authorities. Thus, although customary law played a great role 
in the transition of such countries as Ghana, Nigeria, etc., this situation cannot 
be directly compared to the case of Albania. Regarding the transition in Africa, 
it is inadequate to talk about the rebirth of customary law since it was present 
and practiced during the colonial times with a tacit or direct support from the 
colonial governments. In post- socialists countries, as Joireman (2014, 16) writes, 
‘there was little use for it at all during the socialist era, yet it survived and when 
the regimes in Albania and Yugoslavia disintegrated, customary law revived as a 
method of conflict resolution and social organization when the state was weak’.
The rebirth of customary law after 1991 – decollectivisation
In the times of transition from the end of the 1980s until the end of the 1990s, it 
was possible to observe a phenomenon that may be called the rebirth of customary 
law. After decades of marginalization, customary law started to play a great role in 
Albanian society once again. On the following pages, three of the best examples of 
that phenomenon will be discussed – the renaissance of the blood feud practice, 
the decollectivisation of land based on the Kanun and the rights regarding forests 
in Northern Albania. We will see that the Kanun played both positive and negative 
roles in the tough times of the transition.
In the previous subsection, the data concerning the percentage of blood feud 
killings in comparison with the total murders were used to demonstrate the de-
creasing role of customary law during the communist period. The same data 
show a sharp increase in the number of customary killings in 1989–1991. At the 
time of the first democratic elections, it was eighteen per cent of murders, even 
more than in the 1946–50 period. What is interesting is not only the return of a 
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tradition that had been forgotten for two decades, but also the way in which that 
practice was realized.
Although the Kanun was written down in the 1930s by Franciscan priest 
Shtjefёn Gjeҫov and its copies have been widely available since then, what the 
Kanun says is not as important as what people think it says (Joireman 2014, 10). 
It was (and still is) the ultimate authority on Albanian tradition although few have 
read it (Reineck 1991, 40). Joireman (2014, 10) writes that ‘the Kanun is used as 
a totem, much in the fashion that the constitution is used by some Americans 
who may refer to their “Constitutional Rights”, but never have seriously read or 
studied the Constitution‘. It is also compared to the knowledge of the Bible in 
Western culture, much in a way that certain metaphors and references are a part 
of common knowledge and are known even by those who have not read the Bible 
(see Arsovska 2006). Even Shtjefёn Gjeҫov himself claimed that during his studies 
he had not found the ‘original Kanun’. Those readings that treat the Kanun as a 
black- letter law and ‘petrified’, unified entity, a non- contradictory set of norms, 
are incompatible with the theoretical position of reading law as a social process 
(Bardhoshi 2012, 122). Obviously, this understanding generates a significant un-
certainty of interpretations and their wide variety. The practice of a blood feud is 
a model example of a gap between the written text and the actual social behaviour.
The Kanun describes blood revenge as an acceptable reaction to a crime or 
insult to the honour of a family but specifies that only a perpetrator can be a 
target. The contemporary understanding developed after 1991 widens the group 
of potential targets by adding all male or even female relatives of the perpetra-
tor. Sometimes it also includes minors in the family. Gjin Marku of the National 
Reconciliation Committee in Albania (NGO which works to mediate and prevent 
blood feud conflicts) states that ‘the problem with blood feuds today is that people 
are using their own personal interpretation of the Kanun to suit their needs […]. 
They are abusing the laws instead of following the original script, and this is why 
you see young women […] becoming targets‘ (Cohen 2012). It is against the rules 
that were written down by Gjecov as they state: ‘Fathers shall not be killed in place 
of their sons, nor sons in place of their fathers, but each shall die for his own sin‘ 
(Fox 1989, 172). Using the Kanun to justify blood revenge was certainly the most 
negative aspect of the rebirth of customary law that happened in Albania in the 
times of transition.
Besides the negatively evaluated practice of blood feud, the Kanun became 
useful and present in Albanian society also in other fields. Probably the most im-
portant field was the decollectivisation when customary law was used by people 
with an actual approval from the state. The collectivization of land was imposed 
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by Enver Hoxa in the south of the country in the 1950s, but the process was more 
difficult in the mountainous north where it took ten more years to finish. The 
decollectivisation started slowly in 1987, as a result of a food crisis, but a proper 
Land Reform was passed in 1991. According to that law, land parcels should be 
allocated by a lottery – all the previous ownership was nullified and each family 
received a quantity of land adequate for the number of family members (including 
minors). It worked well in the south where the land was outside the village with 
houses clustered in the centre and where, since land had been collectivized for 
four decades, the memory of previous ownership was more fully obliterated. In the 
north, the villagers’ houses were surrounded by the land which used to belong to 
them. What is more, their memory of the former holdings was more vivid because 
the collectivization came much later. In 1991, it was obvious for both the people 
and the state that the formally required form of decollectivisation would not be 
practical in that area (de Waal 2004, 21).
Taking the above into consideration, the northern land committees decided 
to distribute the land to the hereditary owners, following the rules of customary 
law. Although according to the 1991 Law on Land, the prior ownership and old 
boundaries should have nothing to do with the way land would be distributed, the 
Kanun emphasizes the extreme exclusiveness of private property. Land reforms 
were introduced by the committee of ‘national salvation‘, which was established 
after the fall of the first democratically elected government and lasted only for six 
months. The political situation at that time was highly unstable and the influence 
of the state authorities in the regions was very weak. The regional land committees 
were not able to enforce the decollectivisation in the way it was demanded by law. 
Thus, it was carried out from the bottom up by the people following the Kanun 
which seemed to be the most reliable source of rules in this region at the time. 
Harol Lemel (1998, 124) writes that ‘in Kukës, […] distribution was carried out 
on a family not on a per capita basis and with reference to old boundaries; families 
and clans simply reoccupied their old land and distributed it as they saw fit. This 
pattern extended to other districts throughout the mountainous northeast‘. Such a 
distribution was deemed illegal by the state authorities for almost two years during 
which they refused to sanction and document it. Finally, in 1993, because of ‘the 
special circumstances of the region, and the interests of maintaining social peace‘, 
the customary model of land distribution was accepted by the state (ibid., 130).
Indeed, entrusting customary law and the village elders with distribution of the 
land played a huge role in the maintaining of social peace and avoiding conflicts 
in this particular area. First of all, the Kanun was the only normative system there 
which had the redistribution of land within its regulating power. Any other solu-
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tion would have had to be enforced by the authorities, which did not have the 
power to do so. Secondly, the elders, as the members of the involved clans, were 
directly interested in avoiding any possible conflicts. It can be clearly seen when 
we connect this process to the data concerning the blood feud practice that was 
chosen as a conflict resolution method more and more often at the time. The rules 
of Kanun were clear and specific, covering all aspects of decollectivisation, which 
made the decision based on customary law less likely to be contested.
Distribution of the land was based on two main principles described by Bard-
hoshi as follows:
The basic rule followed was that of a balanced reciprocity: you do not touch our property 
and we do not touch yours! Another practice that had to do with following of rules set 
down by the Kanun was the permanent use of the common property by the members of 
that social group that once owned it. Individuals pruned the forest, for example, cleaned 
the water source every spring or summer, etc. as a means to memorize and mark the land 
or water source that belonged to their family. (…) [I]f you do not use your property for 
a long time and someone else does, you lose your right to the property over time. If you 
use a piece of land, forest or water source for some time and no one came to claim it, it 
means that this land has no owner and you have won the property or you have publicly 
reconfirmed your right of ownership” (Bardhoshi 2012, 117–118).
Following these rules, land returned to its previous owners or their legal suc-
cessors. Those principles were not applied only to private, individual property 
rights. The Kanun recognises three forms of property: church property, collective 
property and private property (Mehilli 2015, 177). Collective property, described 
as ‘the pastures, where everybody was able to send the animals there, to cut woods 
in the mountains for their families, to use the streams in the village, etc.‘ (Mehilli 
2015, 177), was returned to the villagers on the same basis.
In the case of redistributing previously collectivized land, the Kanun, although 
used as a normative system competitive to the state law, acted in favour of main-
taining social peace and was able to provide a desirable effect – the land property 
in northern Albania was mostly decollectivized by the end of 1992. According to 
the World Bank, approximately 15–20% of the total agricultural land was redis-
tributed with respect to customary law and pre-1945 boundaries and ownership. 
After a major political debate concerning the fairness of redistribution and the 
outcomes of the land reform, there were cases of villages revisiting their first land 
division and redistributing land again according to customary law and pre-1945 
boundaries (Zhllima, Rama 2014, 80).
Although the government’s idea of land reform was based on a concept of so-
cial equality and distribution according to needs, the legal system of the state failed 
to meet its goals. Originally, collectivization of land was designed to be a tool of 
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social change, to help socialist government in its ‘struggle against this inheritance 
system and related household formation system and family ideologies’ but the 
traditional system of inheritance that supported and protected traditional social 
structure continued to exist. Therefore, social expectations for a land reform and 
decollectivisation were far from the government’s goals. Existing traditional social 
structures were an efficient mechanism to legitimise the Kanun as a normative 
system alternative to state law (Bardhoshi 2012, 108).
Those structures consolidate the patriarchal character of Albanian society. 
When the division of land property was done according to the Kanun, it was 
shared ‘per brother’ and women had no right to claim any immobile property 
(Bardhoshi 2012, 119). There are some arguments that may be used to allow fe-
male heirs to a share of their fathers’ property. Nevertheless, as Bardhoshi states, 
‘such norms are part of people’s social memory and examples or cases when 
females have inherited immobile property following such a rule are very rare’ 
(2013, 322). Thus, it can be said that the redistribution of land according to the 
Kanun failed to meet gender equality standards.
On the other hand, the Kanun provided the mechanism of inclusion and 
the acceptance of newcomers in the village that was used to manage migration 
changes which happened during communism and at the beginning of the 1990s. 
According to customary law, it depends on ‘whether they behave according to 
local customs’ (Bardhoshi 2012, 118) whether people from south are allowed to 
participate in the land division of the north. Nevertheless, the majority of migrants 
went from north to Tirana, where there was no customary law based decollec-
tivisation. Instead, they developed informal urban areas where they occupied 
former state farms (Bardhoshi 2011, 12–14) and adapted the Kanun to their new 
environment (see Voell 2003).
The rebirth of customary law after 1991 – forest rights
There was a different social conflict present in Northern Albania at that time, 
which was generated by a clash between customary law norms and the state regu-
lations. The area of battle was the rights concerning forests and timber harvest.
The forest usage rights were described precisely in the Kanun. As de Waal 
(2004, 32) writes, they were based on the recognition of specific areas as the 
property of a particular group of brothers (vllazni), beyond that of a particular 
clan (fis). Within a certain distance, the forest was the common property (kujrit) 
of a village; beyond such distance, it belonged to the bajrak (district). There were 
several layers of government: clan chiefs, village elders, minor elders, and the 
people themselves.
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This scheme had been used for ages to execute the rights in the forests in North-
ern Albania. During the communist era, the forests were governed by the Forestry 
Commission, a department of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was responsible 
for the administration, conservation, planting and exploitation for domestic use 
and export. At that time, the strong state prevented any illegal deforestation.
In a time of transition, the previous system of administering the forests was 
torn down. For example, in 1990, all the members of Forestry Commission in the 
district of Mirdita were dismissed and nobody was appointed to take their place 
until 1992. There, in 1993, a new forest law came into operation. It was strongly 
criticized both by forestry experts and local authorities. It was based on a system 
of government- controlled licenses granted to the interested individuals and based 
exclusively on a financial criterion. No past experience in forestry was required 
(ibid., 34). Unfortunately, the new law turned out to be a failure from both the 
economic and the social point of view. Only a few auctions gave a profit that was 
expected by the government because licensees had secretly agreed on which forest 
areas they would bid for to avoid bidding against each other and increasing the 
prices. Moreover, the clash of two normative systems – the newly- introduced state 
law and customary law already exercised by people in the forests – was inevitable.
In the beginning, the villagers kept exercising their customary rights in the 
forest but they started to sell the acquired wood to licensed operators. They, how-
ever, were required to pay high taxes, so the prices they paid for purchasing the 
wood from the villagers were low. Because of that, the villagers quickly started to 
establish informal, custom- based groups that sold the wood directly to the mid-
dlemen, avoiding the licensees (but competing with them at the same time). The 
villagers, to avoid taxes, could offer middlemen lower prices, even if they had to 
include police bribes in their costs. Because of that competition, the profit made 
by the official licensees was lower than expected and in the period of 1992–2000 
many of them resigned. For example, in the Mirdita District in 2001, there were 
only two licensees left from the original nine (ibid., 35).
In the process of drafting the law on forests in 1992, the voice of the villag-
ers was ignored by the government. In response, through the 1990s the village 
councils and elders clearly paid no attention to the state law regarding forests 
and continued to exercise their customary- based rights. The weak state authori-
ties were not capable of protecting the legal licensees. The local police and ad-
ministration were corrupt and unable to help the case, either. As a result of this 
conflict, the northern Albanian forests were exploited in a way that was far from 
the optimal sustainable development criteria. By the end of the 20th century, 
this region had been highly deforested and the failure of the license system was 
Jan Bazyli Klakla84
obvious. At the beginning of the 21st century, a new plan for protecting Albanian 
forests and providing a better legal framework for forestry was introduced under 
the auspices of the World Bank. Ironically, it was based on customary institutions 
and showed great similarities to the solutions rejected by the government in the 
early1990s (ibid., 36, 39).
Conclusion
In my opinion, the situation in Albania during the transformation process can be 
described as a case of social anomie. According to the classic definition (associ-
ated with Emile Durkheim), social anomie is perceived as a ‘condition in which 
society provides little moral guidance to individuals‘ (Macionis, Gerber 2010, 97). 
In a more modern approach, among others presented by Robert Merton (1938), 
it is seen rather as the discrepancy between the common social goals and the le-
gitimate means to attain those goals. Such a discrepancy can be clearly seen in the 
cases presented in the paper above. Socialism as a political and social system has 
fallen, but democracy and civil society have not developed yet. The weak state and 
its corrupt authorities and agencies were unable to provide a stable legal frame-
work for people to achieve their goals (social justice, reprivatisation, exercising 
rights in the forests, etc.). Moreover, even the communist regime was partially un-
able to enforce significant changes in social structure, which allowed the Kanun to 
be preserved as a normative system alternative to state law (Bardhoshi 2012, 121).
Religion as well, a normative system that has a potential to be a moral guide 
and a unifying force in society in a time of transition, was not able to do so, then. 
Albania before the communist times was a country of religious pluralism. It was 
inhabited by the Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Sunni Muslims, and Bektashi. 
Bektashija is a Turkish dervish brotherhood that represented 25% of the Alba-
nian Muslim community. It was founded between the 12th and 14th centuries 
in Anatolia and went from the great influence they had in the Ottoman Empire 
to prosecution and a ban that was imposed on them in 1925. Bektashija is a 
syncretic religion combining mostly Christian and Muslim practices (Lubonja 
2002, 76). During the formation of the Albanian national identity, the issue of 
religion was one of the most important. On the one hand, choosing Islam (the 
religion of the majority of Albanians) as part of the common Albanian identity 
would not have been well received in the Western European countries and would 
have been considered as an unnecessary tie with the falling Ottoman Empire. On 
the other hand, religion had to distinguish the Albanians from the neighbouring 
Christian nations – the Serbs and the Greeks. Moreover, choosing Christianity as 
an integrating force would be difficult as it was the religion of a minority (ibid., 
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74). After the Second World War, Enver Hoxa and the communist government 
started the fight with any form of religiosity, together with the prosecution of all 
organized religions. In 1967, all religious practices were banned and churches, 
mosques, and tekke (bektashi temples) were transformed into cinemas, restau-
rants or warehouses. Albania was officially declared the first fully- atheist country 
in the world (ibid., 78).
Because of the above, religion was not able to play an integrative role in the 
society after the transition. It could not fill the gap that was left by the lack of state 
regulations and state presence in general. The integrative role of religion is well 
described in the literature. Emile Durkheim wrote that beliefs and practices tend 
to unify people in a moral community (Kehrer 2006, 38). Bronisław Malinowski 
believed that religion has the power to restabilize group unity in boundary situ-
ations (ibid., 44). He gave an anthropological example of the death of a group 
member, but in my opinion, a general transition from one political system to 
another can be seen as an example of boundary situation on a larger scale. Thus, 
it required a strong, preferably deeply- internalized, normative guidance to bring 
back predictability and stability.
As it can be seen from the examples given above, customary law was the only 
stable normative system that could provide that kind of guidance at the given 
time. From today’s perspective, some of the regulations may seem ancient and 
outdated (like a blood feud system) but they were clear, precise and (due to the 
respect that the Kanun enjoyed in the society) they guaranteed some sort of pre-
dictability. As it was presented in the paper above, the shift towards customary 
law had some positive (decollectivisation) and negative (blood feuds), as well as 
highly- ambivalent (forest rights) consequences.
Originally, the concept of social anomie was developed to help understand 
‘the repercussions of rapid social change on social integration and social stability’ 
(Huschka, Mau 2005, 467). We commonly associate anomie with ‘great difficul-
ties of individual adaptation, resulting in a loss of general social orientation, the 
development of feelings of insecurity and marginalization, uncontrolled rising 
expectations, feelings of relative deprivation and the questioning of the legitimacy 
of core social values’ (Orru`, 1987: 215). As it was demonstrated above, that was 
the case of post- communist transition in Albania. On the other hand, one key 
element should be mentioned here, which goes beyond the traditional mean-
ing of social anomie. Lack of trust in state institutions, governments laws and 
reforms was so strong in Northern Albania, because new regulations proved to 
be incompatible with the local traditions, the Kanun and some of its core values 
(Bardhoshi 2012, 122). Therefore, a cultural aspect should be considered as well 
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when we talk about social anomie in transitional countries (for other examples, 
see Huschka, Mau 2005 on South Africa, Adnanes 2007 on Bulgaria, Kolarska- 
Bobitiska on Poland and others).
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Transitioning Boundaries Between Law and 
Social Practice: Corruption in Hungary Before 
and After 1989
Abstract: The modern history of corruption in Hungary demonstrates that when social 
structures and the legal system are in a constant state of flux, turning away from the nor-
mative order and focusing on personal values instead is particularly attractive. When of-
ficial norms are changing persistently, individuals are keen to find stability and reliability 
in their mutually shared norms and personal relations outside the scope of the laws. The 
transformation of social structures is a very complex ongoing process causing widespread 
uncertainty regarding the social, legal and moral perception of which act counts as corrup-
tion. Historic evidence proves that the legal understanding of corruption and the specific 
countermeasures have constantly been changing and developing. While the most impor-
tant actor regarding anti- corruption measures has always been the state, the exclusive and 
discretionary power coming from its monopoly position, especially since the socialist era, 
has turned into a general social demand for the government to take an active lead in such 
initiatives, while most Hungarian citizens, in a rather passive manner, expect the laws to 
have a positive impact on their livelihoods.
Introduction: corruption in transition
There is no single definition of corruption due to the different social, economic, 
legal, historical and cultural understandings of it. The different academic disci-
plines, instead of providing one unified definition, rather emphasize the different 
economic, political, social and cultural characteristics, attributes, paradigms and 
inherent contradictions related to corruption. From a merely economic point of 
view, corruption is a ‘pervasive failure to tap self- interest for productive purposes’ 
(Rose- Ackermann 1999, 2). Furthermore, corruption is also seen as a sign of ir-
responsibility in the redistribution of resources and thus violates the legal and 
social norms of public and civic order (Rogow and Lasswell 1970, 54–55). The 
skewed allocation of resources leads to limited supply and increasing demand 
in, inter alia, public services and intensifies rent- seeking up to illegal measures 
(Mauro 1977, 4–6).
However, it would be a mistake to regard corruption as a mere exchange of 
money or bribe for services carried out for lucrative purposes. It influences several 
other ‘goods’, not only in economic terms, that have special value for the society: 
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properties, salaries, private services, licences, social benefits, employment, as well 
as behaviour (loyalty, political attitude, kindness) and the ‘conditions of autono-
mous human existence’ as lack of fear, feeling of security, human rights, opportu-
nities and choices made in life (Hankiss 1983, 92). To provide the widest possible 
understanding of the phenomenon for the sake of this study a deliberately broader 
approach is to be used encompassing any act of abuse of entrusted power, office 
or competence for private gain which might entail pecuniary and non- pecuniary 
benefits for the parties concerned.
Societies and the norms they enforce are in constant flux under the influence 
of political, economic and cultural changes. The social balance is easily shaken 
in case of radical normative transformations, as it happened in Hungary turning 
from communism to capitalism after 1989. Under the communist rule ideological 
corruption, taken in a broad sense, caused the disintegration of the belief sys-
tem and the state by misinterpreting rules to the power holders’ own advantage. 
Due to the systematic and pervasive misinterpretation, exceptions from the le-
gal order multiplied and often became the rule (Friedrich 2002, 17). Hence, the 
communist era has produced its own social values, norms and customs, such as 
informal gratitude payments in the health care sector and the tight network of 
the nepotistic nomenklatura. Even where paying bribes did not prevail in society, 
the use of contacts, networks and influence to purchase goods and services was 
widespread. Furthermore, traditional practices as gifts, bargaining and relying 
on networks or kinship have been largely perceived as inseparable from social 
reality and corruption.
In the new market societies both ordinary citizens and state employees found 
themselves overwhelmed by unstructured and unprecedented normative plural-
ism, hence ‘increasingly vulnerable in an unregulated public sphere’ (Rivkin- Fish 
2005, 63). One way out from the pressure of everyday moral choices and legal 
contradictions was legitimising corruption as a natural element of state opera-
tion and a mutually accepted method to receive services sooner than others in 
exchange for additional payments (Sedlenieks 2004, 123). Another path of ad-
justment was following the new, mostly unwritten rules set up by the powerful 
elite or the underworld extorting the state, especially if the social consequences 
and sanctions for breaking such rules were much stricter than for breaching legal 
regulations (Žižek 1996, 100).
Hungary has shared many of such experiences with other post- communist 
countries. The transformation of social structures has been a highly complex 
(and still ongoing) process causing widespread uncertainty regarding the social, 
legal and moral perception of which act counts as corruption. To understand the 
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distinctive characteristics of the transition of corruption in Hungary after 1989, 
this study aims to explore how the understanding and perception of corruption 
have evolved both under socialism and market capitalism, whether the relevant 
laws and counter- measures were adapted to the drastic social, political, economic 
and legal changes, and how the Hungarian society and its members reacted to 
the transformation.
Before the transition: corruption and its legal implications in 
the socialist Hungary
After World War II fighting corruption became a central subject of the public 
agenda. Both the legal and the social approach to corruption were dominated 
by the communist ideology introduced by the Hungarian Workers Party (MDP). 
The MDP as the ‘sole remaining’ political force after a few turbulent years after 
World War II got to absolute power in 1949 and remained there (after 1956 its 
successor was called Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party [MSZMP]) until the 1989 
political transition. While upon the Constitution adopted in 1949, ‘on paper, Hun-
gary constitutionally retained a restricted political pluralism in political life and 
a separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers’ (Romsics 2010, 268), in 
reality, the country became a totalitarian state under the realm of the Soviet Un-
ion. Tackling corruption played a significant role in the socialist ideology. Social 
theorist Karl Marx, who (along with Friedrich Engels) laid the ideological founda-
tions of socialism, saw corruption as a natural and inevitable accompaniment of 
each ‘exploitive’ capitalist society in which the ruling social class, the ‘bourgeoisie’ 
aimed to maintain its rule also by using corrupt means (Marx 1852).1
The materialist definition of corruption based on historic dialecticism and 
Marxism- Leninism approached corruption from several aspects. On the general 
level corruption was regarded as a phenomenon determined by economic and 
social relations, as well as a social mass phenomenon that corrected and distorted 
the share order of the material and non- material goods produced. On the specific 
level corruption was connected to distinct classes of society that held a separate 
place in the social order of work share. On the individual level, the approach that 
1 Regarding the inherent corruption in political life Marx noted that in the course of the 
19th century parliamentary elections in England ’…the Bourgeoisie contended for the 
principle of moral elections and forced the enactment of laws in that sense, intended, 
each of them, as safeguards against the local influence of the landed aristocracy; and 
indeed, from 1831 down, bribery adopted a more civilized, more hidden form, and 
general elections went off in a more sober way than before’ (Marx 1852).
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appeared in the legal regulations as well, corruption was an interaction between 
an active and a passive partner in which the passive partner held the power to 
act or make a decision, while the active partner provided a pecuniary or non- 
pecuniary advantage for a manipulation putting him into a better position (ibid., 
67–68). Fighting corruption in Hungary was a prominent task and monopoly of 
the state, while social movements and initiatives falling outside the control of the 
government were feared, thus were consequently terminated and banned in the 
1950s (Kuti 1993, 4).
High importance was given to rooting out corruption threatening the new 
Hungarian socialist state. Administrative and judicial wrongdoings, red tape and 
the abuse of hierarchical power were seen as the most severe problems. Despite the 
criminal regulations the social practice of hiring professional procurers and fixers 
to ease the bureaucratic procedures was still an inherent part of everyday public 
administration (Villányi 1947, 27). The communist propaganda machine had a 
significant impact on the measures against bureaucratic corruption. Councils, the 
newly established and highly centralized administrative bodies that replaced local 
governments were expected to ‘fight any kind of opportunism, abuse and corrup-
tion’, because, as a functionary of that time argued, ‘we must not let them get into 
the mood tow fed by the enemy’. Under the oppressive regime of Mátyás Rákosi 
the forms and instances of corruption dropped radically. Not only the general fear 
from the regime and its leaders prevented such acts, but the perfectly structured 
spying system and the cruelty of the secret police as well. In the first half of the 
1950s more than one million Hungarians became targets of investigations by the 
law enforcement authorities, ‘which meant that practically every third family was 
a subject to some form of political harassment’ carried out by the repressive state 
and its collaborators (Kolář 2014, 208).
Nevertheless, corruption never disappeared. While the totalitarian state and its 
leaders had all the means to utilize and corrupt their power, most citizens tried 
to improve their living standards through petty corruption (Horváth 2001, 73). 
Following years of retaliation after the defeat of the 1956 Revolution, repression 
took a different path. János Kádár established the so- called soft dictatorship in 
which the state became more stable and the number of political trials decreased 
(Skilling 1984, 430). While the state monopolized all segments of business life that 
resulted in planned and state- owned economy (Holmes 2013, 1165), power was 
strictly centralized to members of distinguished circles of society who had influ-
ence on decision- making, the executive, control bodies and the judiciary (Szamel 
1989, 15–16). The political system relied heavily on its so- called nomenklatura, 
the exclusive network of party functionaries, political and economic leaders, presi-
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dents of local councils, public prosecutors, judges and members of the police all 
appointed upon political criteria and connected through close relationships or 
even friendships (Schöpflin 1990, 4). The second line of network could also be 
characterized as outer circle consisted of the implementers of the decisions as 
well as the leaders of more formal and representative bodies including the trade 
union, youth organizations and the ‘Workers’ Militia’ (Munkásőrség) (Horváth 
2001, 77–78). Furthermore, party leaders selected people to senior positions con-
sciously and influenced the appointments of middle managers, thus creating a 
tangled network of interests, loyalty and clientelism that allowed them to uphold 
the system (Pintér 1998, 76).
Soon enough members of society were divided on whether they had access to 
sufficient power to be corrupt or not (Horváth 2001, 75). Access was particularly 
important, since all goods, services, privileges and exemptions were selectively 
distributed to ensure the power of the socialist elite (Hankiss 2001, 17). First, 
corruption was seen and tolerated as an essential means to grease the wheels of 
the shortage economy that was lacking important social goods (Horváth 2001, 
75). By the time the new economic mechanisms were introduced in 1968 the state 
basically accepted opaque methods like tipping, gratitude money in the health 
service, excessive overtime work as advantageous ways of petty corruption helping 
its citizens to improve their life (ibid., 74). In addition to the evident economic 
perks corruption was also tolerated to prevent social and political unrest. Eco-
nomic benefits, regardless of their source or nature, in exchange for the restricted 
implementation of fundamental rights, like freedom of speech and assembly, 
could promote loyalty to the system (Holmes 2002, 55). In the parallel economic 
mechanisms corruption flourished to the extent that by the 1980s it operated as 
a recognized ‘second economy’ that everybody was familiar with and used to his 
own advantage. The ‘second economy’ was often seen as a mixture of ‘95% of 
honest and hard work and 5% of corruption, fraud and theft, that discredited the 
whole of that segment of life’ (Hankiss 1986, 192).
At the same time, the legal system could function in a fairly accountable way 
as long as the powerful elite remained above the law.2 According to the socialist 
2 For example, despite his well- known luxurious lifestyle during the socialist era, Lajos 
Czinege, who was the minister of defence between 1960 and 1984, had only been 
investigated after the transition. The investigation was launched rather exceptionally 
in a decision of the Parliament referring to a book written about Czinege’s affairs. The 
decision also emphasized that ’the governments of the Kádár regime did not comply 
with their constitutional duties regarding the direction and control of the Ministry of 
Defence, therefore it shall bear the responsibility for each wrongdoing and the immoral 
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notion of legality, law was considered to be a mean of state control, while its 
implementers were merely seen as executers’ of the state’s will. Leaning rather 
on the law enforcement bodies to uphold the system the Kádár regime did not 
utilize courts to oppress society directly. The government left the judiciary to 
work almost independently, but judges still faced serious political constraints 
and lacked social appreciation (Fleck 1996, 52–53). Parallel to the shift in the 
economic system, by the 1980s the control over the judiciary and law enforce-
ment had loosened up, as the requirement to hold party membership in order 
to become a judge, public prosecutor or police officer was lifted. The more 
lenient new approach was particularly important since party organizations 
discussing each case were still operating at the bodies concerned, and their 
decisions were binding for, inter alia, party member judges and prosecutors. 
Direct informal control was apparent from the investigation until the courts 
brought their decisions. Only carefully selected people chosen by the Socialist 
Party leadership could handle cases that were declared politically sensitive. 
Most judges never gained in- depth knowledge about the background of such 
sensitive cases they adjudicated. Hence the political elite’s escape from crimi-
nal proceedings disturbed the judges more than false accusations or judgments 
(Fleck 1996, 56).
The legal system also reflected the changes in the morphology of corrupt deeds, 
thus incorporating the widest possible understanding of the public sector as well 
as the clarity of the economic and cultural life. As the result of the evolution of 
both corruption and its regulation, the Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code (1978 
Criminal Code) that had been in force until 2012 differentiated between active and 
passive as well as official (administrative) and economic bribery (Section 250–252, 
Section 253–254). While official (administrative) bribery was seen as a threat to 
the political- social system on the whole, economic bribery had the potential to 
disturb the order of making business. It regulated the special case of bribery relat-
ed to the media (Section 255) if an advantage was provided or received to publish 
or withdraw information through mass broadcasters. The 1978 Criminal Code 
also included official (administrative) and economic trading in influence, while 
Section 257 punished the persecution of so- called announcers of public interest, 
i.e. whistle- blowers. Passive bribery was an immaterial crime, its result, namely the 
breach of official duty, overstepping competence or misuse of official competence 
conditions that evolved among the leaders of the military’. Point 2 of the Decision 
No. 28/1990. (III. 13.) OGY on the contents of Imre Bokor’s book titled Oligarchs in 
Uniform (Kiskirályok mundérban) (Translation by P.B.)
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was sanctioned severely (Kránitz 1988, 132–135). As to the subjects of the law, 
on one hand, party officials were not included in the category of public officials. 
Pointing out the evident contradiction, legal scholar Lajos Szamel underlined the 
importance of the positions senior party members and ‘functionaries of other 
political entities’ held, since they were also subjects of special confidence, hence 
the corruption they committed was ‘the most brutal abuse’, yet, it was treated less 
harshly (Szamel 1989, 19). On the other hand, while party functionaries enjoyed 
the special status of exemption, the scope of the regulation had been extended 
to members of co- operations and associations as possible perpetrators. The ad-
vantage that could have been acquired through corruption implied both mate-
rial (pecuniary) and non- material, so- called personal advantages under the law. 
Interestingly, Hungary provided protection for whistle- blowers from quite early 
on. The Act I of 1977 on announcements of public interest, recommendations and 
complaints aimed to protect the announcers and obliged the organs to solve the 
cases lodged to them. However, instead of using the system to blow the whistle 
on corruption, people regarded any channels of reporting with suspicion due to 
the operation of the secret state services and their opaque methods of collecting 
and using data about and against citizens.
Economic corruption flourished in the opaque mechanisms of the second 
economy that mostly fell out of the realm of the legal system and the compe-
tence of the law enforcement authorities (Hankiss 1986, 193). Transactions were 
either integrated and legally accepted parts of the official system or, being very 
much apparent and tolerated, hardly punishable under the law. Autonomous 
acts outside the realm of the state and the scope of the legal regulations were 
often referred to as the black market (Sík 1992, 156). However, such typologies 
were only straightforward in theory, since, in reality, transactions were often 
closely related to each other, practically depending on each other, blurring the 
boundaries between legal and illegal. Furthermore, the implicit governmental 
support of hidden transactions encouraged ‘cynicism and disrespect for the 
law when it conflicted with individual interests’ (Rose 1998, 67). Deeds adju-
dicated under economic corruption typically included securing procurements, 
handling matters out of turn, accepting non- quality products from small arti-
sans and entrepreneurs, enabling admission to technical college or vocational 
school, as well as issuing permits (Duschek 1968, 30). Corruption risks in the 
socialist public administration lay in the over- bureaucratisation of permissions, 
the wide discretion of local officials and the lacking general overview of the 
official records.
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The Hungarian state and corruption after the transition
In the Socialist era most people lived under the ‘Paradigm of Prisoners’, being 
‘deprived of the freedom of shaping their own lives and the joys of a self- fulfilling 
life’, but ‘the world in which they lived had its comforts and tempting gratifica-
tions’ (Hankiss 1994, 117). Consequently, when in 1989 the social contract (or 
rather silent agreement) on maintaining the living standards for general passive 
obedience could not be upheld, the collapse of the political and economic system 
became unavoidable (Hollander 1993, 50). The ‘the unique and unprecedented 
nature’ of the peaceful, yet heavily compromised transition process had turned 
out to be extremely complex, with tremendous impact on the national identity 
and social constructions, the constitutional system as well as the economy (Offe 
2004, 505). Furthermore, the dual political and economic transition had a mutual 
impact on each- other also shaping the level of corruption and the implementation 
of fundamental rights.
During socialism members of the Hungarian society lived among relatively 
equal living conditions as same amount of work paid the same salary (Cserta 2000, 
89). While socialism operated upon the principle of centralized social redistribu-
tion and bargained interests in society, with the introduction of market economy 
the gap between living standards widened drastically (Hankiss 2002, 246–247). 
In the socialist era, when clientelism was at its peak, small- scale corruption was 
widely seen and applied as a ‘side effect of the given social organization’ (Sajó 2002, 
15). Meanwhile, throughout the transition, corruption evolved from the realm 
of rather petty everyday interactions to a new level, mostly characterized as state 
capture. Through state capture corrupt stakeholders not only used the existing 
legal and social order for their own benefit, but shaped ‘the basic rules of the game 
(i.e. laws, rules, decrees and regulations) through illicit and non- transparent pri-
vate payments to public officials’ (Hellman 2000, 2), to the extent that ‘corruption 
has replaced repression as the main threat to the rule of law’ (Rose et al. 1998, 219).
Corruption was not limited to scattered occurrences of public and private sec-
tor bribery anymore (Nielsen et al. 1995, 14). Instead, it was rather understood 
as the hardly avoidable network of illegal social interactions without which the 
new political system could have not operated (Sajó 2001). However, the number 
of documented corruption cases between 1981 and 1999 decreased, never reach-
ing 1000 cases a year, while the total number of crimes increased from 120,000 
to almost 500,000 per year (Kránitz 2000, 11).
The new level and forms of corruption were able to thrive in the nascent new 
economic order accompanied by insufficient expertise and hasty regulations. At 
the beginning of the 1990s the restructuring and sale of former state enterprises 
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was completed in a very short period of time. Initially, though ‘the emerging new 
political elite seemed to be practically independent from business interests’, they 
soon ‘lost their innocence’ (Hankiss 2002, 253). The legal and institutional frame-
work, as well as the political and economic experience, was hardly sufficient to 
provide a stable background or control the privatization of socialist state property 
(Terták 2000, 18). The privatization procedure included many corruption risks 
that influenced not only the distribution of state, party and private wealth, but 
has determined the level and nature of corruption in Hungary ever since (Sajó 
2002, 7). Through the opaque, spontaneous privatization during the last years of 
socialism, private persons got hold of parts and shares of state property upon very 
favourable conditions, mostly using the existing loopholes in the legal system. 
After 1990 the state agency for privatizations (first called ÁVÜ, later ÁPV Rt.) be-
came responsible for centralized privatization. Political pressure became evident 
when the final decisions regarding the applications were taken. Most influence 
was targeted at the administrators handling requests and providing information 
about each procedure (Mihályi 2000, 33). A comprehensive regulation covering 
the process was only adopted in 1995, almost a decade after privatization started.3
In addition to the disputed ways of gaining state property and, along with it, 
private wealth, decision- makers of the competent state agency were highly wel-
comed to take jobs at companies, which they helped through the privatization 
procedure. Exemptions approved by the government enabled the frequent use of 
the revolving door between the private and the public sector. As a result, privati-
zation became a hotbed for political corruption. While government jobs, private 
sector positions and services were offered in exchange for different favours and 
money, ‘the emerging governments acted as clients, in their turn, of the patrons 
who helped these governing parties to win elections’ (Sajó 2002, 7). Beside officials 
and companies involved in the corrupt practices of third parties including fixers, 
lobbyists and lawyers who assisted the lucrative transactions also benefitted from 
the shady procedures. Paradoxically, while scandals were common and the eco-
nomic transformation was regarded as an advantageous way- out for the socialist 
nomenklatura to gain new wealth in the enterprises (also called nomenklatura 
privatization), (former) state officials were also held indispensable for their exper-
3 Act XXXIX of 1995 on entrepreneurial property owned by the state. Previously, pri-
vatization was covered by the Act LIII of 1992 on handling and capitalization of the 
entrepreneurial property remaining permanently under state ownership and Act LIV of 
1992 on the realization, capitalization and protection of property remaining temporar-
ily under state ownership. The Act XIII of 1989 on the transition of business entities 
and companies also applied.
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tise in economics, therefore the overall public opinion was more lenient regarding 
their lacking lustration or purging (Hollander 1993, 47). Public officials who did 
not have access to the benefits of privatization, on the other hand, mostly had 
to rely on their personal loyalty to those in power and use the means offered by 
clientelism to avoid uncertainty (Kulcsár 2006, 191). By the middle of the 1990s, 
society at large accepted corruption as a necessary phenomenon that accompanied 
the turn to market economy (Cserta 2000, 89). Paying bribes to front- line public 
officials (including policemen and, according to the contemporary legal terminol-
ogy, civil servants) was hardly condemned, instead overall sympathy was shown 
for their need to compensate low salaries and lost privileges previously enjoyed 
in the socialist era with petty bribes (Holmes 2002, 55). Public surveys showed 
similar views regarding the ‘necessity’ of corruption, putting the maintenance of 
living conditions and low income high on the list of justifications.
Table: Reasons for accepting bribes compared to the situation before the political transition 
in 2000 (Gábos 2000, 16)
Reasons for accepting bribes compared to the 
situation before the political transition
Affirmative answers in 
percentage of the respondents
More money is needed to maintain living standard 44%
Low salary of public officials 41%
The reputation of authorities is damaged for tolerating 
corruption
27%
People tolerate corruption 22%
It’s not certain that authorities are always just 21%
The authorities lack staff and money 19%
Privatisation 18%
The heritage of communism 10%
Lacking confidence in authorities 10%
Market economy 9%
Anomie (it’s not evident what is a crime to punish) 8%
Competition in politics 6%
Impact of the West 5%
Despite the expectations the socialist second economy had not turned out to be 
a well- functioning private sector, rather it evolved to be an ‘informal economy’ 
incorporating ‘all income- earning activities that take place outside the scope of 
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state regulation’ (Sík 1992, 155). Entrepreneurship was still often taken as a second 
job; tax evasion was widespread, while unregistered work became the favoured 
form of employment (Stark 1995, 73). At the beginning of the 1990s, after the 
liberalization of oil and gas, the competition in the market set the prize. Due to 
the lacking regulations on importing gas, hundreds of applicants got permission 
to trade. The gas business proved to be particularly lucrative, as, until the adoption 
of the Act LVIII of 1993 on the regulation and control of excise custom payment, 
suspensions could have been requested. From 1995 to 1998 products classified 
as ‘other heating oil’ were exempted from paying taxes. Consequently, officials, 
especially underpaid police and customs officers who granted permissions were 
constant targets of corruption, as the so- called oil entrepreneurs needed a network 
of corrupt officials to keep their oil business operating (Terták 2000, 20–21). In 
extreme cases, the systematic demand for bribes might have established extortive 
power for the corrupt officials (Sajó 2001). The out- of- date and almost chaotic 
administrative register systems were typically transitional corruption risks with 
significant impact on economic development. The court registry recording data 
on companies could not cope with the overwhelming amount of newly established 
firms at the beginning of the 1990s. At the same time, the serious delays to record 
new ownerships in the land registry gave way to many frauds. Clients, eager to 
speed up the procedures, tried to offer bribes to public officials. Furthermore, 
properties with pending final registration could have been sold on more occa-
sions, deceiving potential buyers (Terták 2000, 22).
Conclusion: from transition to a constant state of flux
The transition process in Hungary has highlighted that the understanding of 
corruption is a constantly changing and developing notion. The central actor 
shaping both corruption and anti- corruption measures has traditionally been 
the state. Meanwhile, the exclusive and discretionary power coming from that 
monopole position has turned into a general social demand towards the govern-
ment to take an active lead in such initiatives, while citizens, in general, expect 
the laws to have impact on their livelihoods in a rather passive manner. However, 
the state, in the Hungarian context, is a highly complex actor with paradoxical 
connotations.4 The regulation of anti- corruption measures and the extent to which 
4 Losing the country’s independence first to the Turkish- Ottoman occupation, then 
being the subject to bureaucratic systems operated by or under the influence of the 
Habsburg Empire altogether for almost 450 years has had a significant impact on the 
popular attitude towards it. Deceiving or cheating the government by fraud and cor-
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dubious transactions were tolerated has always been dependent on the state’s and 
its leaders’ actual political and economic interests. Beside the willingness of the 
powerful the effectiveness of the legislation has been highly determined by the 
competence of the authorities concerned to investigate corruption cases, their 
oversight of other bodies as well as their own institutional integrity and the ability 
to prevent such deeds.
Admittedly, most anti- corruption measures have hardly been the direct inter-
est of the citizens either. Instead, the deeply rooted traditions of clientelism built 
upon the trust vested in networks and power have rather seemed to take precedent 
over the implementation of laws. In such cases, the legal regulations have lost 
their normativity for being regarded with overall cynicism, due to their lacking 
social value and personal benefit. One advantageous way to use the weakening 
legal system for those in power has been drafting and passing regulations for their 
own sake (i.e. state capture), causing further loss of faith in the laws, the state and 
economy. As the experiences of the socialist era have proved, such a tendency 
does not necessarily lead to social anomie but to a chain of secondary transac-
tions in society. However, history has also showed that such parallel normative 
and economic systems cannot be sustained in the long run.
The Hungarian transitional history has proved that turning away from the 
normative order and finding own values is particularly relevant if social structures 
and the legal system is in a constant flux. When the ‘official’ norms are changing 
persistently, individuals are keen to find stability and reliability in their mutually 
shared norms and personal relations outside the scope of the laws. Loopholes 
were frequently used in more peaceful times to establish personal wealth. Trans-
formation of the social structures is still a very complex ongoing process, while 
the evident rise in the quantity of legislation alone is hardly sufficient to include 
all aspects under the law or prevent regulations from failing. Around and after the 
accession to the European Union the number of regulations and strategies aiming 
to reduce the level of corruption have increased significantly, but even with the 
growth of specifically designed and targeted legislation, both the measured and 
perceived level of corruption exacerbated. That is not to say that the legal measures 
concerned, in general, do not operate at all, but signals that there are fundamental 
mistakes in the dominant top- down approach applied in anti- corruption legisla-
tion, also influencing the implementation of democratic principles and human 
rights in Hungary.
ruption were rather regarded as patriotic acts and signs of social solidarity than crimes 
against the law.
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Law, Politics and the Economy in Poland’s 
Post- Socialist Transformation: Preliminary 
Notes Towards an Investigation
Abstract: The paper aims at analysing the role of law in systemic transformation on the 
example of Poland’s move from Actually Existing Socialism (1944–1989) to capitalism. For 
this purpose four case studies are analysed: the lex Wilczek liberalizing economic activity, 
the privatization laws of 1987 and 1990, the Round Table agreements of April 1989 and, 
finally, the establishment of the Constitutional Court (1986). On the basis of each case 
study, a certain order of causation is established. Drawing on similarities identified between 
the four case studies, the paper draws the conclusion that in the first phase of transforma-
tion, the law was instrumentalised by political decision- makers, motivated by economic 
factors, in order to bring about changes in the social reality. However, once the law was put 
into motion, a new dynamic emerged in which the law started to play an independent role. 
Referring to recent research by Bruno Schönfelder, the paper concludes that this growing 
autonomy of the law can be seen as the essence of post- socialist transformation as such.
…legal changes have, in essence, a secondary charac-
ter with regard to all other changes. They do not com-
mence principal social processes, but rather confirm 
within the legal system what has already taken place 
in the economy, politics and other areas of social life.
Jan Wawrzyniak (2011, 12)1
Introduction
It can be said that the political and socio- economic transition from Actually 
Existing Socialism2 towards capitalism and democracy took the Polish legal 
* The present paper represents the Author’s personal views and should not be attributed 
to any specific institution or organisation
1 All quotations from Polish texts have been translated by the Author.
2 The element of ‘actually existing’ in the term serves to emphasise the gap between 
‘socialism’ in the strict sense of the word (as envisaged, e.g. by Marx and Engels or 
by non- Soviet Marxists) and the actual economic, political and social practice in the 
Soviet bloc (Sowa 2012). Being aware of a long- standing debate as to the nature of that 
system, in particular whether it should be described even as ‘state capitalism’ (e.g. Cliff 
1948), I do not wish to enter it here, sticking to a purely descriptive understanding 
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elites by surprise. Indeed, despite the participation of certain lawyers in the anti- 
communist opposition movement (especially among advocates), the legal com-
munity en masse participated in the everyday workings of the system as judges, 
prosecutors, legal advisors or university professors. The transformation came from 
outside the sphere of law, originating rather in the spheres of politics and the 
economy.
The main enquiry of the paper will be whether, in the socio- economic trans-
formation of 1989, the law was merely a ‘form’ which recorded (more or less faith-
fully) the changes in the socio- economic and political ‘substance’ (or, as Marxists 
would say, was the law merely a ‘superstructure’ which reflected changes in the 
‘base’)? In other words, can it be said that law was not ‘autonomous’ in the trans-
formation, being merely ‘an expression of the will of the sovereign with nearly no 
limitation’ (Czarnota 2016, 316)? Or, perhaps, was it the other way around, i.e. that 
the transforming impulses originated in the law itself? Or, perhaps, a middle way 
answer is correct, namely that the transformation did not originate in the legal 
sphere, but that sphere contributed to the dynamics of transformation?
In order to answer this theoretical question, the paper intends to give a pre-
liminary empirical look at the interstices of law and transformation in Poland 
at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. Four case studies will be analysed: the lex 
Wilczek liberalising economic activty; early privatisation laws; the Round Table 
agreement of 1989; and the emergence of the rule of law in the case- law of the 
Constitutional Court.
It must, however, be underlined that the present enquiry has but a preliminary 
character, and rather aims at framing questions (something which is often more 
important than giving answers), making notes towards further investigation, as 
well as putting forward some working hypotheses. What must be underscored is 
of the notion of ‘actually existing socialism’. According to the late Polish economist 
Tadeusz Kowalik (1926–2012): ‘The most important attribute of really [actually] ex-
isting socialism was the combination of closely centralized and hierarchical political 
authority with state ownership of means of production. This gave the political author-
ity nearly absolute control over the economy. The all- encompassing planning, often 
called command- distributive planning, was bureaucratic in nature’ (Kowalik 2011, 26). 
Furthermore, I concur with critical theorist Jan Sowa that ‘there are strong theoretical 
and historical reasons to question the communist nature of regimes developed within 
the Soviet Bloc in the 20th century (…) if we accept the conceptual framework devel-
oped by Marx and Engels as a point of reference’ (Sowa 2012, 26). Therefore, despite 
the practice of many other authors, I do not use the term ‘communism’ to describe the 
social, economic and political system of actually existing socialism.
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that giving a fully fledged answer – even limited to the four case studies – would 
certainly require an in- depth interdisciplinary (legal, economic, sociological) re-
search, the outcome of which would require (at least) the volume of a research 
monograph in its own right.
Theoretical and methodological considerations
The paper adopts a tripartite division of social reality into the spheres of law, 
the economy and politics. The division of human activity into distinct phenom-
ena, including inter alia law, politics and the economy, is a commonly held view 
among social theorists of very different inspirations (e.g. Bourdieu 1986; Berger 
and Luckmann 1991; Kojève 2007; Luhmann 2013). These spheres are concep-
tualised differently, as ‘fields’ (Bourdieu 1986), ‘institutional worlds’ (Berger and 
Luckmann 1991), ‘phenomena’ (Kojève 2007) or ‘systems’ (Luhmann 2013). Ad-
mittedly, the way in which the distinct facets of social life are conceptualised has 
an impact on an analysis of their mutual relationships, not only through a differ-
ent terminology, but also through a different understanding of how these spheres 
interact. This division is not intended to be exhaustive: such spheres as religion, 
administration (bureaucracy), education or culture are left out from my analysis, 
although they could also play a role in the transformation processes. The method 
for differentiating the three spheres rests upon the binary code upon which they 
are founded, for law it is ‘legal/illegal’, for the economy it is ‘profitable/not profit-
able’ and for politics it is ‘friend/enemy’ (Paździora and Stambulski 2014, 57), as 
well as the main principle underlying each sphere, for law it is legality (norma-
tivity), for the economy – value, and for politics – it is (political) power. Finally, 
each sphere has its typical core of social practices which allow to identify it – for 
law these are predominantly legislation and adjudication (Mańko 2009, 113), for 
the economy – production, services and commerce, for politics – struggle for 
power (democratic or not). Finally, decisions taken in the logic of each sphere 
have a different legitimacy – a decision in the sphere of law is based on legality, 
a decision in the sphere of the economy is based on profitability, and a decision 
in the sphere of politics is based on effectiveness (instrumental logic, based on 
pursuing political goals). Characteristically for our context of post- communist 
transformation, the official Marxist- Leninist ideology explicitly rejected the divi-
sion of social reality into distinct spheres of law, politics and economy and one of 
the aims of communists was to bring them under the hegemony of the political 
sphere (Schönfelder 2016, 299).
Applying this abstract typology to the historical period from which the four 
case studies originate, it can be said that the ‘legal’ sphere refers to the enactment 
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of legal texts by the Parliament (statutes and constitutional amendments), as well 
as the judicial activity of the courts (case- law of the Constitutional Court); the 
‘economic’ refers to the economic activity both of individuals (privately- owned) 
and public (state- owned) enterprises; whilst the ‘political’ sphere refers to political 
decisions taken by the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), by the opposition, as 
well as by voters (e.g. 4 June 1989 elections). At least with regard to this concrete 
historical period, the differentiation of social reality into law, politics and the 
economy does not seem to cause any practical doubts.
Having thus identified the three spheres both in abstracto, as well as in concreto 
for the period under scrutiny, it should be underlined that the object of the en-
quiry is to answer the question, which of these spheres influences the other ones, 
i.e. which of them exerts causal effects. I will resort to graphical representations of 
such influence, assuming that it will help to conceptualise the research problem 
and help to identify common elements in all case studies. For this purpose, I will 
use L to denote the legal sphere, E to denote the economic sphere and P to denote 
the political sphere. An arrow (→) will denote the direction of influence (causal-
ity) in a concrete historical situation.
As regards methodology, the present paper presupposes, firstly, the existence 
of the phenomenon of causation, and secondly, the possibility of its identification. 
Since the paper intends to provide an interpretation of historical events in terms 
of relations between the three spheres under scrutiny (law, politics and the econo-
my), it will rely, as to the facts (including causation) on existing literature, focusing 
on an interpretation of those facts (established by historians) from the standoint 
of the research question, i.e. the role of law in the socio- economic transformation.
Case study I: lex Wilczek
In the second half of the 1980s General Jaruzelski – who held political power as 
1st Secretary of PZPR – ‘gradually adopted the view that in order to get out of the 
economic crisis, Poland needs deep social reforms, a change in the method of 
managing the economy, including a certain degree of marketization’ (A.L. Sowa 
2011, 597). During the period between 1981 and 1986, the number of private en-
terprises grew from 357.000 to 500.000, and they employed over 1 million people 
(Kieżun 2012, 113), which reflected a change of the regime’s attitude towards the 
private sector (Poznański 1996, 215). It must be kept in mind that in communist 
Poland small private enterprises were never fully prohibited, and their activity was 
even encouraged at times, e.g. after 1956 (Kieżun 2012, 114–115).
In October 1988 a new government was established under the premiership of 
M.F. Rakowski (A.L. Sowa 2011, 616). The new government aimed at “economic 
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stability and a deep economic reform’ (A.L. Sowa 2011, 616), and instrumental to 
this aim was an entire economic package, creating ‘a new economic order, based 
on the principles of liberty, equality and competition’ (A.L. Sowa 2011, 616–617). 
Among them was the so- called lex Wilczek (Act of 23 December 1988) nicknamed 
after the Minister who proposed its enactment. In contrast to the whole communist 
period, lex Wilczek abolished most restrictions on private economic activity, making 
it essentially legal and free to pursue a business for the first time since World War II. 
It seems plausible to argue that lex Wilczek itself was the effect of a political decision 
of the Communist Party. This follows from the well- known and undisputed fact 
that the legal sphere in general, and Parliamentary legislation in particular, was not 
autonomous under Actually Existing Socialism, but simply depended on the politi-
cal will of the Communist Party. Once it entered into force, the lex Wilczek caused 
an unprecedented explosion of social energy, chanelled into economic activity. A 
symbol of this “heroic’ period of Poland’s new capitalism was the so- called “jaws’ 
(szczęki), simple, easy to open and close one- person shops made from metal, which 
populated Polish market places and even representative areas, such as the monu-
mental surroundings of the Palace of Culture and Science – the Soviet- style palace 
in the very centre of Warsaw. Also statistical data clearly indicate a robust expansion 
of the private sector following lex Wilczek (Poznański 1996, 241).
What lex Wilczek represents, therefore, is an example of the impact of the the 
economic sphere (crisis) upon the sphere of politics (decision of the Communist 
Party), which in turn re- impacts upon the sphere of the economy (explosion of 
economic activity once the limitations were removed), via the legal sphere (the lex 
Wilczek itself). Undoubtedly, it was the lex Wilczek (and its enforcement) which 
allowed for an explosion of economic activity and release of enterpreneurial en-
ergy of the Polish society (cf. Schönfelder 2016, 306). This is because the economic 
history of the period of Actually Existing Socialism reveals that the state repressive 
apparatus had to invest a lot of effort in supressing the economic energy of citizens 
(Madej 2010) – ‘the communist economic order depended on the coercive pow-
ers of government’ (Schönfelder 2016, 296). Once this repression was done away 
with – by abolishing its legal framework on the basis of a political decision – the 
economic potential of Polish society became unleashed. As Schönfelder (2016, 
305) writes, ‘[w]hen profit- maximizing behavior was no longer ostracized, the 
economy spurted. After the removal of administrative obstacles, it quickly rein-
tegrated into the world economy (…).’
In a schematic way, the interaction between law, politics and the economy in 
the case of lex Wilczek can be presented as follows: E1 → P → L → E2, where: E1 = 
economic crisis; P = political decision to liberalise the economy; L = lex Wilczek, 
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i.e. the legal instrument liberalising the economy, E2 = mass explosion of private 
economic activivty.
Case study II: Nomenklatura Privatisation and the 
Privatization Act of 1990
The second example is the Privatisation Act of 1990, enacted as a step directly 
following the so- called ‘shock therapy’ or ‘Balcerowicz Plan’.3 The more or less 
informal privatisation of state property, by way of the so- called ‘nomenklatura 
privatisation’ started already in the second half of the 1980s and elements of the 
central planning began to be dismantled. In the 1980s the ruling elite of PZPR 
functionaries came to the conclusion that the country’s economy not only is no 
longer able to deliver rising standards of living for workers but the deep crisis 
has threatened the privileged position of the elite itself (Hardy 2009, 23). This led 
them to the idea that only a reform towards a market economy (‘market social-
ism’) could improve the economic situation of the country. Central planning was 
relaxed and state enterprises were given a large degree of independence, in order 
to make them self- financing (Hardy 2009, 23). As a result, Poland’s economy 
‘ceased to be a classical planned economy, but decision- making (…) descended 
into chaos and uncertainty’ (Hardy 2009, 24).
These circumstances were in turn used by the nomenklatura members to initi-
ate the so- called ‘nomenklatura privatisation’, i.e. the appropriation of state assets 
by private individuals holding managerial positions in the state- owned enter-
prises. Privatisation processes of this kind began in the second half of the 1980s; 
Poland officially remained a socialist country, and the legal system was still a 
socialist one, but the underlying economic system has begun to change.
The legal framework for early privatisation processes was created by the Act of 
31.7.1987 ‘adapting the provisions of certain acts regulating the functioning of the 
economy to the conditions and needs of further socio- economic development of 
the country’, enabling to transform state enterprises into commercial companies, 
thus allowing the sale of state enterprises’ assets, as well as mergers, divisions of 
such enterprises and their lease (Zalewa 2008, 67). A further easement in that 
regard was created by the Act of 24.2.1989 regarding certain conditions of the 
3 In considering this example, I am dealing with the role of law vis- a-vis politics and the 
economy (in line with the research question), and therefoe I leave outside my interest 
the question whether the ‘nomenklatura privatisation’ hindered or favoured Poland’s 
economic integration with the capitalist world. Whilst this is an interesting research 
question, answering it would not shed any light on the role of law in the transformation.
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consolidation of the national economy which simply allowed transferring the as-
sets of a state enterprise to natural or legal persons (Zalewa 2008, 67). According 
to English political economist Jane Hardy (2009, 24–25):
these so- called nomenklatura privatisations involved the selling of non- core operations 
such as a computer centre, repair facilities or a sales centre to a group of insiders that 
included managers and party members. State- Owned Enterprises were often stripped of 
their most profitable operations (…) The nomenklatura used their position to become 
wealthy owners of what used to be state enterprises through two important legal forms: 
the leasing of state owned companies and joint stock companies (…).
Polish economist Piotr Zalewa pointed out that nomenklatura privatisation, de-
spite being formally legal, was in fact an ‘ordinary embezzlement’ and that the 
nomenklatura companies ‘did not create any added value’ but ‘served ordinary 
looting’ (Zalewa 2008, 68). He drew attention to the fact that in order to remove 
any obstacles to a mass appropriation of state property, in 1989 the administrative 
instruments of control of economic crime were disabled (Zalewa 2008, 68). As 
Jan Sowa (2012, 175) has observed:
Party members, even high ranking officials, were becoming private entrepreneurs, mainly 
by taking control over restructured state enterprises. Jadwiga Staniszkis showed that 80% 
of the Party elite from the 1980s became private entrepreneurs in the 1990s.
The mass privatisation of state enterprises, in ‘direct clash with Solidarity’s eco-
nomic program of worker ownership’ (Klein 2007, 177), was based on Act of 
13.7.1990 on the privatisation of state enterprises, drafted in very broad terms, 
without any indications as to the aims, direction and speed of the process, nor the 
methodology of evaluating the value of the privatised entities (Zalewa 2007, 79). 
The legal provisions granted special powers to the Government, thus insulating 
the privatisation process from other stakeholders (employees, society at large 
represented by Parliament etc.) (Zalewa 2007, 80). Contrary to the convictions of 
society at large that privatisation should lead to an equitable distribution of wealth 
(Dunn 2004, 36–37), the process took the form of a bargain sale of the majority 
of Polish enterprises to international capital.4
Looking from the perspective of interaction between law, politics and the econ-
omy, the process could be described by the following scheme: E1 → P → L → E2, 
4 I omit from my discussion the so- called ‘universal privatization programme’ (program 
powszechnej prywatyzacji) which, despite a complicated mechanism and the purported 
aim of giving ownership powers to all citizens, ended up as a complete failure (Zalewa 
2007, 85–86). The value of a ‘participation certificate’ in the programme was equal to 
a pair of discount shoes (Zalewa 2007, 86).
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where E1 represents the economic crisis of the 1980s, P represents the political 
decision to start the nomenklatura privatisation, L1 represents the 1987 act and 
E2 represents the situation of actual change in the economy (the nomenklatura 
privatisation itself).
It could also be argued by reference to the discussion below (case study III), 
that the changed economic situation (E2) actually led to further political changes, 
namely the decision to share power with Solidarity (once the first phase of nomen-
klatura privatization, guaranteeing a good economic standing to PZPR elites, was 
accomplished). Once the former opposition took over, an era of mass privatisation 
began (Privatisation Act of 1990). This would allow the expansion of the above 
scheme to the following: E1 → P1 → L1→ E2 → P2 → L2 → E3, where E1 = economic 
crisis of the 1980s, P1 = political decision to start the nomenklatura privatisation, 
L1 = Act of 1987, E2 = nomenklatura privatisation, P2 = Round Table Talks, L2 = 
Privatisation Act 1990 and E3 = mass privatisation. Of course, the passage from E2 
to L2 is simplified here (for a more detailed account, see the next section).
Case study III: The Round Table Agreement
According to Naomi Klein, ‘authoritarian regimes have a habit of embracing 
democracy at the precise moment when their economic projects are about to 
implode. Poland was no exception’ (Klein 2007, 175). Indeed, in the 1980s an ideo-
logical consensus between the neoliberal/neoconservative wing of the opposition 
and the liberal wing of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) enabled a peace-
ful transformation from actually existing socialism to democracy and a market 
economy (J. Sowa 2012, 172), and by mid-1988 PZPR leaders had conceded to 
share their political power and responsibility for the country with the hitherto 
illegal opposition movement. This unprecedented peaceful transfer of power was 
first negotiated within the framework of the famous Round Table talks between 
representatives of the PZPR and opposition leaders, which lasted between Febru-
ary and April 1989 (Sowa 2011, 624–628). The deal struck by PZPR and Solidarity 
provided for significant political reforms, including partly pluralist parliamentary 
elections to be held on 4 June 1989 and the legalisation of the Solidarity trade un-
ion (A.L. Sowa 2011, 627). It involved an amendment of the 1952 constitution (Act 
of 7.4.1989 amending the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic). There is 
no doubt that the constitutional amendment – adopted hastily just two days after 
the end of the Round Table talks, was a simple ‘execution of the political agreement 
that had been reached’ (Szmyt 2010, 123) or its ‘implementation’ (Stelmachowski 
2011, 116). Following the 1989 elections, in which Solidarity won 260 of the 261 
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seats subject to free voting (Klein 2007, 174–175), a coalition government of PZPR 
members and Solidarity members was formed in September 1989.
On 31.12.1989 the Parliament of the Polish People’s Republic adopted an 
amendment to the Constitution (Act of 29.12.1989 amending the Constitution 
of the Polish People’s Republic), symbolically changing the name of the country 
to ‘Republic of Poland’ (which had also been used until 1952) and reintroducing 
the crown on the head of the eagle on the national emblem (which had been used 
in the 2nd Republic). As Szmyt (2010, 136) points out, whilst the April amend-
ment of the constitution ‘opened the first stage of systemic transformation’, the 
December amendment ‘stabilised that stage still as a temporary form, albeit on 
democratic foundations’.
The further two steps of the Polish transformation were the pluralist presiden-
tial elections (1990) and the first fully pluralist parliamentary elections (1991), 
followed by the enactment of a ‘Small Constitution’ the next year (Constitutional 
Act of 17.10.1992 regarding the mutual relationships between the legislative and 
executive power of the Republic of Poland and local self- government). Finally, 
in 1997 a new Polish constitution was enacted, replacing the 1952 constitution 
(alongside the ‘Small Constitution’) and creating a system of parliamentary de-
mocracy with a president elected in general elections. From the point of view of 
constitutional law, this moment marked the completion of the process of trans-
formation commenced eight years later.
Examining the role of law (vis- à-vis politics) in the process of constitutional 
transformation, one cannot but emphasise the role of the Round Table agreement, 
reach between February and April 1989, and immediately enacted by the obedient 
Parliament (9th term) of the Polish People’s Republic. The constitutional amend-
ment of April 1989 was clearly a direct enactment of the political deal struck at the 
Round Table. Nonetheless, it opened up a new dynamic – through the elections 
of 4 June 1989 – which later on changed the political sphere itself (new coalition 
between Solidarity, PSL and SD which replaced the original PZPR led coalition). 
Furthermore, if we accept the account, expressed inter alia by Klein (2007, 175) 
that the decision to sit down to talks with the Solidarity opposition were actually 
caused by an imminent economic implosion, we arrive at an interesting scheme of 
causality: E → P → L. Nonetheless, the legal changes (amendments to constitution 
and electoral laws) themselves caused political changes (L → P), due to the unex-
pected (for PZPR) result of the 4 June 1989 elections. These political changes led 
to further legal changes (L1 → P → L2), namely the December 1989 amendment 
to the constitution which went much, much farther than the April amendment. 
The full order of influence could then be expressed by the following scheme: E → 
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P1 → L1 → P2 → L2, where: E = economic crisis, P1 = Round Table Agreement, 
L1 = constitutional amendment of April 1989; P2 = the 4 June 1989 elections and 
their aftermath (Mazowiecki government); L2 = December 1989 amendment to 
the constitution. If the above representation is correct, it would suggest that eco-
nomic factors caused the entire change, but later on law and politics interacted 
with each other accelerating the transformation.
Case study IV: Rule of Law – the Constitutional Court
Under communism, the constitution played only a façade role. This is in line 
with the negation of a division into a legal and a political sphere under commu-
nism (Schönfelder 2016, 301). Hence, communist countries did not, as a matter of 
ideological principle, have constitutional courts (Sulikowski 2016, 16). The same 
applied to the public administration which was not subject to judicial review, but 
rather to manual political steering by the communist party. However, things start-
ed to change in Poland already in the 1980s. As Sulikowski (2016, 18–19) explains:
‘Between 1976 and 1980 there were a significant number of massive strikes. Despite being 
effectively suppressed it resulted in a downturn in the legitimacy of the authorities. As a 
consequence, the authorities tried to base their legitimacy on experts and to strengthen 
law and order. This appeared to be the best ground to implement a constitutional court.’
The decision to create the Constitutional Court (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, there-
after: TK) was, therefore, clearly a political decision to boost the legitimacy of the 
regime (Mażewski 2011, 333; Dębska 2015, 130) which was, in turn, motivated by 
economic factors (crisis, strikes). Dębska (2015, 127–128) and Sulikowski (2016, 
20) clearly indicate that the direct impulse for the creation of the Constitutional 
Court was a resolution adopted at the 9th Extraordinary Convention of the PZPR 
in July 1981. The TK was established formally in the Constitution already in 1982 
(Szmyt 2010, 117; Dębska 2015, 132–134), but an appropriate statute giving effect 
to it was enacted only in 1985 (Dębska 2015, 135–136, 144–149) and the TK be-
came operational in 1986. Until 1997, the TK’s decisions were subject to a possible 
parliamentary veto, which considerably weakened its position in comparison to 
constitutional courts in capitalist countries (Sulikowski 2016, 20).
During the first years of its existence, i.e. until the transformation, the TK ‘was 
rather reserved and passive, and undertook numerous but cautious decisions to 
strengthen the rule of law institutions in Poland’ (Sulikowski 2016, 20; cf. Mańko 
2014, 83). However, after the transformation, the Court, virtually overnight
‘discovered’ in the constitution many unwritten rules such as: the presumption of in-
nocence, the right to justice, the right to life, the right to privacy, the principle of propor-
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tionality (the prohibition of excessive interference in the rights of individuals), the rule 
of law, the principle of social justice, the principle of loyalty to the state of the citizen, 
the non- retroactivity of law (lex retro non agit), the principle of lex severior non agit, the 
protection of acquired rights, the principle of legal clarity etc. (Sulikowski 2016, 21–22)
Hence, the Court built – in an exercise of unprecedented judicial activism – a com-
plex set of rules laying down the foundations of the Rule of Law (‘democratic state 
of law’) in Poland.5 Here the political element was a clear determining factor – 
there can be no coincidence in the fact that a timid and passive court suddenly 
became activist and engaged in judicial law- making in the daylight. However, once 
the Rule of Law became established, the TK started gaining autonomy from the 
sphere of politics. A good example is its 1996 decision (Case K 26/96) overturning 
an Act of Parliament legalising abortion – it was based on an unwritten principle 
of right to life, ‘discovered’ by the Court in the constitution (Sulikowski 2016, 22; 
cf. Dębska and Warczok 2016, 117, 121–128). As Sulikowski (2016, 22) writes, the 
TK ‘took up the role of chief engineer of transformation and made numerous and 
controversial political decisions’. Whilst the abortion case represents and example 
of interaction between the spheres of law (TK decision) and politics (parliament’s 
democratic decision), there are also numerous examples of the TK interfering with 
the sphere of the economy, as in the judgment on maximum rents in housing (TK 
judgment of 12.1.2000, Case P 11/98).
Hence, in schematic terms, the situations can be described as follows: E → Pa 
→ L1 + Pb → L2 → L3, where E = economic crisis; Pa = political decision to create 
CC; L1 = CC Act; Pb = changed political situation after 1989 (not a consequence 
of Pa), L2 = CC’s rule of law case- law of the 1990s; L3 = codification of the TK’s 
rule of law case- law in the 1997 Constitution.
Conclusions
A formal presentation of the order of causation identified in each of the four case 
studies can be summarised as follows:
Case study I: E1 → P → L → E2
Case study II: E1 → P1 → L1→ E2 → P2 -> L2 → E3,
Case study III: E → P1 → L1 → P2 → L2
5 Cf., however, the critique of Czarnota (2016), who argues that the ‘the rule of law in 
post- communist states plays a façade role for masking the structural corruption of the 
state’, adding that this concept ‘has been understood in a formal, positivistic way and 
reduced to the concept of legality and the rule of the legal text (Czarnota 2016, 318).
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Case study IV: E → Pa → L1 + Pb → L2 → L3
The schematic presentation of the (hypothetical) order of causation allows analys-
ing it in the abstract, in detachment from the specific circumstances of each case. 
This, in turn, allows for the formulation of more general conclusions, relating to 
the three respective spheres (L, P, E), and therefore permitting for a broader out-
look of the research. The general conclusions are as follows. First of all, economic 
factors (E) are at the very beginning of each scheme. This is not a suprise, given 
the scale and profoundness of the economic crisis which directly preceded the 
transformation. Secondly, economic factors impacted political ones in the first 
link of the chain of causation (E → P). Again, this is in line with the hypothesis 
that the elites of PZPR reacted to the economic crisis making various political 
decisions aimed either at preserving their rule through a boost of legitimacy (case 
study IV), or at transforming the economic and political system (case studies I, II 
and III respectively). The next link of the chain of causation is – in all case stud-
ies – the translation of the political decision into legal terms (P → L). Hence, what 
all case studies have in common is the indirect impact of the economic sphere 
upon the legal sphere, mediated by the political sphere (E → P → L). Again, this 
is not a suprising result given the fact of the supremacy of the political over the 
legal and economic in communism, as described recently by Schönfelder (2016).
What happens next is different in the individual case studies. The legal sphere 
may either impact the economic one (L → E) or the political one (L → P) or gen-
erate a new legal reality intrinsically, via law’s internal logic (L1 → L2), or through 
the intervention of an additional, external political factor (L1 + P → L2). In case 
study II, the second part of the chain of causation actually replicates the first one 
(…E2 → P2 → L2 → E3). In case study III, the second part of the chain symbolises 
a mutual interaction between law and politics (L1 → P2 → L2).
The final, most abstract conclusion would therefore be as follows: in the case of 
the 1989 transformation, the four case studies analysed in a preliminary manner 
suggest that the initial phase of transformation always follows the (E → P → L) 
scheme. This means that the law is only a secondary factor, being influenced in 
the last instance by the economy, as mediated through politics. In other words, 
law is instrumentalized by the ruling elites to bring about desired changes in the 
socio- economic sphere (cf. Gromski 2000). However, once the new law is put 
into place, the situation enters a new dynamic, where law itself can become a 
decisive factor, impacting the economy, politics or changing itself (L1 → L2). This 
would tend to confirm the hypothesis put forward by Schönfelder (2016) that the 
transformation lead to a change from the situation in which law and the economy 
were subject to politics (no functional differentiation) to a situation where such 
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a functional differentiation becomes more pronounced and which, in the case of 
law, means that the legal sphere gains autonomy and its own potential of influenc-
ing politics and the economy on its own account. Indeed, on a very rudimental 
level, this seems intuitively as a correct account of the role of law in the 1989 
socio- economic transformation.
Therefore, one cannot but agree with the diagnosis put forward by Wawrzyniak 
(2011, 12, 14):
…legal changes have, in essence, a secondary character with regard to all other changes. 
They do not commence principal social processes, but rather confirm within the legal 
system what has already taken place in the economy, politics and other areas of social life. 
(…) One must also keep in mind that the law does not reflect (and should not reflect) 
all changes actually taking place in various spheres of social and economic life. The law 
reflects (…) only the most important events of a transformative character.
Ultimately, therefore, law is a ‘form’ which merely cloaks the ‘substance’ of political 
and socio- economic relationships (Pashukanis 1983, 53–64; Balbus 1977), or – to 
put the same idea in the very different theoretical language of Carl Schmitt – the 
legal system is a ‘special mirror of reality’ (Croce and Salvatore 2013, 35), because 
law’s normativity presupposes a certain social normality (Croce and Salvatore 
2013, 36; cf. Schmitt 2004). When this social normality is in flux – as in a time 
of socio- economic transformation – law reflects the changes at a faster or slower 
period. Nonetheless, as the case studies seem to indicate, law can be not only a 
passive form or mirror of reality, but it can also be directly instrumentalised by 
the sphere of politics in the process of socio- economic transformation.
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Dario Čepo
Between Path Dependence and Political Elite 
Capture: The Second Chambers in Central and 
Eastern European Unitary States Explained
Abstract: Research on second chambers (or upper houses) of bicameral legislatures has 
focused on examples of strong bicameralisms – the United States and Germany – or tra-
ditional examples of second chambers, like the British House of Lords. What is rarely re-
searched is the reason why second chambers exist in unitary states with no visible societal 
cleavages. This paper aims to review the reasons for the establishment of, as well as the 
necessity of maintaining, second chambers in unitary states of Central and Eastern Europe. 
It discusses four cases – the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia – analysing 
their constitutions and other primary and secondary literature that deals with the establish-
ment and functioning of second chambers. The main findings show that second chambers 
in unitary states of Central and Eastern Europe were established and/or maintained due 
to a combination of institutional path dependence and the capture of the institution by a 
political elite. This paper argues that an institutional framework can maintain and support 
an atavistic institution, but political actors need to find a function for it in order for the 
institution to maintain its legitimacy.
Introduction
To be interested in political institutions means trying to understand why a par-
ticular society has developed, evolved and maintained a specific set of institutions, 
and how those institutions help nurture democratic developments in a society. 
Following the idea of new institutionalism (Peters 1999), institutions are not (or 
are not only) progenies of socioeconomic determinants, but are also entities by 
themselves, which have a strong influence on a political system they serve. If we 
accept the idea that representative bodies are the most important institutions in 
democratic polities, then we have to understand how they function, what makes 
them work properly, or how they get into a state of gridlock. We also need to un-
derstand what the correct inputs that would yield optimal outputs are, and how 
to reform them on time, if we notice they stopped serving a purpose society has 
ascribed to them.
Having that in mind, one can see why so many political scientists have focused 
on studying representative bodies (Mill 1989), their legislative (Ball and Peters 
2005), and representative functions (Nohlen 1992), and the way they coexist and 
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cooperate with other democratic institutions (Haggard and McCubbins 2001; 
Laver and Shepsle 1996; Shugart and Carey 1992). It is especially true for bodies 
which represent all citizens, i.e. the nation as a source of the sovereign will.
Less common are researches of other types of representative bodies, those 
that represent collective interests – territorial, functional, and societal. With the 
exception of strong second chambers (Čepo 2013), such as the US Senate, or the 
German Bundesrat, and the oldest second chamber in the world, the British House 
of Lords (Hartmann 2006), other second chambers have garnered scant interest 
from political scientists. However, this paper focuses on second chambers of four 
unitary Central and Eastern European countries – the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania and Slovenia.
As Temperley (1910, viii), wrote more than a hundred years ago, to have any 
real value, a study of second chambers has to be focused on practice, not theory, 
i.e. we need to understand why they exist in a political system, how they function, 
and how their existence and functioning influence the system as a whole. It is 
especially important to understand whether second chambers, as they presently 
function, bring benefits to a political system and enhance democracy, or if they 
destabilize the system, and support the emergence and establishment of defective 
democracy (Merkel 2011).
Although once all- powerful, because they were established as ways for politi-
cal and economic elites to protect their interests in face of perceived irrationality 
of first (people’s) chambers, with the passing of time they lost power, and with it 
the legitimacy to hold sway in the decision– making process (Čepo 2013). In that 
manner, most of the second chambers (like those in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and partly France), evolved into ‘dignified bodies’ (Uhr, Bach and Massicotte 2011, 
81), with a lot of historical weight and almost no real power. There is a myriad of 
papers, articles, and books covering the process of the modernization, reform, or 
abolishment (sometimes even introduction) of second chambers, both in federal 
and unitary states, plural and nonplural societies, and democratic and authoritar-
ian regimes. Just a few examples encompass ideas about reforming bicameralism 
in Canada (Joyal 2003), Spain (Roller 2002), the United Kingdom (Mitchell and 
Davis 1993; Russell 2000), Russia (Ross 2003), Germany (Robbers 2005), Italy 
(Pasquino 2002), Lebanon (Salamey 2009) etc.
Following all of this is the research question of this paper: what is the raison 
d’être of second chambers in four unitary states of Central and Eastern Europe? 
The analysis starts from the position that second chambers were introduced (or 
kept), during the transition from autocratic to democratic regimes, as a political 
necessity of the moment, and not as a requirement a stable institutional frame-
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work needed. Hence, the hypothesis of this paper is that the establishment and 
further existence of second chambers in unitary states of Central and Eastern 
Europe is a result of the combination of path dependence and the needs of political 
elites of the time to maintain political power.
The theoretical Framework
Theoretically, Lijphart’s (1984) categorization of second chambers is used in or-
der to provide an in- depth understanding of differences and similarities of our 
cases. Tsebelis and Money’s (1997) approach to understanding the necessity of 
bicameral legislatures will also be used as a framework for extrapolating conclu-
sions in this paper. Longley’s and Olson’s (1991) justifications for introducing or 
maintaining a bicameral legislature will be a helpful tool to measure the need for 
second chambers in our cases as well.
Longley and Olson (1991, 1–3) summarize four main justifications for bicam-
eralism. First, two distinct chambers represent the societal need of represent-
ing different estates, classes or other collective groups that form cleavages in the 
society. In that way, different chambers are used to represent divergent interests 
of collectives that form a society in question. Second, justification takes into ac-
count the geographical factor, insisting that bicameralism is needed in cases where 
common national interest differs in a major way from specific territorial interests 
of specific regions of a country in question. Although the parliament represents 
the interests of an entire nation, particular segments of that nation might have 
opposing, or unorthodox, or highly specific interests, geographically located, that 
will need specific representation. Third, functional justification reasons that two 
chambers will surely be able to give a more optimal solution to a problem than 
one would be able to, providing diversity of outlook and making the best possible 
policy under given circumstances. Fourth, justification is linked to the notion of 
institutional conservatism. Bicameralism exists because there is no political will 
to change the institutional framework, due to the inertia, conservatism or the 
unwillingness of decision makers to abolish an institution with lucrative positions 
for political actors. Even if there are attempts of abolishing the second chamber, 
the institution itself tries to reinvent itself and tries to show it is needed as a way 
to further the democracy of the political system it serves.
In his seminal work Democracies (1984), Lijphart looked at differences between 
majoritarian and consensus democracies, trying to discover patterns of similari-
ties as well as differing points. One of the variables he used was the number of 
legislative bodies a system had. When comparing those systems, he tried to see 
prevailing factors that led to establishing either a unicameral or bicameral legis-
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lature. First, he looked at whether the number of legislative chambers is linked 
to plural (i.e. complex societies, with one or several societal cleavages) societies 
(1984, 92), showing that the link is weak. Both plural and nonplural societies 
have both unicameral and bicameral legislative bodies, although he did conclude 
nonplural societies tend to have unicameral bodies.
His second question was linked to the size of the country, wondering if larger 
countries have bicameral assemblies because different parts of a large country 
have different needs that want representation in the legislative process. Another 
question is whether a country is a federation, or a federation- like entity (1984, 93). 
In his study of 21 (later 36) democracies he found a strong correlation between 
the size of the country and bicameralism, as well as between federalism and bi-
cameralism.
Selection of cases and methodology
Out of 17 bicameral legislatures in Europe seven are situated in Central and East-
ern Europe. Of those, five are in democratic countries, measure of “democratic” 
taken from Polity IV (Boix, Miller, and Rosato, 2013). Non- democratic countries 
with bicameral legislatures are Russia and Belarus. Russia, though, has been ex-
cluded due to having a federal political system, while Belarus has not been used 
as a case because it is, by all intents in purposes, considered “a last dictatorship 
in Europe”(Bennet, 2011), where no institutions, including the second chamber, 
perform constitutionally assigned roles (Silitski 2005; Ioffe 2004).
Despite a growing number of research into how hybrid and autocratic regimes 
function (e.g. Donno 2013; Pepinsky et al. 2014; Morgenbesser 2014), we decided 
it was opportune not to take into account second chambers of non- democratic 
regimes, as institutional frameworks need freedom, separation of powers and in-
dependence to work properly. Those are only feasible, and sometimes even barely, 
in a democratic political systems. Nothing would be gained, and, it is presumed, 
a lot would be obfuscated, if one would look at how a certain institution works 
without taking into account how ‘free’ it is to work as was intended. That doesn’t 
mean one cannot gain certain insights into the working of political institutions 
in regimes different from democratic ones, but that is not the scope of this paper, 
and hence it is the reason second chamber of Belarus is not a part of this analysis.
Taking into account five remaining second chambers in democratic political 
systems of Central and Eastern Europe, four are parts of institutional frameworks 
of unitary countries, with the sole exception being the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see more: Čepo 2016). Bearing in mind that 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina are considered a federation, albeit an asymmetric1 one 
(Kasapović 2005), we will exclude it from the analysis as well. Recent scholarship 
on bicameralism cannot agree on much, but they all agree that federal systems 
not only legitimize the existence of bicameral legislatures, but consider it a sine 
qua non. Second chambers have a legitimacy in federal countries, because they are 
the most important institutional mechanisms for the representation of different 
parts of the federation (states, provinces, regions) on the federal or central level 
(Swenden 2004, 18).
Therefore, this research is based on four cases – the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovenia. All four are Central and Eastern European countries, 
all are unitary states with no, or little, observable social or political cleavages 
(cf. the case of Hungarian minority in Romania notwithstanding), and all are 
democracies.
Methodologically, this paper is based on a qualitative approach. We used the 
content analysis of primary (constitutions, laws, acts) and secondary literature, 
in order to focus on a legislative institutional framework, the relations between 
the two chambers, the powers of second chambers, the electoral rules for second 
chambers, and any political impetuses that could sway political actors to rule in 
favour of establishing and/or maintaining a second chamber. As for the selection 
of cases, we used the most similar case design, considering the similarities within 
all four cases. New institutionalism, especially historic institutionalism (as well as 
normative institutionalism), is used as an underpinning of the research design.
Elaboration of case studies
As none of our four cases has been a part of the democratic world until the fall 
of communism (potentially with the exemption of the Czech Republic), we can 
only extrapolate their experiences with bicameralism (and its success) from the 
points in time in which they made a change from an authoritarian to a demo-
cratic regime. Therefore, the timeframe of this study is more or less the same. 
The transformation began in Poland in 1989, continued in Slovenia, and ended 
in Romania. The case of the Czech Republic is slightly more complex, because 
we must take into account the independence of the country after the dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia 1993, and not only the transformation from communism to 
a multiparty democracy. But the process of transformation lasted no more than 
1 In this context, an asymmetric federation is a federal configuration in which different 
parts of federation (political entities), are not equal in powers, roles, or authorities that 
they possess. For more in- depth explanation, see Kasapović (2005).
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5 years (1989–1993), was driven by similar forces (moderate opposition and/
or moderate regime forces), which led the transformation to similar resolutions 
(from authoritarianism to democracy), and used similar tools (transformation of 
institutions through the process of constitutional reform).
The Polish Senate
The first constitution of Poland of 1791 established a body with a legislative 
power – the Sejm – which was composed of the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies. The King was at the helm of the Senate, but sovereignty was vested in 
the chamber of Deputies (Ludwikowski 1996, 10). Subsequent constitutions kept 
the bicameral nature of legislature, based, as it was common in that age, on class 
differences, i.e. the differentiation of the estates. But having enacted the commu-
nist constitution of 1946 the Senate was abolished, and Poland’s legislative body 
became unicameral.
The reestablishment of the Polish Senate was a result of roundtable negotia-
tions. Its reason is not particularly clear. As there are no minutes from the ne-
gotiation process, one cannot explain the deeper reasoning behind introducing 
a second chamber into legislature that previously did not have but one house of 
parliament, and where the country had not had a need for it from the point of 
view of existing cleavages. Therefore, one can only state that the Polish Senate 
was established as a way to surpass an impasse between the ruling party and the 
democratic opposition regarding the best way to proceed with the transition of 
the political system.
Hence, the Senate was a child of the moment it was conceived in and not of a 
thoroughly reasoned debate on what the Polish political system needs in order 
to function properly. Or, as Ludwikowski (1996, 129), concludes, the Senate in 
Poland was established to counterbalance the communist elite’s interests in the 
first chamber, i.e. it was a novel idea with which to break the deadlock between 
the government and opposition negotiators – offering the government a way to 
control the more powerful first chamber, while opening the way for the opposi-
tion to participate in truly competitive elections against the ruling party (ibid, 
149). Longley and Olson (1991, 14) follow that logic to some extent, noting that 
the (re)introduction of a Senate into the institutional framework of Poland was 
a way for the Polish Parliament to try and offer different ideas on resolving eco-
nomic difficulties that were plaguing Poland at the time, but that had no chance 
of passing a Communist- dominated Parliament with its rigid economic doctrine.
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The National Council of Slovenia
The case of Slovenian second chamber, the National Council, is maybe the most 
striking. It, in some way, shows a shadow of the past, pointing to the time Slovenia 
was part of the (socialist federal) Yugoslavia, and where, the last incarnation of 
legislature was tricameral. In a similar way, the National Council reaffirms the 
right of sectoral and territorial interests to representation in the legislative process.
The National Council has been (re)established, according to Ramet (1993, 879), 
as a compromise between leftist parties’ desire to establish a bicameral legislature 
with a second chamber to represent regional differences, and rightist parties who 
were opposed to such a solution. Compromise was found in establishing an ex-
tremely weak version of bicameralism with legislative powers given solely to the 
first chamber, while the second chamber had supervisory powers, and the right 
to return a bill to the first chamber for reconsideration.
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, the National Council 
is the representative body for social, economic, professional, and local interests 
[…] It is composed of: four representatives of employers; four representatives of 
employees; four representatives of farmers, crafts and trades, and independent 
professions; six representatives of non- commercial fields; and twenty- two repre-
sentatives of local interests. Considering the powers of the National Council, it 
may: propose to the National Assembly the passing of laws; convey to the National 
Assembly its opinion on all matters within the competence of the National As-
sembly; require the National Assembly to decide again on a given law prior to its 
promulgation; require inquiries on matters of public importance.
Although, at first one may see the Slovenian second chamber as the least le-
gitimate of the four, if we consider giving citizens a direct right to elect their 
representatives as an indication of legitimacy, it may nonetheless be the only one 
that can successfully exist in an era of the deligitimisation of obsolete political in-
stitutions (Russell 2001). The reason behind that afct is that the National Council 
has a different source of legitimacy than the first chamber of the Slovenian legis-
lature. Other things being equal, different electoral bases allow us to separate the 
legitimacy of an institution from citizens, as there is no basis of said legitimacy 
in the direct electoral process.
The Senate of the Czech Republic
After the dissolution of the Austro- Hungarian Empire, and the establishment of 
an independent Czechoslovakia, the Constitution of 1920 established a bicameral 
legislature, which was continued during communist times, especially after 1968 
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amendments to the 1960 Constitution, which created the Czechoslovak federation 
(Ludwikowski 1996, 29).
According to Ludwikowski (1996, 172), the Senate remained at the centre of 
constitutional controversies, especially with the constant efforts to abolish it, 
which failed to gather support in the Chamber of Deputies. That is particularly 
strange, when one knows that usually (see e.g. the cases of the United Kingdom, 
Italy, and Croatia), politicians in the second chambers are the actors that are ada-
mantly opposed to the idea of their institution being abolished, not necessarily 
their counterparts in the first chamber.
But as the Czech Senate had not even been elected until 1996, it is confusing 
why the Chamber of Deputies was so much against the change of constitution 
which would abolish the almost stillborn second chamber. That does not mean 
that there were no attempts at abolishing it, but they were all fruitless, and in 1996 
the first Czech Senate was elected.
According to Olson (1996, 47), the Senate was an institution born out of ne-
cessity to gather support for a quick constitutional change that followed the dis-
solution of Czechoslovak federation. The most powerful political actor of the 
time, the prime minister, was indifferent to the idea of bicameralism, but many 
parties, some of whom were part of his coalition, strongly supported the idea of 
establishing the Senate. Political compromise was, therefore, struck to establish 
a weak second chamber, whose powers, composition and electoral mechanisms 
were ambiguous.
Olson (1996, 48) elaborates further that two main propelling forces for the 
establishment of the Senate were the historical narrative of a successful Czecho-
slovak democracy during the interwar period, and politicians’ self- interest. The 
Senate was introduced, not only as a continuation of the federal practices of the 
now- dissolved communist federation, but as a reflection of the glorious days of 
pre- communist Czechoslovakia. The weak Senate of the 1920s and the 1930s, was 
resurrected as a reflective institution of sorts, in which senators will mull over 
bills and try to make them better and more inclusive.
Constitutional changes and subsequent laws on the election of the Senate, help 
us conclude that Czech bicameralism is, in Lijphart’s typology, an asymmetrical 
and incongruent bicameralism. It is asymmetrical, because the powers of the 
second chamber are strongly curtailed and much weaker than the powers of the 
first chamber. They are mostly supervisory in role, but are easily overridden by the 
actions of the Chamber of Deputies (Olson 1999, 49). Incongruent bicameralism, 
on the other hand, means that the Senate was elected in a manner that differs from 
the way the Chamber of Deputies is elected. Incongruence is the only aspect of 
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weak bicameralisms that gives them a semblance of legitimacy, as different ways of 
electing a second chamber means different public, and therefore different sources 
of legitimizing legislative action.
The Romanian Senate
Historically, the Romanian parliament, which was first established in 1858, was 
bicameral from the constitution of 1866 until the introduction of communism, 
a response of the prevailing practice of the day (Roper and Crowther 1998, 403). 
Constitutional reforms that Romania undertook after the overthrow of commu-
nism were based on the French constitutional tradition, similarly to some other 
cases in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Croatia). That could be a reason, together 
with the idea of a ‘return to historical roots’, why the new constitution introduced 
the Senate as a second chamber of a previously unicameral parliament.
Some authors (Ludwikowski 1996, 129; Čepo 2007) maintain that the reasons 
for the introduction of bicameralism in Romania were not clear, especially because 
the roles, the prerogatives, and the ways of establishment of both chambers were 
virtually the same. Olson (1999, 302) insists that, similarly to other bicameral 
legislatures in Central and Eastern Europe that had two chambers in interwar 
period (Poland and the Czech Republic), so too did Romania. Therefore, newly 
democratic political forces decided on reintroducing a Senate, as a part of the new 
institutional arrangement.
Comparing the four cases
If we take Lijpahrt’s definition of a large state as the one with more than 10 million 
inhabitants, than among our sample we have three large countries (the Czech Re-
public, Poland and Romania), and one small state (Slovenia). All of them are uni-
tary states, as previously stated and in the case of Slovenia and the Czech Republic 
they are rather compact, and don’t differ that much geographically, economically 
or socially. Poland and Romania are larger territorially, with different parts of the 
country having different needs and interests, from the socio- economic point of 
view. The large Hungarian minority in Romania (predominantly in Transylvania) 
also introduces an ethno- political variable into interest differentiation among the 
different parts of the state.
Considering Lijphart’s variables, we see that in our cases, the variable of plural-
ism has no link with the number of legislatures, i.e. our four nonplural societies 
all have bicameral legislatures. As all our cases are unitary states, the federalism 
variable also cannot be used to explain why there are bicameral legislatures.
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Taking into account Longley’s and Olson’s four justifications, our research has 
shown, similarly to conclusions surmised from Lijphart’s variables, incongruence 
between them and the reasons second chambers exist in four countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (with a possible exception of fourth justification). First, 
societal justification, similar to Lijphart’s plural/nonplural society variable, does 
not explain why any of our four cases needs bicameral legislature. None of them 
has major social cleavages, and the difference according to estate and class is, of 
course, not acceptable explanation for a democratic societies. The only differing 
case of the four could be Romania, with its significant Hungarian minority, but as 
its second chamber is not established, nor does it function as a way of represent-
ing ethno- linguistic differences this justification does not sufficiently explain the 
reason of the existence of the Romanian Senate.
The second point, geographic justification, is similar to Lijphart’s size variable, 
and can tentatively be used to explain the cases of Poland and Romania, but not 
those of the Czech Republic, or Slovenia, whose territories are much smaller and 
more compact, and therefore do not have such great differences which would 
justify the need for specific representation. The Romanian example, again, does 
not show that territorial differences were used as a reason for the establishment 
of its Senate, as the way it is elected and how it functions does not differ from the 
first chamber. Hence, the sources of their legitimacies are the same. Poland, on 
the other hand, is sufficiently large in size (and population) and elects its Senate 
based on territorial separation into regions, so Longley’s and Olson’s justification, 
partly, explains bicameralism in Poland. A different question is, of course, whether 
the interests of those regions differ so much as to need their own representation.
Thirdly, functional justification is questionable as well, considering that all of 
our countries have second chambers that are significantly weaker than their coun-
terparts in first chambers, i.e. their powers are weaker and their eventual dissent 
can easily be overruled. Romania’s case of completely congruent but asymmetrical 
bicameralism does not even show that this third justification holds true as the 
same source of legitimacy but weaker powers hardly make senators equal actors 
in the process of decision- making in Romania.
Lastly, a status quo/self- interest justification, however, can partly be observed, 
and is congruent with the conclusion of this paper. Institutional conservatism, 
historical sympathies for the bygone days of national prominence, inertia, or the 
interest of political elites in maintaining an institution with lucrative seats with 
which to reward their supporters and/or maintain their grip on power could be 
used to explain bicameralisms in all four cases we observed. Poland’s case obvi-
ously follows the historical narrative, which was used as a way to break the grid-
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lock between opposing sides during a negotiation process. The cases of Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic are closest to the concept of inertia as both, more or less, 
transferred the institutional framework of their representative institutions from 
the multinational federations they were part of before becoming independent. 
The case of Romania is not as clear. All four, however, follow the status quo/self- 
interest justification in maintaining the bicameral legislature, even with all the 
evidence that point to the conclusion that the second chamber was not needed. 
Therefore, it concurs with the underlying hypothesis of this paper.
Our conclusion is that the existence of bicameral legislatures in the cases of 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, is connected to the historical 
development of respective legislatures, and with the interest of preserving political 
power. Specifically, second chambers of current, democratic legislative bodies in 
four states have been established as manifestations of legislative predecessors of 
those institutions in previous regimes and the nature of their political systems 
(federalism). The reason of the fact that bicameralisms were maintained, on the 
other hand, is linked to the political power of vested interests and the political 
elite’s proclivity of accumulating power and dispensing it to their followers. With 
this, we confirm the cornerstone of the historical institutionalism: Pierson’s con-
cept of path dependency.
The Slovenian second chamber is an obvious continuation of the countries’ 
tricameral legislative body, from the time it was part of the socialist Yugoslavia. 
Even the way the body is elected (indirectly) and whom it represents (special ter-
ritorial and functional interests) is a continuation of the Council of municipalities, 
and the Council of Associated Labour, which existed before 1990. Similarly, the 
case of the Senate of the Czech Republic points to the historical continuation 
variable. The former Czechoslovakia, as a federal state, logically had a second 
chamber. The current Czech Senate is a manifestation of that institution, albeit in 
changed circumstances (the nature of the state changed from federal to unitary). 
The case of the Polish Senate is linked to the (re)establishment of bicameral leg-
islature from the first Polish state, when the Sejm, was a representative of Polish 
nobility. Poland is also a case study for understanding how institution- building is 
connected to negotiations during regime changes, i.e. to the interests of different 
political groups representing the old regime and new democratic forces (both 
with radical and moderate wings).
What about the prospects of maintaining bicameral legislatures in our case 
studies, and its influence on the democratic stability of political systems? Consid-
ering Lijphart’s variables again, one can conclude that despite unitary countries 
with nonplural societies having predominantly unicameral legislatures, one can 
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find a reason for maintaining second chambers in cases when those nonplural, 
unitary, countries are large, i.e. have a population size over 10 million spread out 
on a relatively (from a European perspective at least) large area. In that case, both 
Poland and Romania could realistically retain their second chambers, and legiti-
mize them in the eyes of the electorate as a much needed way to differentiate vary-
ing territorial interests. There are, however, limits to that, as was shown in Čepo 
(2007), hence it is questionable how one could construct a narrative that second 
chambers bring anything novel or different to a political process dominated by 
first chambers in such a profound way as it happens in both Poland and Romania.
The case of the Czech Republic is a borderline one, as it just barely fits the 
great- size variable (having 10.5 million inhabitants), so the critics would have a 
much stronger case of pointing out that size should not be a reason to keep an 
institution that obviously gives no added value to the political process.
The case of Slovenia is particularly an outlier. Not only is Slovenia a unitary 
state, it also has a homogenous society, with no visible socio- political cleavages, 
i.e. it is a nonplural society. The size (both in territory and population) also does 
not give a logical explanation of the introduction of a second chamber, as Slovenia 
is both small (around 2 million inhabitants), and compact, with regional differ-
ences, being on miniscule proportions and, hence, of no particular influence in 
the political process.
Conclusion
The hypothesis of the research was that the establishment, and further existence, 
of second chambers in unitary states of Central and Eastern Europe is due to 
the combination of path dependence and institutional capture by political elites. 
The research has validated the starting hypothesis. Path dependency is a logical 
explanation of introducing bicameralism in newly- democratic political systems 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Hence, the first part of the hypothesis has been 
confirmed, both in the cases of Poland and Romania, where a historical narrative 
was used to (re)establish their respective Senates, as well as in the cases of the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia, where institutional frameworks suitable for federal 
states (which both were parts of), were kept once those countries gained their 
independence and became unitary in their nature.
But we also needed an explanation that would help us understand why have 
second chambers survived in our four cases, both in the light of evidence that sec-
ond chambers do not necessarily enhance the democratic process, and knowing 
that countries with similar political systems (unitary, parliamentary, states) have 
already abolished their second chambers (e.g. Denmark, Sweden, and Croatia). 
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Lijphart (1991, ix– x) concludes that a main reason for maintaining an institu-
tion when a system obviously has no need for it can be found in institutional 
conservatism, i.e. the reluctance of democratic systems to change the institutional 
framework that has been there for a while, and that obviously has no destabilizing 
effect on the political system. But it seems that institutional conservatism can be 
a tool as well, meaning that elites are interested in maintaining the status quo, not 
because they think the system still needs it, or because of some historical senti-
ment, but because of their intent of using it to gain more power.
The tendency of political elites to accumulate (or capture) power, and to reward 
loyalty with sinecures, turns second chambers into institutions of empty chairs 
ready to be filled with followers who will further the interests of the elites, and 
will help them accumulate or maintain even more power. This question, however, 
deserves more thorough research focused on in- depth interviews with politi-
cians in the studied countries. As it was not possible at this moment, it remains 
as a separate hypothesis to be tested. But sufficient examples of the ways second 
chambers have been elected and how they acted in decision- making processes in 
their respective countries give us confidence to proclaim political elite capture is 
a major reason for maintaining (but also for abolishing) second chambers.
All in all, as Olson and Longley (1991, 226), conclude, the decision to abolish a 
bicameral parliament rests squarely in the hands of political parties and is formu-
lated on the grounds of party interests, as well as self- interests of party members. 
Bicameralism will be abolished if political actors in the first chamber feel limited 
in exerting power by the intransigence of their second chamber counterparts, and 
they see no way of capturing the second chamber for themselves in a short period 
(due to differing electoral processes). They could decide to introduce unicamer-
alism when they decide powers they could gain from holding an institution are 
outweighed by the costs of maintaining it. This is especially so if their move to 
abolish the second chamber could be viewed positively by the public, which sees 
no reason for keeping an obsolete institution. Even in that case, political parties 
work with their own interest in mind. If they see obvious gain in maintaining an 
institution that has obviously lost legitimacy in the eyes of the public, they will 
try and keep it, even if it destabilizes the system.
As Olson and Longley (1991, 218) state, cameral change is not a normal issue 
that can be done whenever actors feel like it and without major repercussions. 
Those changes are, therefore, not done frequently. As previous examples of change 
from bicameral to unicameral legislatures (New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Croatia) attest, only a few countries have decided to undergo such a profound 
change. Reasons behind it are different, but can surely be attributed to institutional 
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conservatism on the one hand, and self- interest of political elite on the other hand. 
That does not mean one cannot show that without the necessary adjustments, 
conservatism can lead to intransigence, which can allow for institutional capture 
and for the destabilization of the democratic foundations of the political system.
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Explaining the Trajectories of Post- Communist 
Democratization. The Case of Albania
Abstract: After the fall of the communist regimes, the countries of Eastern Europe opened 
their gates to new democratic systems. Democratization started to take place in every 
country in the region, although unequal steps were taken by each country to start this 
process from scratch. Our research aims to find out what explains democratization pro-
cesses after the fall of communism. In order to provide an answer to this, the paper will 
examine the democratization trajectories in Albania, given that Albania embraced a specific 
communist regime.
Considering the communist legacy, one of the most important characteristics of the re-
gime, the authors use the empirical case to explain how the communist legacy affects the 
democratization process.
Introduction: Democracy and democratization –  
the theoretical framework
The concept of democracy originates from ancient Greece. ‘Democratia’ means 
the rule of the people. From that time the concept has changed and as David Held 
puts it, ‘the history of the idea of democracy is curious; the history of democracies 
is puzzling’ (1996, 1). In this light, the idea of democracy has been advanced over 
centuries and it is still a dynamic concept that changes over time and space. Scru-
tinizing the literature one finds that a general and overall definition of democracy 
does not exist. What makes the concept difficult to define is, as Sartori says, ‘the 
fact that it is both a normative and an analytical concept’ (1987, 8). A normative 
approach to democracy involves telling people what they should do, rather than 
simply describing what is done. Sartori goes on to explain that ‘the democratic ide-
als do not define the democratic reality and vice versa, a real democracy is not, and 
cannot be, the same as an ideal one’ (1987, 8). However, a consolidated democracy 
is considered to be very close to an ideal pattern of democracy. When describ-
ing consolidated democracy and its categories, scholars’ arguments compensate 
each other and almost reach a sophisticated concept of democracy. According to 
Cheema, a consolidated democracy means a functioning and respected “politi-
cal society”; a fair and free electoral system; a social and political environment 
conducive to the growth of civil society; and the rule of law (2005).
Ketrina Çabiri Mijo / Adela Danaj
Explaining the Trajectories of Post- Communist Democra-
tization
Ketrina Çabiri Mijo / Adela Danaj138
Other scholars of democracy and transition argue that a democracy cannot be 
called consolidated if the following conditions do not exist:
First the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. 
Second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society. Third, there 
must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent 
associational life. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is useable by the new 
democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society (Linz 
and Stephan 1996, 7).
Linz and Stephan add the two latter categories to the concept of consolidated 
democracy, allowing for the concept to be more completed. In this vein, one of 
the most applied definitions of a consolidated democracy is given by Freedom 
House, which offers additional space by widening the concept into seven cat-
egories: electoral process; civil society, independent media, national democratic 
governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, 
corruption. (Countries Report 2008)
Theorizing the communist legacy
Communism was a system that changed world history. According to Ekiert ‘com-
munism had the most important impact on specific paths of reform and types 
of transformations unfolding across the region during the first decade of post- 
communism’ (2003, 89). Eastern European countries adopted a western example 
that parachuted in the eastern part of Europe. However, it is important to notice 
that post- communist countries experienced different levels of communist legacies, 
and as a consequence their approach to democratic norms was different. In coun-
tries where communist regime was not very repressive, democratic norms leaked 
into segmented parts of the society trying to amortize communist rule, while in 
countries where the communist regime was strongly established by repressing the 
people, democratic ideas and principles were alien and hostile to the given society. 
After this diversity of communist experience, countries faced different levels of 
democratization. In one author’s definition democratization in CEE countries is a 
process that is strongly affected by the legacy of the communist regime. Vachudova 
points out that ‘the most important factors shaping the political and economic 
trajectories of Eastern European states after communism are found among the 
legacies of the past’ (2005, 21). Having said that, ‘the shortcomings of the old 
regime will excuse faults in the performance of the new regime’ (Rose 1998, 63). 
Thus, claiming that democratization is affected by the type of the previous regime, 
the current situation on the level of democracy shows that in some countries the 
divorce from communism was only formal. Scholars like Rupnik are pessimistic 
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enough to claim that ‘for the people of Eastern Europe, the past, to use Faulkner’s 
phrase, is never dead. It is not even past’ (1989, 36).
The lack of democratic experience for some countries made it difficult to per-
form in a democratic environment. Such countries showed enthusiasm in over-
throwing the old system, while they didn’t have the necessary experience, skills 
and structures to replace it with a new democratic one. As Holmes puts it ‘post- 
communism is better understood as the rejection of the communist power than 
as a clear- cut adoption of an alternative system’ (1997, 13). According to Rose ‘in 
a post- communist society, there is no escaping from the legacy of the communist 
regime’ (1998, 142). Actually, communist legacy is an available explanation for 
each post- communist country’s trajectory to democracy, but depending on the 
regime’s repressiveness, its legacies are stronger for some countries and weaker 
for others. According to Rose, ‘a new regime can receive a ”soft” or a ”hard” legacy 
from its predecessor depending on the extent to which the predecessor respected 
the rule of law, tolerated institutions of civil society and had institutionalized elec-
toral competition and accountability’ (Rose 1998, 63). Other authors, including 
Lijphard and Crawford, explain the types of legacies communist regimes have left 
behind. They specify six fundamental legacies: ‘the history of ”backwardness”, the 
absence of a successor elite, weak party system, interrupted nation building, the 
persistence of old institutions, the legacy of the command economy- that may 
affect post- communist transformations’ (1995, 179). Correspondingly, Hanson 
identified four components of Leninist Legacy: ‘ideological, political, socioeco-
nomic, and cultural – that may have different impacts and varying capacities to 
persist’ (1995).
While exploring all these models established in order to explain the type and 
weight of the communist legacy, we find that the literature does not clearly ex-
plain how communist legacy impacts the democratisation. Different variables 
are offered to explain the trajectory of democracy, for example, the impact of the 
social- economic structure of communism, the pace of transition, etc. Demogra-
phy as a social structure and industrialization as an economic structure, shaped 
under the democratic regime, might impact the development of the new system. 
However, our research presents a theoretical model which examines the impact 
of communist legacy in the democracy system. For this reason, the model ex-
plains that the lack of opponents and the lack of democratic culture influence the 
communist legacy (independent variable) that explains democratization process 
(dependant variable).
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The legacy of communist repression and its impact
The model of the impact of communist legacy in the democratic consolidation 
process considers the former as a paramount factor which explains the democ-
ratization process.
Legacy of communist regime → lack of opponents and political culture→ 
weak democratic leader → unstable institutional choices → weak democratiza-
tion process
Following Rose’s terminology, when communist legacy is strong, the com-
munist rule has been highly intolerant of civil society, institutionalized electoral 
competition, accountability, etc. What is more important is that under such re-
gimes contestation doesn’t exist and as a result there are almost no opponents 
or dissidents of the regime. In such regimes, if dissidents are noted, they are 
immediately eliminated. Having said this, in order to have a softer communist 
legacy, the existence of opponents within the communist regime is seen as a very 
important element. As Vachudova puts it, ‘the quality of political competition, 
which determined whether the state embarked on what she called a liberal or 
illiberal pattern of change after 1989, was initially determined by the presence 
or absence of an opposition to communism’ (2005, 21). Political culture refers to 
the collective opinions, attitudes and values of individuals about politics. When 
people lack democratic culture, they are likely to apply the old communist cul-
ture in implementing the new lifestyle of the new regime. In the new emerging 
system, the cultural patterns starts to change but the mentality of people and new 
leaders remains the same. Quoting Rose ‘the past does not disappear when one 
constitution supersedes another; it persists in the values and beliefs of politicians 
and citizens to accept the cultural norms of the previous regime’ (1998, 44). Al-
though the institutions can be built according to democratic patterns, the com-
munist culture constitutes a tough component that affects democratic principles. 
While the regime changes, the new political class is a mixture of the old elites and 
new politicians. Emerging from a system with no opponents and an inherited 
communist culture, leaders in newly established democracies come to power by 
promising a democratic system, without knowing what democracy means. Lead-
ers implement communist patterns while propagandizing that they are walking 
into a democratic path. They tend to be strong leaders with centralized power. It is 
further argued that their institutional choices are far from democratic. The party 
system tends to be a highly polarized two party system, with strong political lead-
ers. Alliances are unstable and parties change the rules of the game in accordance 
with their interests. Electoral code is usually an expression of big parties’ interests 
and elections tend to be manipulated and corrupted, which means putting in 
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doubt the legitimacy of the new government. Thus, political actors make choices 
dictated by their political culture and the so- called democratic institutions remain 
democratically unstable. As a summary of the above arguments, Kitschelt points 
out that ‘democratic institutions themselves depend on legacies, because they are 
endogenously chosen by political actors emerging from the old pre- democratic 
system’ (Kitschelt et al 1999, II)
Theories of democratization
When analysing the trajectories to democracy in the CEE countries, scholars 
try to shed light on factors which might have influenced this trajectory. Among 
several theories, there are three popular theories found in the academic literature.
The institutional theory explains that ‘changing institutions are expected to 
produce changes in behaviour and values of individuals, because it alters the 
incentives, rules and constrains’ (Rose 1998, 143). This theory supports the idea 
that the right way of establishing institutions will generate the right response 
from people, as they are rational and will behave properly in order to maximize 
the good performance. This theory is contra argued by the legacy theory, which 
explains that ‘historical legacies determines the available alternatives and make 
some institutional choices more likely’ (Ekiert and Hanson 2003, 93). Thus, the 
institutional choices are not just ones made by neutral actors in neutral environ-
ments. They are affected by the political culture of the leader, the socio- economic 
structures of the county and the mentality of people. In this vein Bunce argues that 
‘in post- communism, political institutions seem to be more a consequence than a 
cause of political developments’ (1995, 97). Institutional theory provides a weak 
explanation for the trajectory to democracy, as it fails to explain how institutions 
emerge and how people perceive the right and the wrong institutional choice.
The other theory that explains democratization is based on political actors’ 
choices. As Michael McFaul wrote, ‘inert, invisible structures do not make democ-
racies or dictatorships. People do’ (2002, 214). As a matter of fact, something is 
true in this statement, but democracy is not only about what someone decides, it 
is more about how this decision is absorbed by the society. Starting from scratch, 
this theory misleads attention. An actor’s choices are a consequence of the ac-
tor’s political values, their knowledge of the democratic system and their will to 
implement reforms. All these variables do not emerge in one day, as decisions 
sometimes do, but they root in the actor’s background, which is shaped by the 
communist regime. Emerging from a strong communist regime, new leaders are 
former communists who transport the communist political culture from one 
system to the other. The second argument against this theory is that political op-
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tions are set in accordance to the social and economic structures of the society, 
thus actors are restricted in their choices.
The international factor theory focuses on the influence of international actors 
like the EU, as the engine of democratization. According to Linz and Stephan ‘in-
ternational factors decisively shaped all phases of transition: the deconstruction of 
the old regime, the transfer of power, and the consolidation phase’ (1996, 235–44). 
It is true that international factor (EU) was a very important actor in the turmoil 
of democracy in the former communist countries but there are several reasons 
that explain why the international factor was not the engine of democratization. 
Firstly, the EU was more a promoter of democracy that showed the way to de-
mocratization. In this perspective Pridham claims that ‘EU conditionality trades 
more on persuasion and temptation than coercion’ (2000, 298). Countries were 
looking at the EU as a democratic model which could help more in the stabiliza-
tion process than in the democratization process. Another argument against the 
importance of the EU impact in the democratization process explains that the 
EU cannot impose rules that can be absorbed by people on a national level on an 
easy way, unless these rules come from the people. Kubicek points out that ‘the 
effectiveness of international norms is conditioned by the saliency of the norms 
and the context of domestic policy debate’ (Kubicek 2003, 13). Similarly, John 
Pevehouse claims that ‘most democratization studies present regime transitions 
as the outcome of a domestic political process that is not influenced by actors 
outside the nation- state. Even literature sympathetic to international factors relies 
on domestic processes to explain regime change’ (2002, 517). While the EU was 
promoting a similar democratic baseline for each country, CEE countries differed 
from each other in their implementation of democracy, due to their political past.
The next chapter will describe the democratisation process in Albania, as a 
study case characterized by a difficult trajectory to democracy. Its aim is to pro-
vide a descriptive overview of the democratization trajectory and the state of the 
consolidation of democracy for the period 1997 (the year of Pyramid Schemes) 
to 2006 (the year when the Stabilization and Association Agreement was signed), 
considering the lack of opponents and the lack of democratic culture which ham-
pered the trajectory to democracy.
The Albanian trajectory to democracy
When the old communist system collapsed in 1990, Albania’s road to democracy 
was unavoidable. At the beginning of its journey to democracy, the country was 
expected to be almost similar to the other countries in the region, but these analy-
ses coming from west, failed in the face of the different reality of Albanian politi-
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cal events. Metaphorically, the state of democracy in Albania is described by the 
Freedom House report with the following metaphor: ‘Albanian democratization 
brings to mind the legend of Sisyphus: It is marked by periods of progress fol-
lowed by serious setbacks that brings it repeatedly to the starting point’ (Freedom 
House 2006). In the history of Albanian transition, the biggest backward step was 
the economic failure in 1997, and as a result the political collapse that the country 
experienced. During the 1997 events, in the country there were no rules, political 
and state institutions were frozen or destroyed.
In order to describe the democratization process of Albania, the right and 
freedom, the performance of governance, etc., we have used the Freedom House 
findings. This decisions is based on the strengths of that research’s methodology. 
Firstly, Freedom House methodology only not measures the existence of laws 
but also the implementation by the government and secondly, they make tailor- 
made/multiple interpretations, using specific criteria to decide which category 
the country or territory falls into.
With reference to the Freedom House fields of analysis, in the following section 
we will scrutinise seven areas to analyse the state of democracy and the process of 
consolidation. The table below will show numerically, how the arenas of democ-
racy have been rated based on their democratic performance.
NIT Ratings 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Electoral 
Process 4.25 4.50 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.50
National 
Governance N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.25 4.00
Civil Society 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.00
Independent 
Media 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.00 3.75 4.00 3.75
Local 





N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.50 4.25
Corruption N/A N/A 6.00 5.50 5.25 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.25
Democracy 
Rating N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.04 3.79
Source: Freedom House, 2006
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According to the Freedom House scores, level 1 is a consolidated democracy and 
level 7 is a consolidated authoritarian regime. For the period studied above, one can 
realize that Albanian democracy consolidation is approximately in the middle. A 
slight improvement can be observed over the years in the seven areas. From a Local 
Governance perspective Albania is very close to a consolidated democracy, but with 
respect to Corruption, the country is oriented toward a consolidated authoritarian 
regime. As it will be analysed below, corruption is mainly spread in governance and 
the juridical framework, which are also ranked as two very problematic categories.
What explains democratization in Albania?
All CCE countries emerged from communist regimes, but as Linz and Stephan 
argue, the communist regimes were in fact different. (Linz and Stephan 1996).
For five decades Albania was under a communist regime that was established 
right after World War II as a pure form of the totalitarian regime. In Albania the 
communist system found it easy to be institutionalised, as the county didn’t possess 
a tradition of statehood and its social, political and economic structures, following 
the example of other European countries, were fragile or to some extent didn’t even 
exist. Thus, Albania was among the countries that ‘had little tradition of civil society 
before communism- it never developed the liberal, bourgeois class of citizens com-
monly associated with the flowering of civil society in Western Europe’ (Di Palma 
1991). According to Linz and Stephan, ‘a totalitarian regime is defined as having 
eliminated all pre- existing political, economic and social pluralism; has a unified, 
articulated ideology; has intensive and extensive mobilization; and has a leadership 
that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and 
vulnerability for elites and nonalike’ (Linz and Stephan 1996, 40). Following this ar-
gument, Albania presents three aspects which make the country an interesting case 
study to understand the impact of communist legacy on trajectories of democracy.
Firstly, Albania presents a highly repressed communism. ‘Albanian communist 
regime was considered to be the most repressive and tough regime in the region’ 
(see Bogdani, Loughlin 2007 and Biberaj 1999). Political life was centralized in 
the hands of one of the most repressive leaders of the world, Enver Hoxha. Ac-
cording to the prevailing ideology, everything was inside the state, nothing outside 
the state, thus private life belonged to the collective community and it was treated 
under severe conditions and oppression. ‘The communist leadership insisted in 
society’s total obedience to its rule and extended control over all aspects of social 
political and economic life’ (Goldman 2000, 53).
Hoxha was the party general secretary, the prime minister, the foreign minister, 
and the commander in chief of the military. The party was in charge of keep-
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ing the regime ‘clean’ from capitalist ideology or non- communist elements that 
were called ‘bad seed’. Hence ‘the regime was characterized by the elimination of 
possible political opposition; the elimination of intellectuals and dissidents; the 
abolishment of religious practices; and the harshest political persecution’ (Biberaj 
1999). This repression in political and social life was followed by collectivism in 
the economic sphere as well. As Tafili puts it, the ‘private property, was completely 
banned, and farmers were forced to join cooperatives and to collectivize their 
livestock, economy’. Following this tactic, the economic situation was getting 
harder, especially after the late 70s when the collectivist policy was implemented. 
Because of this policy, Albania remained the least economic developed country 
in Europe. ‘The low GDP per capita put it firmly in the African category of low 
income countries’ (Fowkes 1999, 72).
This small and strange state called Republika Popullore e Shqipërisë (People’s 
Republic of Albania) was never meant to be changed in liberal terms, consider-
ing that the regime was strong enough to suppress every little anti- communist 
movement.
The second aspect is related to the isolation that characterized Albania, espe-
cially during the late years of the regime. According to Freedom House, ‘former 
dictator Enver Hoxha’s xenophobic communist regime turned Albania into the 
most isolated country in Europe’1. While other communist countries were pursu-
ing some liberal reforms, Albania was more and more closing itself into isolation. 
In fact, Albanian communism came into power with the help of the Yugosla-
vian communist party, and initially both implemented the ideology of Marxism- 
Leninism. However, the Albanian dictatorship was strictly loyal to Stalinism and 
wherever reforms appeared to liberalize the system, measures were taken for these 
reforms to stop. After breaking the alliance with Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and 
finally China, in 1976 communist Albania found itself completely isolated. Hoxha 
always joined an alliance which provided him with economic assistance. However, 
he did not accept the economic aid provided by any of the democratic countries, 
even when other communist countries did. That is a reason why the human rights- 
based foreign policies of the Western countries, initiated by U.S. President Carter 
in the 1970s (Bozoki 2008, 5), didn’t reach Albania, as a country that was hostile 
to such democratically inspired initiatives.
The third argument that distinguish Albanian communist regime is its longi-
tude. Albanian communism lasted a longer period than it did in other countries. 
The Communist Party, later the Labour Party, was founded in 1941 and held a 
1 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=6906
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complete monopoly on political power in the country from 1944 to 1990. At this 
point, it is worth mentioning that 41 out of 46 years the communist system was 
controlled by the same dictator, Enver Hoxha. Despite the fact that the regime 
was one of the earliest established in the region, it was also the last to collapse. 
‘By the end of ’80s unlike other countries of eastern communist block where the 
”velvet revolutions” had started their irreversible way toward democracy, Albania 
seemed to slumber in a long lethargic sleep un awakened by the events sparked 
off by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union’ (Bogdani and Loughlin 2007, 21). Stalin’s 
statue in Tirana was removed only in December 1990, after all other countries 
had already entered the transition process.
The communists under the leadership of Alia tried to resist changes but efforts 
were useless at the time, because there was an urgent need for reforms. There 
were changes all over the region, especially the revolution in Romania that made 
the communist leadership in Albania aware that the popular fluster could lead to 
extreme and risky events. Thinking that some slight reforms would tranquilize 
the masses, and meanwhile trying to avoid the collapse of the regime, ‘in Febru-
ary 1990, Alia was pushed for some degree of economic liberalization, to allow 
people to travel abroad, to abolish death penalty for illegal emigration and lift the 
restrictions on religion practice’ (Goldman 2000). Nevertheless Alia refused to 
shed light and liberalize the main factors which would lead to a democratization 
process, thus the party’s monopoly of power remained untouched.
The influence of the communist legacy in the democratic 
trajectory in Albania
Albanian transition was much more difficult than that of other countries, because 
the social, political and economic structures that establish the democracy were 
never experienced during communism in any form. Political culture and insti-
tutional choices were strongly shaped according to a pure communist regime. 
As Biberaj argues, ‘the Albanian road to democracy was strewn with land mines 
in the form of the cumulative political, economic and social legacies of Hoxha’s 
communist dictatorship, which made genuine democratization seem almost im-
possible’ (1999, 71). The communist regime was long and isolated enough not to 
be criticized by externals and in Linz and Stephan’s terminology, communism 
was the only game in the town. Therefore post 90’s Albania was not similar to 
a democratic country, it was a post- communist country rather, which could be 
better defined as a hybrid regime finding it difficult to get rid of the chains of the 
totalitarian past.
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The impact of the legacy of communist repression
The tough Albanian communist regime was characterized by strong repression, 
thus any contestation to the regime was assimilated before it could potentially pose 
a danger for the system. Linz says that there are two factors that characterize the 
repression of a non- democratic regime, ‘first the extent to which they tolerate or 
repress a plurality of ideas and institutions and secondly, the extent to which they 
mobilize their subject or are indifferent to what the masses do’ (1975). Knowing 
that the Albanian communist regime was extremely strong, in Linz’s world it 
didn’t allow pluralism, it controlled masses, it caused lack of democratic culture 
and lack of opponents.
Lack of democratic political culture and opponents
Political culture is a very important factor which can guide successful democratic 
processes or can become a serious obstacle for the democracy to consolidate. 
While political structures can be changed by instant decisions, the mentality of 
politicians requires a long time to change. Thus, when implementing a new po-
litical system, old political culture will still remain. ‘Kubicek’s hypothesis of the 
‘cultural match’ seems to be verified in Albanian case. It appears that the cultural 
gap between the Albanian elite and the EU was much shaped by Albania’s former 
communist legacy’ (Gjomema, 2007).
For five decades communism in Albania shaped people’s mentalities to think 
through communist filters. The people was one single unit; no one was allowed to 
be against the system. One of the main features of the communist regime was the 
idea to always have an enemy. This fear threatened the ‘we- ness’ among people. 
In this vein, the political system in Albania is characterized by the polarization 
of political forces, which means looking at everyone who is not ‘like us’ or ‘with 
us’ as a criminal actor. To quote Rakipi, ‘the polarization of Albanian politics is 
largely based on the ideological “baggage” of the social divisions of the commu-
nist era’ (2004). There were many others cultural aspects of communisms that 
have influenced the new regime. As Bogdani and Loughlin argue, ‘the country’s 
self- imposed international isolation, left a legacy of political passivity and back-
wardness, thus Albania had no points of reference apart from those given by 
the regime’ (2007, 23–24). This legacy of political passivity and backwardness, 
associated by the mentality of corruption, disinterest and intolerance, was trans-
mitted to the new regime. As Rose explains, ‘the legacy of corruption from the 
command economy remained’ (1998, 67). Corruption was found at the decision- 
making levels of government and favouritism was common at lower levels also. In 
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communism appointments were made based on personal interests. This is quite 
similar to post- communist Albania. Public administration in Albania is composed 
by militants of the party in power or by people with personal connection to the 
elites. Even after decades of transition, EU Commission reports still point out a 
“politically motivated staff turnover” (Commission Staff Working Document: 
Analytical Report 2010, 15) and that “public service remains overly politicised” 
(Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014–15, 20).
Weak democratic leader’s performance
The lack of democratic political culture made it difficult for new leaders to perceive 
democratic system and basically they did not know how to deal with the new al-
ternative that was emerging. To quote Goldman, ‘while they wanted democracy for 
Albania, it looked like they didn’t understand the meaning of it or how it worked’ 
(2000, 70). Political leaders of the early years of transitions could be divided into 
four background groups. There were leaders who, after the communist regime col-
lapsed, stayed in power. They used to hold political positions and with the change 
of the regime they converted themselves into the new communist- socialist party. 
The other category of leaders was composed of well- educated people during com-
munism, who held important but non- political positions. Another category was 
made up of persecuted people, who in one way or another were categorized as dis-
sidents during communism. In the last category there were random activists that 
became part of the new leadership. In different ways all leaders shared the same 
characteristics inhered from the communist regime. As Nordlinger points out, ‘post- 
communist isn’t so ”post”. They still think like communists and act like communist. 
They have not developed democratic ways of living, dealing and governing’ (2005). 
That explains the lack of essential political skills such as tolerance, compromise or 
negotiation. New political leaders were used to seeing politics as dominated by a 
strong and charismatic leader, who represents the party. This communist mentality 
became a real obstacle to the consolidation of Albanian democracy. As Fish would 
argue the ‘creativity of actors, is constrained by the experiences of the past’ (1999). 
The leader of DP, Sali Berisha had been the secretary of the Party of Labour to the 
medical school of the University of Tirana (Tarifa and Lucas 2006). The leader of 
SP, Fatos Nano held important political position during the previous regime as well. 
New leaders were using old government, showing that it was almost impossible to 
divorce from the past. ‘It did not take long for Berisha, like communist Enver Hoxha 
before him, to turn authoritarian. His political actions, shows how similar he was 
compared to the successor leaders. He amassed enormous political power, revived 
the old hate- mongering Bolshevik politics of class struggle, had independent report-
Explaining the Trajectories of Post- Communist Democratization 149
ers and opposition leaders arrested, fired critical voices from university teaching 
jobs, and used the courts to hound perceived enemies’2. Regarding the ‘novelty of 
environment’ hypothesis, Gjomema explains that ‘although the DP became quickly 
the party of the new generation, its leader Sali Berisha was a former Communist 
Party member and his governing performance was shaped by the communist au-
thoritarian system’ (2007). Berisha represents an indication that shows how much 
a leader can be affected by communist methods and how easy it is for him to apply 
those methods in a country that used to be under a strong leader, full of charisma, 
intolerance and addicted to the party power. Following this, ‘Nano’s government 
made sure to institutionalize its position by undertaking a campaign of political 
dismissals following on the track of “behaving as they own the state”’ (Kajsiu, Bumci, 
Rakipi 2002, 18).
Albanian post- communist leaders showed a poor performance as far as de-
mocracy style of leadership is concerned. In comparison to other leaders, they are 
ranked among the most authoritarian leaders that have ruled under democratic 
systems. Harvard scholar Steven Levitsky and Lucan compared Albania under 
Berisha to Haiti under Jean Bertrand Aristide, Malaysia under Mahathir Mo-
hammad, Peru under Alberto Fujimori, Russia under Boris Yeltsin, Serbia under 
Slobodan Milosevic, and Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma.
This corruptive mentality has existed since the communist rule, where col-
lectivism allowed people to steal and misuse public property. This mentality is 
dominant among the new elite, as they try to make appointments based on per-
sonal networking or on the exchanging of favours. In this light all instruments 
used by political actors shape institutional choices they make.
Unstable institutional choices (party system, election, division 
of power)
Communism has shaped the political culture of the new leadership in a way that 
it is more likely for them to take political decisions and make institutional choices 
that do not match the democratic requirements of the new system. Communism 
also built very strong structures within the society that were difficult to be changed 
by the new regime.
During communism the state was identified by the party in power. Every-
thing was done on behalf of the party that was the promoter of the ideology. The 
2 The US- based Committee to Protect Journalists, in its 1997 annual report, listed Sali 
Berisha and Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus among the world’s top ten “enemies of 
the press.” See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newsline 1, no. 24, 5 May 1997, part 2.
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party- state formula continues to be a strong characteristic in the post- communist 
Albania. ‘The party winning the elections is perceived as the complete ruler of the 
state, when it takes power, it reshapes the state by appointing its party members 
in the armed forces, police, secret services, foreign service, fiscal administration, 
customs, and even in the universities and other academic institutions. Political 
appointments are also practiced in the justice system and the courts of all levels’. 
(Rakipi 2004). Following this description, the state and politics in Albania look 
like a one man show.
In the communist past elections were fictitious. People used to vote but their 
will was manipulated by the lack of the right to choose between alternatives. 
This kind of communist legacy remained the same in the post- communist years. 
People’s choices are manipulated by false promises and practices. On that ac-
count a ‘political culture is being developed in which manipulation of elections 
has become the norm and such the unwritten law of Albanian electoral system’ 
(Kajsiu, Bumci, Rakipi 2002, 5).
Manipulation of electoral process made the government’s legitimacy doubtful 
and produce fragile institutions which legitimize leaders to make biased decisions 
on the democratization process.
Conclusion
After the overthrow of the communist system, countries of Eastern Europe were 
objectively orientated in establishing a liberal democracy and market economy. 
During this transition period it was seen that, while democracy was a concept 
with fixed components, democratization was a process characterized by a variety 
of trajectories.
Basically, this research raises the burden of the past communist regime to ex-
plain the trajectory of the present democratization. The legacy of the communist 
regime is the factor responsible for the democratization process and consequently 
gives an explanation to the variety of trajectories that have existed in the region.
When talking about a communist regime, a useful leverage is repression. By 
repression a communist regime closes all gates that people may have to get in 
contact with any way of thinking other than totalitarian. It isolates people not only 
physically but also psychologically. Under a repressive communist regime there 
are no dissidents or opponents of the regime, thus there is no way for democratic 
culture to spread. When it comes to building a new regime, society does not 
provide individuals who carry democratic culture, able to lead the country into 
the new system. New politicians are part of the old elite or people educated under 
the strict communist rules which lack any kind of democratic political culture. 
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In this vein leaders have a weak democratic performance, by implementing the 
old communist principles in a new democratic system. Their political outcome 
is measured by the unstable institutional choices they make. The political system 
is based on the old principle ‘winner takes it all’ and the electoral process these 
parties organized are characterized by an unfair electoral code and manipulated 
electoral process. In this light the executive power that takes the office tend to 
control and centralize the other powers, as a communist regime does. Thus the 
legacies of communist repression impact the democratization process, being an 
obstacle to consolidation.
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Danilo Vuković
The Hollowing Out of Institutions: Law- and 
Policymaking in Contemporary Serbia
Abstract: In this article, I offer a sociological analysis of the law- and policymaking process 
in Serbia in the fields of social policy, labor and employment, education, and rural devel-
opment in the period 2004–2013. The analysis is based on the qualitative data gathered 
through in- depth interviews with law- and policymakers, analysis of parliamentary ses-
sions’ transcripts and qualitative analysis of media reporting. The deficiencies of the law- 
making institutions and processes in Serbia within all three stages of the legislative process 
are identified: preparation of the legislation in the executive branch, public consultations, 
and work on the legislation within the parliament. Due to the weak institutional capacities, 
the executive branch is outsourcing some of its functions (such as policy analysis, policy 
planning and drafting, etc.), ultimately leading to the externalisation of the law- making 
process. Public consultations are undermined and ‘form’ prevails over ‘substance’ in this 
process. Finally, laws are neither prepared nor discussed in the parliament and some of its 
key functions (e.g. deliberation at committees and plenary sessions, amending the laws, 
etc.) are being transformed into performances without the necessary content. These are 
manifestations of the ‘hollowing out’ of law- making institutions – transferring institutional 
functions to external actors, be they formal or informal, as well as the precedence of in-
formal over formal norms. As an outcome, institutions are transformed in empty shells; 
they are ineffective and deprived of their internal content and functions with low or no 
public trust in them.
Introduction
In this article, I offer a sociological analysis of the law- and policymaking pro-
cess in Serbia.1 Relying on qualitative research methodology, I have analysed the 
1 This article is part of the project ‘Identity Transformation of Serbia’, which had been 
implemented by the Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade. The analysis is based on the 
qualitative data gathered through: (1) interviews with 15 randomly- selected members 
of parliament (ruling parties and opposition) and 12 members of working groups who 
were responsible for drafting laws in the fields of education, welfare, employment and 
rural development; (2) analysis of parliamentary sessions’ transcripts; (3) qualitative 
analysis of media reporting. The analysis covers a 9-year period, from 2004–2013, but 
the research itself was carried out over one year, from 2012–2013. Some of the previ-
ous results were published in Babović and Vuković 2015; Vuković and Babović 2014; 
Vuković 2013; Vuković 2013b.
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internal perspectives of members of parliament (MPs), politicians, civil servants 
and experts involved in law- making. My aim is, therefore, to demonstrate key 
structural features of this process, most notably the ‘hollowing out’ of law- making 
institutions. Just as Rhodes expressed in his seminal article, I share the notion that, 
even though institutions are not being hollowed out (Rhodes 1994, 138), there is 
still a clearly identifiable tendency to deprive institutions of their internal content. 
Like Jessop (2002), I refer to external pressures of globalization and a shift from 
government to governance and even take a step further in analysing a typical tran-
sitional and post- transitional experience of institutions that have been depleted of 
the social function, internal content and formal and informal rules which regulate 
their behaviour. To some extent, this process is a core element of a society that 
had been deconstructed during the process of post- socialist transformation (cf. 
Bolčić, 2013) and subsequently recorded systematically or anecdotally in numer-
ous areas, ranging from education (Baucal andBabić 2009, Jarić ed. 2010) and 
economy (Arandarenko 2011, Cvejić 2002) to politics (Antonić 2006, Cvejić ed. 
2016, Podunavac ed. 2011) and judiciary (Begović et al. 2004, Begović et al. 2004, 
Vuković, S. 2005, Marinković 2009).
Institutional transformation and performance is often measured against the 
background of quantifiable indicators (e.g. Zubek and Goetz 2010) and used to 
reform existing, or design new, institutions. However, my research does not deal 
with the institutional performance of the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Serbia, line ministries or participation and consultation mechanisms. I rely on 
qualitative data (and official quantitative statistics, when available) as a tool to 
better demonstrate typical performance patterns of these institutions –which in-
dicate their hollowing out. In the end, my aim is to identify the social and political 
factors that determine this particular institutional outcome.
Socio- political Context
Post- socialist transformation led to the collapse of state monopoly over social 
and economic processes. Comprehensive institutional reforms were shaped by 
extensive new legislature. In a rather radical manner, institutional elements of 
the old order were often conceived as unworthy of preservation (Elster, Offe and 
Preuss 1998, 18) and a series of institutional changes (replacements), thus initiated. 
Needless to say, this made way for an even stronger set of informal structures.
In Serbia, post- socialist transformation followed a peculiar path: transforma-
tive processes towards market economy and political pluralism decelerated, and 
were even stunted, during the 1990s. The political elite used various means to 
prolong their power and drain out public resources (Antonić 2002, Bolčić 2013, 
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Lazić 2011). Profound social and political changes began to take place only after 
2000, yet, as was visible in other post- socialist nations, they led to the increased 
impoverishment of large segments of the population and the further deepening 
of inequalities (Bogićević et al. 2003, Milanović 1998). In the Serbian case, eco-
nomic recovery was slow and only affected smaller segments of the population, 
most notably the elite and the middle classes (Arandarenko 2011). By definition, 
the elite strongly influence and benefit from laws and public policies, but in the 
Serbian context, the middle classes were also able to influence public policies and 
capture various state resources (Vuković 2016).
In addition to economic decline and slow recovery, Serbia faced constant politi-
cal instability: during the 1990s, it was involved in civil wars within the former 
Yugoslavia and fell under UN sanctions; in 1999 it was a target of NATO ag-
gression and after 2000 it suffered from the ‘unfinished’ state syndrome, starting 
from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, through to the union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, and the Kosovo and Metohija issue –the latter still remains an un-
settled issue. These collective circumstances had an exceedingly negative impact 
on the legitimacy and the efficiency of institutions and their ability to control 
social, political and economic processes.2 As a consequence, informal actors be-
came stronger than their formal institution counterparts. The whole period after 
2000 was thus marked by fraudulent privatizations and the stripping of public 
and state assets without any legal consequences for the new elite (Antonić 2006). 
Clientelistic relations penetrated all major institutional structures including the 
parliament, the judiciary, the government, local administrations, political parties 
and the media (Pešić and Cvejić 2016, 72).
The institutional decline has also taken place as an effect of globalisation and 
Europeanization – both of which have strengthened transnational institutions 
and, consequently, weakened the national ones. Globalisation leads to a decline 
in state sovereignty (particularly states on the periphery) and reduces their abil-
ity to make political decisions (Sasen 2006, Vuletić 2006). In Jessop’s words, this 
is the process of ‘hollowing out’ the state apparatus of the national state.3 States, 
2 As Boda and Medve- Bálint demonstrate, institutional trust ranks lower in Central East 
Europe than in Western Europe, but in both cases higher income is correlated to higher 
institutional trust (Boda and Medve- Bálint 2014, 11). In the same manner, those who 
benefited most from the transition in Serbia were more supportive towards the rule of 
law. Their ability to adjust their values to the new normative framework was contingent 
on the new system’s capacity to meet their interests (Vuković and Cvejić 2014, 72).
3 The first trend emphasized by Jessop is a general trend towards the de- nationalization 
of the state (or, better, statehood). This structural trend is reflected empirically in the 
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and particularly those that are in post- conflict and in- transformation statuses, are 
facing a decline in their ability to create and implement public policies and laws 
(cf.e.g. Bickerton et al. 2007, Chandler 2006). This function depends on internal 
professional and institutional capacities and the quality of the state administration 
(Evans, et al. eds. 1999, Fukuyama 2004).4 The insufficiency of local resources in 
policy formulation has been analysed in, and across, several fields and various 
territories (cf. Deacon and Stubbs, eds. 2007). In such cases, apart from politicians 
and civil servants, policies are being drafted by international organizations, local 
and international civil society representatives (international and domestic NGOs, 
academia, experts, etc.) and by other actors. Furthermore, there was a strong 
ideological push towards government openness and civil society participation 
in law- making as a means of strengthening democracy and the accountability 
agenda – an initiative that has made these processes more readily available to 
other actors.
Although parliaments are said to be the supreme legislative bodies, it is the ex-
ecutive body that is typically most important. The majority of legislative proposals 
come from the executive branch, which usually has the expertise and resources 
to prepare bills and set the legislative agenda.5 There are at least two features of 
post- communist parliamentary democracies relevant to this discussion:
‘hollowing out’ of the national state apparatus. Second, he claims, there is a trend to-
wards the destatisation of the political system. This is reflected in a shift from govern-
ment to governance on various territorial scales and across various functional domains. 
Third, there is a complex trend towards the internationalization of policy regimes. The 
international context of domestic state action has extended to include a widening range 
of extra- territorial or transnational factors and processes; and it has also become more 
significant, strategically, to domestic policy (Jessop 2002, 206–208).
4 Capacity, in this context, is the ability to formulate and carry out policies, to enact 
laws, to administrate efficiently, and with minimum bureaucracy, to control graft, cor-
ruption, and bribery, to maintain a high level of transparency and accountability in 
government institutions, and, most importantly, to enforce laws (Fukuyama 2004, 8–9).
5 The ability to reject or modify cabinets’ legislative proposals, and formulate and initi-
ate its own bills, is what distinguishes the strong parliaments from the weaker ones 
(Pavlović 2007, 92; Heywood 2000, 215). The strength of parliament is contingent on 
the electoral laws and statuses of MPs (Pajvančić 2008, Uslaner and Zittel 2006). The 
position of the parliament – and the relations between the legislative and executive 
branches – have been adequately captured by Norton: ‘What is remarkable about the 
legislatures is not their power to say no to government but rather their reluctance to 
employ that power […] Party is thus crucial to explaining the limited capacity, or 
viscosity, of parliaments to constrain government’ (Norton 1998, 192–193).
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1. Cabinets are strong and parliaments are weak, as opposed to the early days of 
transition, when parties were not yet consolidated and in which parliaments 
exercised the ability to amend, or reject, the cabinet’s bills. Today, cabinets 
manage to establish and maintain control over the parliaments, due to vari-
ous factors: the general strengthening of the executive branch (e.g. ministries, 
administration, policymaking or advisory bodies), the EU integration process, 
the need to introduce new legislature, etc. (Zubek and Goetz 2010; Kopecký 
2004).6
2. The law- making process is intensive. In order to meet the requirements of har-
monization with the EU legislation, countries have adopted a fast- track legisla-
tive procedure (Ágh 1997, Goetz and Zubek 2007, Kopecký 2004, Pettai and 
Madise 2006). For example, in Lithuania, legislation could be passed using 
‘urgency’ or even ‘special urgency procedures’, which allow time limits be-
tween readings to be reduced to just three hours (Pettai and Madise 2006, 298). 
In Hungary, the Government overused ‘urgency’ and proposed many draft 
laws which had not originally been put on the legislative agenda (Ágh 1997, 
425–426). The same findings apply to almost all former socialist countries.
The Serbian parliament fits the pattern of parliaments with strong parties, party 
voting and a dominant legislative role of the government. The role of parliament 
in the Serbian democracy is shaped by its internal procedures, budgetary de-
pendence, weak administrative and professional structure, etc. (cf. Orlović 2007, 
Pajvančić 2007, Stojiljković 2007). In addition to this, the parliament is the subject 
of constant suspicion and lack of public trust. In 2016, only a third of the Serbian 
population had trust in parliament, while in 2007, the level of trust was at its low-
est (18%) (CeSID, 2008) (Table 1).
It was not only the parliament that had suffered the havoc of post- socialist 
transformation. In the years following the 2000 political changes, Serbian pub-
lic administration had been weakened by brain drain and an inability to attract 
highly- skilled professionals (Eriksen 2005).7 The internal structure of public ad-
ministration was not conducive to effective law- and policymaking. It was, and 
6 Although governments dominate the law- making process, there are still strong parlia-
ments, such as the Polish Sejm (Goetz and Zubek 2007). As for the others, they have 
experienced a high degree of institutionalization (Chiva 2007, 298).
7 Although salaries in the public sector had increased after 2000, the salaries of the 
highly qualified employees in the private sector are still higher than salaries of highly 
qualified employees in the public sector, while this is not the case with employees with 
lower qualifications (Laušev 2012).
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still is, hierarchically structured and functions in an old- fashioned authoritarian 
way, in which decision makers rely on top leaders to initiate and design policies. 
In the often protracted periods when public institutions are without effective 
leadership – for instance, in the months before and after elections – work actually 
comes to a complete standstill (Eriksen 2007, 344).
Since 2004, there have been several attempts to reform public administration 
(cf. Džinić 2011, Rabrenović and Verheijen 2006, SIGMA 2015) but it still faces 
numerous challenges. Recruitment decisions are largely based on political affili-
ation and managers’ discretion (SIGMA 2012),8 while the socio- economic posi-
tion of public servants has deteriorated, due to salary reductions –a result of the 
ongoing economic crisis and austerity measures.
Law- and policymaking processes are supposed to be fairly open to the general 
public and involve public consultations. Public consultations and participation are 
essential in bringing about democracy as there have been growing demands for 
openness and transparency from civil society and international actors. As a result, 
various procedures aimed at securing public participation have been established: 
ranging from public consultation during the law- making process to mechanisms 
of tripartite negotiation, such as with the Socio- economic Council (cf. Vukelić 
2009). However, many of these mechanisms have been criticised for their lack of 
effectiveness and abundance of political abuse (Jelinčić i Đurović 2011, SKGO 
2006, Milovanović et al. 2012).
Law- and policymaking in Serbia
Law- and policymaking primarily take place in the executive branch. However, 
this analysis often points to the limited institutional and professional capacities 
of line ministries and the rather strong influence of external actors.
Typically, draft laws are prepared by a working group, formed by the line min-
istry, which is composed of various civil servants and external members: repre-
sentatives of the professional community and civil society (e.g. external experts, 
university professors, NGOs, etc.). Working group membership has often been 
hardly representative of various social interests that have crystallised around a 
particular legal or policy- based issue. On the contrary, interviews suggested that 
one of the main arguments in the selection process of new members seemed to 
be utilitarian: i.e. to secure financing of the working group, social or political sup-
8 The degree of political discretion in the appointment of top- level civil servants had widely 
increased after the 2012 government election (Verheijen and Rabrenović 2015, 25).
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port, majority in the group for a particular issue, etc. Therefore, it remains unclear 
whose interests members of the working group represent.
The active participation of external professional cadre in public administration 
was a profound, and rather distinguishable, characteristic of the first governments 
after 2000. The lack of expertise and, perhaps, the lack of trust in newly- elected po-
litical figures in the existing public administration structures led to the externali-
zation of regular tasks of government bodies and their delegation to consultants. 
As an example of this, the cabinet of the first minister in charge of social security 
had been almost completely composed of eternally- employed consultants. As the 
political situation stabilised, so did the socio- economic position of civil servants, 
and the role of externally- employed consultants generally shifted from tasks- based 
performance to reform- oriented involvement within a particular sector (i.e. the 
drafting of policies and legislation).They were responsible for innovating ideas 
and solutions, providing advice, securing EU harmonisation, etc. Although these 
were generally considered short- term assignments, we have identified permanent 
modes of collaboration between external experts and representatives of line min-
istries. In some cases, these modes of cooperation were strong, secure and defined 
by common interests and shared ideological preferences that ensured more stable 
policy networks.9
In many cases, individuals were members of policy networks, serving as em-
ployees of international organisations (such as the World Bank and UN agencies), 
bilateral donors, consultancies or international NGOs. These institutions have 
been influential in designing policies in Serbia and elsewhere (Deacon 2007, Dea-
con and Stubbs eds. 2007, Podunavac ed. 2011, Vuković 2013). Membership in a 
policy network is more often reserved for representatives of institutions or organi-
sations than for individuals based on their professional expertise and reputation 
(hence, institutions appear as intermediary factors in their network membership).
This research has identified several ways in which these external actors and 
policy networks influence the law- and policymaking process:
9 Following Burt, networks are understood as relatively stable sets of actors (individu-
als, groups or organisations) that exchange various resources (material resources, in-
formation, favours, norms, practices, etc.) and have a certain structure (Burt 1982). On 
the other hand, policy networks are ‘sets of formal institutional and informal linkages 
between government and other actors which are structured around shared or mutually- 
held beliefs and interests in public policy making and implementation. These actors are 
interdependent and policy thus emerges from the interactions between them’ (Rhodes 
2006, 426).
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External actors provide direct advice and guidance to policymakers
In several of the observed areas, this has not only taken the shape of direct policy 
translation and conditionality but has also become uncritically reliant on exter-
nal consultants. External actors can just exert influence as they finance working 
groups, background studies and analysis, study trips, etc. Sometimes the reliance 
on and the influence by external actors can take place even in an informal manner, 
as one public servant proudly confirmed:
We had here [names] from [international agency] who were still engaged in the project 
on [policy issue], so we could (ab)use them to help us with the draft law. We have even 
translated the first version of the law and gave it to [international agency] that was in-
volved directly and all their suggestions were accepted (Interview, public servant 2012).
External actors support the professional development of public 
servants and experts
They have represented a key platform for professional communication and de-
velopment over a period that was marked by war and isolation, and a subsequent 
lack of financial resources available to universities, research centres and public 
administration. The various projects, trainings and seminars have thus helped to 
keep public servants and experts up- to- date over the last 25 years with the latest 
professional knowledge. Furthermore, external actors (mostly international or-
ganisations and consultancies) have managed to establish discursive and ideologi-
cal monopolies in many areas (Deacon 2007) and influence the content of laws 
and public policies.
Sometimes their ideological monopolies and political influence have led to the securing 
of policy continuity throughout time, in spite of political changes. This has been the case 
in education and social welfare. International actors actually secured continuity of public 
policies even amidst abandonment or opposition due to the prevailing political changes. 
In these two sectors, conflicting viewpoints –between domestic and foreign actors– were 
identified and the interplay of international influences and domestic resistance have 
resulted in a ‘policy mishmash’ (Babović and Vuković 2014).
There is a solid body of evidence suggesting that international actors exert strong 
influence on law- making while local actors, conversely, have far less chance to 
influence laws and public policies (and, thus, fall short of the standards of the 
practice of participative or social democracies, cf. Huber et al. 1997, Young 2000). 
Due to a growing demand for more participative and transparent law- and poli-
cymaking, the government has been implementing various mechanisms for con-
sultation with the civil society actors. These include both temporary mechanisms 
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in the shape of public consultations – i.e.  those of which are organised for a 
particular piece of legislation – and more permanent mechanisms such as in the 
form of the Socio- Economic Council (SEC). However, both are deemed ineffec-
tive and are often abused. The flaws of public consultation have therefore been 
documented below:
They are not organised regularly or in a timely manner
As reported by Milovanović, out of 176 pieces of legislation that were the sub-
ject of public scrutiny through consultation, only 43 underwent this process 
(Milovanović et al. 2012, 113). Furthermore, they were often organised in a short 
time- frame (e.g. seven days, as was the case with one law studied) or limited to the 
parameters of Belgrade. The same applies to SEC. Its procedures are incompatible 
with those of the Cabinet given that SEC requires more time for consultations, due 
to its rather complex nature and the limited capacities of its members.10 In their 
words: ‘European experiences are 4 months and we have 20 days for consultations 
[…] Short deadlines are undermining the consultations’(Interview, SEC 2012).
Participation is not representative
The Cabinet invites representatives of civil society with whom they are on close 
terms and from whom they can expect a favourable vote (i.e. in support of their 
law or policy). SEC, which functions as a formal and high- profile tripartite con-
sultation mechanism, also has dubious representativeness. The interests of the 
employers are represented by the Union of Entrepreneurs whose members are 
only representatives of small and medium- sized businesses.11 In the same manner, 
the work of SEC is marked by constant disputes, among trade unions, on the issue 
of representation (cf. Arandarenko 2011).
Consultations are just a simulation on both sides. Narratives from our interviews 
indicate that the Cabinet approaches consultations formalistically, with the mere 
aim of ‘box- ticking.’ Civil society, on the other hand, is more disinterested and 
inactive in the process: ‘Qualified public representatives do not come to consulta-
tion […] There are no professors unless they are with NGOs. On the other side, 
10 SEC Secretariat receives materials, sends it to members, comments on it and sends it 
back; and only after this procedure, is SEC able to deliberate.
11 According to interview sources, large companies can open the doors to the government 
themselves without the help of the SEC. We might recall here Franz Neumann’s thesis 
which states that small entrepreneurs need the rule of law, rather than the monopolies, 
in order to resolve their own issues (Scheurman ed. 1996, 132).
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the government is not interested to hear ideas. There is a lack of mutual trust […] 
The media are also weak and without credibility.’ (Interview, politician 2012).
The Cabinet frequently breaches the law and tries to avoid public consultation 
yet only faces mild criticism. SEC representatives testify: ‘We received changes in 
the labour regulations two days before the telephone session of the Government. 
This is an abuse of the concept of consultations.’ (Interview, SEC 2012).
After the bill passes public consultations and is adopted by the Cabinet, it is sent 
to the Parliament. The Parliament is extremely effective in producing laws: over 
the period covered by this study, a total of 1,334 laws were enacted. This analysis 
identified the following features of parliament’s law- making function:
Major political and policy- based decisions are not made in 
parliament
This is evident throughout the stages of parliamentary life, from caucuses (parlia-
mentary groups) to committee meetings and plenary sessions. First, ruling- party 
caucuses have no stake in parliamentary life: the crucial role is only played by the 
parties and key discussions take place outside parliament. ‘There are no debates 
in the caucus. When draft law gets to the National Assembly and the caucus, eve-
rything is finalized.’ (Interview, MP 2012).
Opposition caucuses seem to have a more important role. MPs use caucus 
meetings to prepare plans for the deliberation, propose amendments and seek 
support from party leadership for agreed steps.
Secondly, parliamentary committees have an ambitiously- defined scope of 
work12 even though they only play a marginal role. MPs of the ruling parties 
have few incentives to participate in committee meetings since major decisions 
are made at party or Cabinet’s meetings. On the other hand, opposition MPs are 
not motivated to become engaged with a particular law, as they expect that their 
suggestions will be rejected. The government itself holds less interest in the work 
of MPs. Consequently, committee meetings are attended – as the MP testified – 
‘not by ministers’ but by lower- level civil servants or ministry officials. One of the 
interviewed MPs summarized the role of committees: ‘No analysis is conducted at 
committee meetings. Opposition is interested in discussions at plenary sessions, 
where they can be heard. Therefore, discussion rarely occurs at committee meet-
ings’ (Interview, MP 2012).
12 According to the Rules of Procedure (Art. 44), apart from discussing legislative pro-
posals, committees are in charge of overseeing the work of the government and the 
implementation of laws, analysis of work plans of ministries and other institutions, etc.
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MPs are particularly interested in the media coverage of their activities and 
this had been effectively captured by one respondent: ‘As soon as the cameras 
go down, everything stops’ (Interview, MP 2012). In recent years, the role and 
importance of the parliamentary committees have seemingly changed as their 
sessions are broadcast on the net and meeting transcripts regularly published on 
parliament’s website.
MPs have little room for involvement in legislative work even when they are 
engaged in the drafting and discussing of the amendments. Opposition MPs com-
plain that their ‘amendments are not accepted regardless of how much effort has 
been invested. Therefore, we seek to win a political score’ (Interview, MP 2012). 
An amendment is only accepted if the Government has approved it.
Parliamentary committees reflect the opinion of the Cabinet. They wait for the opinion 
of the Cabinet. In 95% of cases, the Cabinet rejects the amendment. And then we meet 
at the committee and we are nothing but voting machines […]. After that, the detailed 
discussion at the plenum starts. What the Cabinet has said in their Opinion is accepted. 
It rarely happens that an MP convinces the Cabinet to accept the amendment (Interview, 
MP 2012).
On the other hand, MPs of the ruling parties often have numerous amendments. 
In reality, these are amendments that are proposed by the government and facili-
tated by fast track legislation: ‘[…] the laws are prepared under time constraints. 
The Cabinet is not able to prepare a proper law. But, in order to avoid submitting 
(e.g. 50 amendments) to its own bill, it delegates proposing amendments to cau-
cuses and parliamentary committees’ (Interview, MP 2012).
Heavy workloads and urgent procedures hamper the law- making role 
of parliament
After the committee meeting, the legislation is discussed at plenary sessions. How-
ever, almost half of the laws (44%) had been enacted using the urgent procedure 
which left MPs with less than a day per law for discussions and voting (Table 2). 
As the EU integration progresses, there is less time allotted to discussions. MPs 
testify that sometimes they had only a few minutes to discuss a particular law. 
Often, several legislative proposals were jointly discussed at the plenary session, 
thus leaving MPs even less time for deliberation. In conclusion, given that the 
parliament is enormously overburdened with numerous legislative proposals, 
deliberation and political discussion in parliament remain virtually absent for 
one in every two enacted laws.
Under these circumstances of heavy workloads and weak support systems, MPs 
are unable to be involved in substantive discussion. Research data indicate that 
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MPs read legislative proposals and prepare for discussions if (a) draft laws are in 
the field of their professional competencies, (b) they are personally interested in 
draft laws, or (c) they have been put in charge by their party. ‘One reads law if one 
is interested. Each MP gets all the materials. We get 45 cm of paper and it is not 
possible to read it all. I read only what I can understand and what I am interested 
in’ (Interview, MP 2012).
MPs have an insufficient professional support system from the 
employees of parliament
The work of MPs on legislative proposals is further hampered by a series of techni-
cal and political obstacles. Preparing a technically correct amendment is a typical 
challenge facing an MP. This means preparing an amendment that can be incorpo-
rated into the law, which contains appropriate phrasing within the text of the law, 
adequate legal vocabulary, etc. MPs themselves receive minor support from their 
parties and professional cadre of parliament and are, therefore, reliant on informal 
networks of friends, experts and interested stakeholders. MPs are without any 
legislative plan which would allow them to prepare in advance for the upcoming 
session. Furthermore, they receive bills only just before the session. Thus, they are 
left ill- equipped and unprepared for the discussion. Below is an illustration of the 
hollowness and legislative pressures within parliament:
A law has 300 amendments. Each needs to be read, who proposed it, opinion of the 
Committee, I do not know the whole bill, I do not know the amendment and then I am 
lost and the voting lasts for 4 hours. When the amendment we need to support is on 
the agenda, the Chairperson rings this bell for silence and I know I need to vote (MP, 
Interview 2012).13
Conclusion
This analysis indicates the deficiencies of the law- making institutions and pro-
cesses in Serbia within all three stages of the legislative process: preparation of 
the legislation in the executive branch, public consultations, and work on the 
legislation within the parliament.
First, globalisation makes local law- making vulnerable to external influences 
due to the political, economic or cultural interconnectedness. However, the re-
search findings indicate an externalisation of the law- making process caused by 
13 This practice, which is still used by Parliament today, has been highly criticised by the 
opposition (Politika, 14.10.2016).
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other factors. Most notably, these are the weak institutional capacities – both 
financial and professional – and the informal norms that open up a space for 
the outsourcing of some of the functions of the executive branch, such as policy 
analysis, policy planning and drafting, etc.
Secondly, the research has identified that ‘form’ prevails over ‘substance’ in 
public consultations. The Cabinet often deliberately undermines or obstructs the 
consultation process, using various strategies. Consultations are often quick, with 
a short notice sent to a carefully- selected and well- controlled list of participants. 
They are conducted in a formalistic manner and all for the purpose of fulfilling 
the formal requirements necessary to maintain the consultation process. SEC is 
similarly inefficient and only an empty shell of tripartism due to ill- conceived 
procedures, unrepresentative membership and the Cabinet’s obstruction.
Finally, the findings presented here reveal a picture of a type of parliament in 
which laws are neither prepared nor discussed. Furthermore, some of its key func-
tions (e.g. deliberation at committees and plenary sessions, amending the laws, 
etc.) are being transformed into performances without the necessary content. 
Parliament seems to be just a complementary function to the hectic executive 
branch, with a series of informal rules further undermining its role. In that sense, 
parliament performs a thin legislative role and is deprived of its internal content.
The pro- creative14 function of a law- making institution, which consists of de-
signing laws and policies and autonomously or actively leading this process, is 
weakening. The research indicates that their role is being reduced to a mere trans-
mission of received inputs (from domestic or international, formal or informal 
actors) into various laws and policies.
In a sense, transferring law- making functions from the parliament to other ac-
tors – most importantly the executive – is a characteristic of contemporary demo-
cratic political systems. The weakening of mechanisms that ensure participation 
of non- privileged social groups in law- and policymaking might also be identified 
across modern democracies. However, what we have identified are deficiencies of 
the whole law- making process, ranging from the performance of the executive to 
the role of parliament and public consultations and participation mechanisms. 
Factors leading to these deficiencies include global processes of EU integration 
and globalisation, as well as the shift from government to governance as identi-
fied by Rhodes, Jessop and others. More importantly, in Serbia they own their 
magnitude to local and context- specific processes related to post- socialist trans-
14 The terms ‘pro- creative’ and ‘transmission function’ have been borrowed from a dif-
ferent context, a sociological study on the use of the internet (Petrović 2013).
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formation: institutional decline, slow and unsuccessful reconstruction, as well as 
the strengthening of informal norms, practices and actors. They are, therefore, 
referred to as the ‘hollowing out’ of institutional structures, a characteristic of a 
wider institutional landscape, including the economy, education, the judiciary, etc.
The ‘hollowing out’ of institutions includes transferring institutional functions 
to external actors, be they formal or informal, as well as precedence of informal 
over formal norms. The externalisation of the law- making functions of the execu-
tive is an illustration of the first while purely formal as opposed to substantive 
consultation process is a good example of the second dimensions of the ‘hollowing 
out’ process. As demonstrated in the case of the Serbian parliament, what often 
remains is an empty shell, an ineffective institution deprived of its internal content 
and functions with low or no public trust in it.
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Appendix
Table 1.  Trust in institutions in % (2016)
Has trust Indecisive No trust
Churches 58 19 21
Military 62 18 17
Police 49 23 26
Government 44 20 33
President of the 
Republic
34 23 40
National Assembly 33 26 38
Judiciary 23 25 48
Media 18 22 54
NGOs 19 26 44
Parties 14 24 58
Source: CeSID, 2016












% of laws 
in urgent 
procedure
2001 48 16 15 95 2.0 33
2002 47 23 11 78 1.7 49
2003 47 15 58 79 1.7 32
2004 88 59 33 118 1.3 67
2005 120 30 26 157 1.3 25
2006 52 26 15 63 1.2 50
2007 72 46 19 111 1.5 64
2008 48 44 16 90 1.9 92
2009 265 90 30 164 0.6 34
2010 260 72 21 116 0.4 28
2011 205 92 33 149 0.7 45
2012 130 88 22 71 0.5 68
2013 147 59 33 130 0.9 40
2014 131 115 32 97 0.7 88




Collective Memory and Historical 
Determinacy:  
The Shaping of the Polish Transition
If life cannot be destroyed for good, then neither can 
history be brought entirely to a halt. A secret stream-
let trickles on beneath the heavy cover of inertia and 
pseudo- events, slowly and inconspicuously undercutting 
it. It may be a long process, but one day it must happen: 
the cover will no longer hold and will start to crack.
This is the moment when once more something visibly 
begins to happen, something truly new and unique, 
something unscheduled in the official calendar of 
‘happenings’, something that makes us no longer 
indifferent to what occurs and when -something truly 
historic, in the sense that history again demands to 
be heard.
Václav Havel
Abstract: In this article, the author tries to explain why, looking back on different factors 
which determined its shape (in particular, historical determinacy and collective memory), 
the Polish transition took such a peculiar form, and whether or not a different scenario 
could have occurred after 1989. In the first part of this paper, the author defines the notions 
of collective memory and historical determinacy. The second part of the article analyses the 
historical factors which shaped the Polish transformation. In the third part of the paper, the 
author focuses on the political factors which shaped the Polish transition, observing how 
the new political scene was created. In the last part of the paper, the author highlights to 
what extent the omnipresent history and collective memory have determined the current 
shape of Polish society and culture.
Our memory is made up of our individual memories 
and our collective memories. The two are intimately 
linked. And history is our collective memory. If our col-
lective memory is taken from us — is rewritten — we 
lose the ability to sustain our true selves.
Haruki Murakami (2013, 322)
Miroslaw Sadowski
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Introduction
As we advance into the 21st century, not only the 1980s, but also the 1990s slip 
further and further away. As Tony Judt so wisely observed, we have started to treat 
the 20th century just like any other part of the past, ‘which has nothing of interest 
to teach us’ (2009, Introduction). The belief that ‘that was then and this is now’ 
(ibid., Introduction), perhaps surprisingly, is spread not only in Western, but also 
in Eastern Europe. Years of successful — at least on paper — transition following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, seem to have constructed another wall (this time in 
our minds), which completely separates us from the previous era (Tokarski 2009).
The famous opening words of British writer L. P. Hartley’s novel The Go- 
Between say: ‘The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there’ (Hart-
ley, 5). These days, this observation seems to be shared not only by millennials, 
but also by their parents and grandparents, who, despite having vivid memories of 
the times of communism, chose to repress them, either by forgetting, or idealising 
the (in their own words) long- distant past.
This ‘memory policy’ was perhaps best summed- up by Hungarian Prime Min-
ister Viktor Orbán who, at the opening of the Budapest House of Terror on the 
24th of February 2002, said that with the opening of this museum his country has 
simply ‘slammed the door on the sick twentieth century’ (cited in Judt 2007, 848).
Poland has also tried to slam its own door on the ‘sick’ twentieth century. How-
ever, it turned out that, unfortunately, the Polish door had enough slits in it for 
the twentieth century to influence (some would go so far as to say envenom) the 
course of events in the present- day era. Thus, it is not very surprising that many 
historians and publicists argue that the Polish transition did not end back in the 
1990s — as it would seem at first glance (Dudek 2008). The end of the transition 
has been announced on various occasions, most recently in 2015, with its last act 
said to have taken place as late as in 2016, which was declared by one of the biggest 
weekly magazines on its cover last February, showing a giant hole in the middle 
of the Round Table, the symbol of Polish transition (Ziemkiewicz 2016, 16–18). 
Whether or not the above is true (I will try to answer this question later on), the 
very idea of such a debate shows how peculiar the Polish transition was, and why 
it is such an interesting subject for a legal researcher. In my essay, I would like to 
examine the process of our transition from two extremely insightful perspectives: 
those of historical determinacy and collective memory.
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The Notions of Historical Determinacy and Collective Memory
The memory is a living thing — it too is in transit. But 
during its moment, all that is remembered joins, and 
lives — the old and the young, the past and the present, 
the living and the dead.
Eudora Welty (1998, 948)
‘The weight of dead generations’, ‘the nightmare of history’ (MacPhee 2011, 4) 
— historical determinacy is neither an obvious, nor an easily definable term. 
However, as historical determinacy conceives of the past as a complex and un-
stable network of contingencies (Clift 2014, Introduction), which to some extent 
influences the present, it is often a useful tool in researching various processes 
which took place in history and influence the present day. Historical determinacy 
makes seeing the connections between various events in the past possible, which 
might have been overlooked otherwise. It has already been successfully applied, 
for example, to investigating the lines of thought in present- day Britain, where it 
has been noted that ‘the historical determinacy of a past which has been lost and 
cannot appear, […] continues to organize the hierarchies and distinctions that 
underpin the postcolonial present’ (MacPhee 2011, 18). I feel that, as one could 
easily describe Polish history as a ‘complex and unstable network of contingencies,’ 
with events seemingly of little importance back in their day having grave repercus-
sions centuries later, and since history was and still is influencing Polish reality, 
it is worth investigating the process of transition from this particular standpoint.
The other often overlooked factor which, in my opinion, significantly influ-
enced Polish transition is collective memory. It is often said that we are living in 
the days of ‘hypertrophy of memory’ or ‘memory boom’ (Bednarek 2012, 5). As 
French historian Pierre Nora observed, ‘we talk so much about memory, because 
so little of it is left’ (2009, 4). However, despite the popularity of memory- related 
topics in general, and collective memory in particular, this term is much more 
complex than it may appear at first glance.
Since its introduction to sociology by Maurice Halbwachs (see Sadowski 2015, 
144), who famously said ‘I usually recall because others induce me to do it; their 
memory is trying to help my memory, and my memory finds support in theirs’ 
(2008, 5), collective memory has had numerous definitions. It can be described as 
‘a pool of shared cultural resources from which a common symbolic canon or the 
national imagery can be consciously selected or newly constructed’ (Wulf 2000, 
6), or as an ‘elaborate network of social mores, values and ideals that marks out 
the dimension of our imaginations according to the attitudes of the social group 
to which we relate’ (Hutton 1993, 78). It has also been said that
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collective memory reflects reality by interpreting the past in terms of images appropriate 
and relevant to the present; it shapes reality by providing people with a program in terms 
of which their present lines of conduct can be formulated and enacted (Schwarz 2000, 18).
As for the major theories, it is worth noting that they are all derived from Hal-
bwachs’ observation that ‘it is in the society that people normally acquire and 
shape their memories and it is also in the society that they recall, recognise and 
localize the remembered entities’ (Halbwachs 1992, 38).
Additionally, it should be observed that nowadays more and more often we ana-
lyse not only collective memory, but also collective forgetting. This intriguing term 
encompasses the memories, which, while not being erased, are ‘inaccessible at the 
time remembering takes place,’ usually due to institutional and cultural practices 
(Stone and Hirst 2014, 315–316) — for example slender memories survive of the 
Armenian genocide in Turkey, or of the treatment of indigenous people during the 
colonial period among the Spanish or the Portuguese. This phenomenon may be 
yet another interesting perspective from which to investigate the Polish transition.
History and the Shape of Polish Transition
In the final analysis, the range of life must be deter-
mined by history.
Walter Benjamin (2004, 1: 204–5)
In Poland, the debates on the past are far from settled. What is the reason be-
hind this controversy? In my opinion, there are at least two, interlinked, possible 
answers. Firstly, history still is a much more important factor in Poland than in 
most other countries: permanently a subject of public debate, it often seems to be 
omnipresent. Secondly, the baffling idea expressed by several historians, that ‘the 
19th century has not yet finished in Poland,’ may be very much true.
Which events in the history of Poland were so significant, that they had re-
percussions even at the turn of the 20th and the 21st century? Well, a list of such 
moments in our history could be very long — from the decision of our first his-
toric ruler, Mieszko I to convert to Christianity in 966 to the forming of a Polish- 
Lithuanian alliance in 1385, to an outlandish idea of the Polish nobility to choose 
the king in general elections (general: all the nobility, about 10% of the population) 
in 1573. But if I were to choose just two events which had long- term effects of such 
magnitude that they partially influenced what happened after 1989, I would opt 
for the partitions of Poland, which took place between 1772 and 1795 (and their 
direct impact on the 19th and 20th centuries in Poland), and the Second World War.
In 1795, when Poland disappeared from the European maps, little did anybody 
realise that (with the exception of the years 1807–1813) it meant losing independ-
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ence for one hundred and twenty three years. Years, which for other European 
countries were crucial for their socio- political and cultural development. This first 
resulted in Poland’s ‘dormancy in relation to European centres of civilization, eco-
nomics and culture, and then in different routes of reform, catching up, compensa-
tion’ (Nowak 2013). On the other hand, since Poland lay far away from said centres 
of civilization, it also meant it was absent from ‘the race for colonies’ taking place 
in Europe at that time, thus sparing Poles the moral responsibility for colonialism, 
or the destruction of the natural environment, which still has an important place in 
the collective memories of the British, the French, or the Spanish (ibid.).
What effect did these partitions have on the shape of the Polish transition? First, 
it is worth pointing out that in Poland the 19th century continued to live on even 
after the Second World War, ‘as in Polish cultural memory the pattern of the image 
of the time we belong was revived’ (ibid.) again with the loss of sovereignty in 
1945. It lived on in the collective memory of the people who once more could not 
commemorate the anniversaries and events they wanted (i.e. the November and 
January uprisings — in the 19th century, the Katyń massacre, the Warsaw uprising, 
or the history of the cursed soldiers — in the times of communism); who knew 
how to preserve different than official versions of history and culture, and how to 
cultivate them in emigration; who once more turned to the Catholic Church in 
search of moral support; who on the one hand knew how to organise underground 
organisations and how to contest the regime, but on the other learned the lesson 
that military actions against it may result in bloodshed (ibid.).
As a result, when the transition came, its course was not free from 19th century 
influences. The dilemmas about the question of scope of cooperation with the 
former communist authorities were reminiscent of thoseof the great reformer, 
count Wielopolski, in the 1860s. The distrust and disrespect towards the authori-
ties, obvious during the times of partitions and of communism, unfortunately con-
tinued to live on in Polish society even after 1989 (Wnuk- Lipiński and Bukowska 
2008), which meant that necessary changes (especially economical ones) lacked 
social support . And, perhaps most surprisingly, all the election results until 2015 
confirmed that regional political sympathies varied according to which country 
had the region belonged to during the partitions — either the more conservative 
Russian and Austrian, or the more liberal Prussian. (Nota bene, the fact that the 
2015 elections broke off with this pattern, confirms in the eyes of many publicists 
and political scientists that it may have been the end of the transition — if that was 
the case, it would have been not only a transition from the times of communism, 
but also from the 19th century.) (Radziszewski 2015).
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The other event which has had the strongest long- term effects on (among 
others) the course of transition in our country, the Second World War, had a 
tremendous effect on Poland. Due to the Second World War everything changed: 
from the shape of borders, through the ethnic composition of the society, to the 
nature of the government. It is no exaggeration to say that Poland virtually lay in 
ruins — our country suffered the most of all the ones taking part in the conflict: 
6,028,000, or 22,2% of the population died (Madejczyk 1970, 371), 40% of cultural 
monuments were destroyed (GUM 1984) and 84% of the capital (Warsaw) was 
reduced to debris (Getter 2004). The material losses of Polish citizens amounted 
to 285 billion dollars (Chmielarz 2012).
Thus, , apart from changing the shape and condition of our society, the Sec-
ond World War directly and indirectly influenced the transition in several ways. 
Firstly, it strengthened both traditions, from the times of partitions, of working 
in conspiracy (the Polish Underground State during the Second World War was 
the biggest organisation of this kind in Europe) and contesting the unwanted 
regime — hence Poland was among the first communist countries where pro-
tests occurred, ultimately resulting in the rise of Solidarność in 1980. Secondly, 
the disastrous end of the Warsaw Uprising – it was bloodily defeated and 30% of 
Warsaw was destroyed– only confirmed the previous bad experiences of other 
Polish uprisings, thus Solidarność always ruled out using force against the au-
thorities, which not only helped it gain such broad public support, but also put 
the communist authorities in a very difficult position. Finally, the behaviour of 
Polish politicians during the Second World War (all the main pre- war political 
parties were a part of the government in exile) gave a very good example of how 
people with different views can work together for the sake of the country, which 
was later also repeated in Solidarność. However, it has to be noted that, while the 
unity of members of this movement helped to put the transition in motion, the 
quarrels and animosities among them jeopardised the necessary changes in our 
country, sometimes even making them impossible.
In addition, I would like to remark on the changes in Polish collective memory 
during both the times of communism and the transition. They provide a good 
insight into how the perception of Polish history varied over the years, and how 
it was influenced by the current historical period.
Back in 1965, sociologist Barbara Szacka – the first, who carried out an extensive 
research on Polish collective memory – distinguished four groups of tradition that 
Poles of that time identified with: (i.) the tradition of ‘strong state’ correlated with 
‘armed combat,’ centred around such people as Józef Piłsudski (the ‘creator’ of in-
dependent Poland in 1918) and Stefan Batory (Polish king, who in the 16th century 
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defeated the Russians, and thus was absent from the main school curriculum at the 
time); (ii.) the tradition of ‘strong state’ correlated with ‘economic growth’, centred 
around Kazimierz Wielki (the medieval king who modernised Poland in the 14th 
century) and Stanisław Staszic and Hugo Kołłątaj (18th century reformers); (iii.) the 
tradition of ‘fight for independence’, centred around Tadeusz Kościuszko (the leader 
of struggle against Russia at the time of partitions) and some communist- propaganda 
‘heroes;’ and (iv.) the tradition of national culture, centred around Nicolaus Coper-
nicus, Frederic Chopin, or Marie Curie- Skłodowska (Szacka 2006, 206–212).
However, such a shape of Polish collective memory ‘crumbled into pieces’ when 
the first post- war generation grew- up. In the 1970s, the reformist ideas succumbed 
to the romantic tradition of ‘armed combat’ and ‘fight for independence,’ with Józef 
Piłsudski largely leading the classification of most valued Poles.
1980s brought another redefinition of the national values and collective memo-
ries. The nation began to be seen as a ‘political community’, associated with a ‘strong 
state,’ which was chosen as the most important value, along with the tradition of the 
‘fight for independence,’ while the importance of ‘national culture’ waned (it began 
to be seen as the least significant value). Józef Piłsudski’s popularity rose once more, 
while the historical figures and events used to legitimise the Socialist Polish People’s 
Republic completely disappeared from Polish collective memory.
Eventually, the research conducted in the last phase of transition (2003), showed 
another (final?) shift in Polish collective memory. The temporal horizon got much 
shorter, as Poles now mostly focused on the post-1918 events. Józef Piłsudski’s 
place at the top of national pantheon did not change. However, culture and science 
were regarded as the most important national values. The perceptions of historical 
figures also changed, in harmony with global trends, as they became more indi-
vidualised, with the respondents focusing mostly of the figures’ personal virtues.
Politics and the Shape of Polish Transition
I could distinguish only that to repeat what everybody 
else was thinking was, in politics, the mark not of an 
inferior but of a superior mind.
Marcel Proust (1919, 1.)
While historical factors, with their influence on religion, politics, and the shape 
of the society in general, were undoubtedly among the most important factors 
influencing the course of Polish transition, it were the politicians, not historians, 
who ultimately shaped it. That is the reason why the political factors behind our 
transition are also worth investigating.
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When the June the 4th 1989 elections came, almost the whole anti- communist 
opposition seemed unified. However, the cracks in the supposed unity have al-
ready begun to show up. They became even more visible during the presidential 
campaign in 1990, in which the first non- communist Polish Prime Minister after 
1945, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, entered the lists against the leader of Solidarność, Lech 
Wałęsa. The election of the latter did not stop further splits in the former anti- 
communist opposition, which ultimately led to the victory of the post- communist 
party in the parliamentary elections of 1993, and then of its candidate, Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski, in the 1995 presidential elections.
However, while the divides between the former Solidarność members grew 
deeper, their influence on the course of Polish transition and politics has remained 
steady. Three out of five presidents chosen since 1990 and almost half of the prime 
ministers have had opposition backgrounds. Even today, in 2016, the two main 
parties in Poland are PiS and PO, both of which have roots in Solidarność, and 
their leaders are former members of the anti- communist opposition.
On the other hand, PZPR (the communist party), albeit defeated in the 1989 
elections and soon dissolved (in January 1990) — somewhat symbolically during a 
congress taking place in the Palace of Culture and Science, which was a ‘gift’ from 
Stalin — ultimately transformed into a party called SLD, which exists to this day. 
The party won the 1993 and 2001 parliamentary and the 1995 and 2000 presiden-
tial elections. A number of scandals, however, led to its decline, and finally SLD 
did not win any seats in parliament in 2015 (which, for many publicists, was yet 
another sign of the end of the time of transition in Poland).
Somewhat surprisingly, one of the biggest problems in Polish politics after 
1989 proved to be the lack of ‘real’ lustration. Lustration was supposed to be a 
process of public disclosure of collaboration of people running for or occupying 
public function with the organs of communist secret service during the years 
1944–1990. While the process of lustration was carried out successfully in some 
other post- communist countries, notably the Czech Republic and Eastern Ger-
many, it never really happened in Poland. It seemed as if the words of Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki’s exposé about ‘separating the past with a thick line’ haunted all the 
lustration attempts.
The 1992 lustration law, which lodged a wide process of lustration, was found 
unconstitutional. The 1997 one, despite coming into force, was thought by many 
as not stringent enough. The last, much fiercer, lustration attempt, of 2006, was 
also found to be partially unconstitutional.
However, the unresolved question of lustration simply would not disappear. 
It was coming back every few years, eventually erupting in February 2016, when 
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the widow of the last communist interior minister, Czesław Kiszczak, appeared 
on the doorstep of the IPN (National Institute of Remembrance, responsible, in-
ter alia, for the archives of former communist secret services), requesting 90,000 
PLN for important documents her late husband kept at home. Among them, the 
investigators found a dossier of agent ‘Bolek’ from years 1970–1976. He turned out 
to be none other than former president and legend of Solidarność, Lech Wałęsa, 
who beforehand denied all accusations of collaboration. These events once more 
sparked the debate on lustration, with many people, who had previously been 
opposed to it, asking whether doing it back in the 1990s would not have had a 
catharsis- like effect on Polish politics and society.
Lastly, a remark has to be made on the collective memories of the times of com-
munism in Poland. As Barbara Szacka observes (2006, 213–217), the opinion of 
Poles on the Polish People’s Republic, or PPR, drastically changed over the years. 
While in 1965 44,6% of respondents said they valued the past 20 years more than 
the interwar period (which, as the sociologist herself acknowledges, may be put 
down to heavy communist propaganda), in 1977 only 6% of the surveyed chose 
‘achievements of the Polish People’s Republic’ as a source of pride in national 
history. Unsurprisingly, this percentage fell even lower, to only 3% in 1988, with 
29.8% of the respondents saying the events which occurred during the time of 
communism of Poland were the most shameful in the Polish history as a whole.
Nevertheless, as the years passed by, it has become quite visible that percep-
tion of the Polish People’s Republic slightly changed, which means the collective 
memories of that time shifted too, as the two are clearly linked. The regime still 
has mostly bad connotations: 42% of Poles regarded it negatively and only 28% 
positively in 2004 (CBOS 2014). However, many people (37% in 2003), especially 
the ones who have suffered economically during the transition, praise this period 
for its ‘achievements’ in the areas of work and everyday life (ibid.). What is worth 
noting, however, is the correlation between the age of respondents and their opin-
ion on the time of communism — while only 24% of the respondents aged 18–39 
regard it positively, 45% negatively, and 31% are ambiguous on this matter, 54% 
of the surveyed aged 40+ regard it positively and 42% negatively, with only 4% 
ambiguous (ibid.). As the collective memories will be evolving in the future, so will 
the opinions on the time of communism in Poland. One particularly interesting 
trend may already be observed — the most recent studies of the younger genera-
tion of Poles suggest that they are much more conservative than the rest of the 
society, which was quite visible in the 2015 parliamentary elections, when almost 
two– thirds of the youngest voters (from 18 to 29) voted for right- wing parties 
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(Wojtalik 2015). This prompted Professor Henryk Domański, a Polish sociologist, 
to suggest that ‘there are 30 years of domination of the right ahead of us’ (2016).
Society, Culture and the Shape of Polish Transition
We do not truly possess our humanity and culture as 
long as we live only in the present, in our own accidental 
environment.
Walter Kaufmann (1966, 117)
We, (to paraphrase Tetmajer and Hillar, two famous Polish poets), the people of 
the 21st century, often forget that Poland was once a cultural melting pot and treat 
this statement more as a tourist slogan than anything else. The first Polish Republic 
(or, more correctly, the Republic of Both Nations, 1569–1795), however, was a 
truly multicultural country, and only 113 years ago, in 1913, the invisible borders 
of the partitioned Poland were home to 50 million of people, of which only about 
20 million regarded themselves as Polish. The remaining 30 million were Jewish, 
Ukrainian, Belarussian, Lithuanian, Russian or German (Nowak 2013). Although 
Polish culture largely influenced other nations, they also cultivated their own 
customs, creating rich, successful local communities together with the Poles.
Even after Poland regained independence after the First World War, and its bor-
ders moved much further to the West compared to 1795, the 1931 census showed 
that the Polish constituted 68,9% of the citizens, the Ukrainians 14%, the Jews 
7,8%, the Belarusians 3,9% , the Germans 3,8%, and other nationalities 3,2% (GUS 
1931). The religious landscape was no less diverse, with 64,8% of Catholics, 11,7% 
of Orthodox, 10,3% of Greco Catholics, 9,8% of Jews, 1,32% of Lutherans, 1,29% 
of believers of other Protestant Churches, 0,45% of believers of other Christian 
faiths, and 0,16% of others, among them atheists (ibid.).
Compared to this, present- day Poland seems quite homogenous. 97,09% of Pol-
ish citizens declare themselves as Polish, 0,38% as German, 0,13% as Ukrainian, 
0,12% as Belarusian, and the remaining 2,28% as other (GUS 2011). In terms of 
religion, 86,9% of Poles regard themselves as Catholics, 2,41% as atheists, 1,31% 
as Orthodox, 0,38% as Protestant, and, with the remaining 9% either answering 
differently or chose not to answer (ibid.).
How could such a diverse society turn into a monolith? The answer is devastat-
ingly simple: due to the Second World War (and its consequences, partly under 
Communism). With most of the Polish Jews killed by the Germans in concentra-
tion camps, the borders moved further to the West, and the national minorities 
displaced on Stalin’s decision mostly to USSR or Germany, Poland ended up, with 
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collective memories and a cultural history of a multicultural past, in an extremely 
‘monocultural’ present.
What effect did this shift in the shape of Polish society have on the course of 
events during the transition? On the one hand, it certainly made it easier for the 
nation to unite against the regime, as the authorities could not stir up the conflicts 
between different nationality groups and use them to prevent the opposition from 
gaining the majority of public support. (Latvia, where only half of non- Latvian 
citizens voted for independence from USSR in 1991, is a good example of prob-
lems which might have occurred in Poland if it had still been a multicultural coun-
try after the Second World War.) The homogenous structure of society certainly 
helped the transition to run more smoothly, as there were no great dividing lines 
within society, which, as the example of Czechoslovakia, or, as an extreme case, 
Yugoslavia show, may have led to secession or the partition of a country.
On the other hand, in becoming a monolithic society, Poles lost a large share 
of their collective memories and culture, which, lest we forget, are interrelated.
For every society sets up images of the past. Yet to make a difference in society, it is not 
enough for a certain past to be selected. It must steer emotions, motivate people to act, be 
received; in short it must become a socio- cultural mode of action (Confino 1997, 1390).
It may have been difficult, especially for a generation born in post- war Poland, 
to act on and ‘receive’ the multicultural past and relate to some of our cultural 
monuments (for example, our most famous literary work [Adam Mickiewicz’s, 
Pan Tadeusz] begins with the words ‘Lithuania, my native land’), while living 
in a homogenous society. This might have made people much more prone to 
communist propaganda, but also led to the idealisation of Kresy (eastern regions 
of Poland lost after the Second World War) and fading of many problems and 
debates which heated up pre- war Poland, further deepening the divide between 
‘past’ and ‘the present’ (Nowak 2013). Because in Poland, more than anywhere in 
the world, pre-1939 past really ‘is a foreign country,’ as they not only ‘do things 
differently there,’ but sometimes also seem completely alien there, even as far as 
their nationality is concerned.
It is also worth noting that Polish society changed not only in terms of nation-
ality and religion, but also in class structure. Both the German and the Russian 
occupants were trying to execute a plan of ‘destruction’ of the Polish intelligentsia, 
with disastrous results. Due to such events as, inter alia, Intelligenzaktion, Ac-
tion AB, or the Katyń massacre, Poland, permanently struggling to expand the 
intelligentsia during the interwar period, lost 39% of doctors, 33% of teachers, 
30% of scientists and university scholars (approximately 700 university profes-
sors were killed), 28% of priests, and 26% of lawyers during the Second World 
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War (Sieradzki 2003). These actions and the nationalisation of land (with several 
other laws passed by the communists at the beginning of their rule) also led to 
utter disintegration of the Polish gentry, which, while often regarded as behind 
the times before the war, for centuries has been responsible for spreading culture 
in the country (PTZ 2013).
The loss of such a large part of the Polish elite had severe repercussions. First 
of all, it made the taking of the power by the communists much easier, as many 
people who would have been the most vivacious critics of the new regime were 
killed, intimidated, or in exile. Secondly, as the Polish intelligentsia had to be 
largely created from scratch after the war, it was much more dependent on the 
authorities — its first significant act of protest was a two- sentence ‘Letter 34’ sent 
to the prime minister only in 1964. Ultimately, it resulted in a very low esteem 
of the elites among the Polish, who, even in the present day, do not see people in 
the public life they can look up to (57%), mostly treating their family and friends 
as their authorities — 71% of the respondents (CBOS 2009).
In addition, a recent phenomenon which transpired in the course of transi-
tion in Poland has to be discussed. As opposed to ‘collective forgetting’, I would 
call it ‘collective evoking’, defining it as a process of bringing certain memories, 
which have been lost, back to society as a whole, with or without the help of the 
government, using mass media, most notably the internet.
This phenomenon may be observed in the history of the Cursed Soldiers (or, 
probably more accurately, Indomitable Soldiers). These are the names given to the 
members of the anti- communist resistance movements, who, between 1944 and 
1963 (when the last partisan was killed by the communists), chose to fight the new, 
pro- Soviet regime in Poland. They were severely persecuted by the communist 
authorities, who tortured and killed many of them (inter alia Witold Pilecki, who 
volunteered to Auschwitz in order to investigate it for the Polish Underground 
Army and create a resistance movement there; general Emil Fieldorf ‘Nil’, one of 
the creators of Polish Underground Army during the Second World War; Dantuta 
Siedzikówna ‘Inka’, an 18-year old nurse of one of the partisan troops). Usually 
buried in unmarked graves, called traitors, malefactors and Nazi collaborators, 
they were supposed to be ‘cursed’ — forgotten and erased from Polish history 
and the collective memory.
And so they had been at least until the time of transition. The first mentions 
of the Cursed Soldiers appeared publicly at the beginning of the 1990s (the term 
itself was created in 1993). However, it was not until 2011 when the activities of 
the soldiers’ families, numerous organisations, book authors and filmmakers was 
finally rewarded — since then, every March the 1st is the National Cursed Sol-
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diers’ Remembrance Day. Perhaps surprisingly, it is gaining popularity every year, 
particularly among the youth, with multitudinous commemorating events taking 
place not only in Poland, but also in many places around the world. This process in 
my personal opinion disproves Pierre Nora’s words cited at the beginning of this 
article, that ‘we talk so much about memory, because so little of it is left,’ showing 
that in the times of collective forgetting, ‘collective evoking’ may also take place.
Concluding Remarks
For hindsight is also a disadvantage. Perhaps the most 
difficult thing of all for the historian to recapture is the 
sense of what, at a given historical moment, people did 
not know about the future.
Timothy Garton Ash (1989)
In this paper, I have ventured to answer the question “What made the Polish 
transition take such a particular form?”. In the end, I would like to briefly remark 
on the fact that further explanation of this problem may be found in the analysis 
of not only its main events, but also its character, its very nature.
Describing the events of 1989, Timothy Garton Ash was among the first to 
note that the transition of power in Poland (and Hungary) took a different course 
than in other Central and Eastern European countries. Instead of a revolution, a 
‘refolution’ — “half- reform, half- revolution” (Ash 1989), a ‘change from the above’ 
— took place.
What is particularly notable is that all the main events of ‘the Autumn of Na-
tions,’ despite their lack of violence, their single class base (the anti- communist 
movements in Central and Eastern European Countries saw workers aligned with 
intellectuals), their utopian vision of society, or serious defiance of the incumbent 
governments, resembled classical European revolutions, and at the same time 
were something completely different (Marciniak 2009, 15). Hence the concepts 
of ‘velvet revolution,’ ‘peaceful revolution,’ ‘rationed revolution’ (Antoni Dudek); 
‘silent revolution,’ ‘sad revolution’ (Andrew Arato); ‘negotiated revolution’ (László 
Bruszt); ‘self- restraining revolution,’ ‘revolution from the above’ (Jadwiga Stan-
iszkis) were developed.
As Włodzimierz Marciniak so accurately notes (ibid.), all the expressions listed 
above indicate that the events of 1989 lacked what Hannah Arendt called the 
‘revolutionary pathos of an entirely new beginning’ (2006, 37), which, intercon-
nected with the idea of freedom, constitutes a ‘true’ revolution. The absence of 
this pathos in 1989 resulted later on in the loss of continuity and the feeling of 
chaos among the people of post- communist countries, and also in the ‘longing for 
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the lost time’ of political solidarity. This absence, along with the fact that, while 
many symbolic events boosting the feeling of freedom took place, e.g. the with-
drawal of the Russian Army, or the turning of the main headquarters of PZPR, 
the Polish communist party, in Warsaw into the building of stock exchange, an 
embodiment of capitalism (Wolak), the functionaries of the previous regime not 
only remained unpunished, but also often turned into successful politicians or 
businessmen while unemployment rates soared, triggering very strong emotions 
in the societies. These emotions led to the creation of the myths of ‘stolen revolu-
tion,’ ‘betrayed revolution,’ or even ‘dissipated revolution’ (Marciniak 2009, 212), 
which only seems to support the hypothesis that some factor or factors were 
missing from the events of 1989. That is, in fact, no real, true revolution took place.
And nowhere else had these myths been as strong as in Poland, which, in my 
opinion, in part explains the particular course of Polish transition. Because, while 
in the collective memory of the years 1989–1991 the images of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, of the happy crowds in the squares of Prague, Tbilisi, and Yerevan, or of 
the singing revolution in the Baltic States continue to live on, the ‘revolution-
ary carnival of Solidarność’ (ibid., 12) happened in 1980 and 1981, and was not 
repeated again in 1989. Instead, the new, Third Republic, was born in the course 
of a ‘refolution’. Hence the Polish wish, or even longing, for a ‘true’ revolution, a 
bumpy course of transition, and a difficulty in pinpointing its ending.
Has Polish society finally worked through this ‘trauma’? Is it ready to move on? 
And has the Polish transition finally ended? I am sure the course of events in the 
years to come will give us answers to these, and many other questions, concerning 
the Polish transition. I hope this paper will also help, at least in a small way, to 
better understand the political and moral significance of these questions.
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Axelle Reiter
Justice (Lost) in Transition: Assessing the  
ICTY Legacy
Abstract: International law relies on criminal avenues to deal with wartime violence. The 
need to test the appropriateness of this approach calls for an examination of the effec-
tiveness of international criminal justice in meeting the aspirations of the international 
community. The ICTY purports to fulfil various functions, some of which are associated 
with transitional justice. The methods adopted to achieve these goals have resulted in 
violations of the rights of the accused, the denial of victims’ claims, and the undermin-
ing of reconciliation in the region. These consequences can be traced back to the hybrid 
nature of international criminal justice and a lack of insight into the causes of wartime 
criminality. A switch of emphasis from penal responses to transitional justice mechanisms 
would help in breaking the vicious circle of war and penalisation and in preventing the 
resurgence of violence.
Introduction
International law relies on criminal avenues to deal with wartime violence and 
past human rights abuses in post- conflict societies. The appropriateness of this ap-
proach is presumed, rather than grounded on any actual assessment of its benefits, 
and alternative means of conflict management are sidelined. The need to test this 
uncritical assumption calls for an examination of the effectiveness of international 
criminal justice in meeting the aspirations of the ‘international community’ and 
generating the outcomes it is meant to bring about; here, focusing on the penalisa-
tion of violence in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in front of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Criminal 
law aims at determining the individual accountability of the accused for past of-
fences. It is punitive and retributive. Besides, the ICTY purports to fulfil various 
functions, some of which are associated with transitional justice mechanisms 
and human rights law. The questionable methods adopted in order to achieve 
these goals have resulted in severe violations of the rights of the accused, denial 
of victims’ claims and the undermining of reconciliation in the region. These 
consequences can be traced back to the hybrid nature of international criminal 
justice and a lack of insight into the causes of wartime criminality.
This paper analyses the causes of wartime criminality, the specificities of this 
form of violence, the adverse consequences of the penalisation of violence in 
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front of the ICTY, and the social reaction to international trials in the SFRY 
successor states and entities. It is divided in four sections. The first clarifies the 
ambitions of the ICTY and how they can be realistically circumscribed to provide 
standards against which to judge the usefulness of the Tribunal and an operative 
benchmark for its success. It argues that the mandate and functions of the ICTY 
may be cut down to the fulfilment of three main purposes: conventional deontic 
justice, redress for the victims, and the restoration and maintenance of peace in 
the region. The second examines the roots and distinctiveness of wartime crimi-
nality, the challenges posed by the penalisation of acts of systemic violence and 
the inadequacy of ordinary criminal law mechanisms to establish responsibility 
for mass atrocities. The remaining sections gauge the ICTY’s effectiveness in de-
livering its three core aims and investigate the reasons of its failure to attain any 
of these objectives; a failure echoed in the local population’s scepticism towards 
the institution. Finally, the paper scrutinises alternative options and advocates a 
switch of emphasis from penal responses to transitional justice mechanisms like 
truth commissions and compensatory solutions.
Standards of effectiveness
Assessment of the success of international criminal justice calls for an inquiry into 
its aims. One must then investigate what the prosecution of individuals in supra- 
national fora effectively achieves, in order to determine whether they fulfil their 
explicit mandate and the broader expectations of the ‘international community’.
International criminal law basically regulates the international responsibility 
of individual actors. Security Council Resolution 827 purports to establish the 
ICTY ‘for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia’.1 This allegedly unique function of the Tribunal cannot be divorced 
from underlying strategic goals. The Security Council adopted Resolution 827 
in the frame of its ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security’ under Article 24 §1 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. After 
determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted ‘a threat to 
international peace and security’, it puts forward that the prosecution of interna-
tional crimes committed on its territory ‘would contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace’.2 Accordingly, the main criterion to appraise its adequacy 
from a teleological perspective is its effectiveness in contributing to, on one hand, 
1 UN Security Council, Resolution 827 (1993), 25 May 1993, UN Doc., S/25704, § 2.
2 Ibid., Preamble.
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the restoration of peace, the deterrence of additional violence and the cessation 
of military hostilities and, on the other hand, the maintenance and consolidation 
of peace and security in the post- conflict era (Futamura 2008, 3–4; Kerr 2000, 
17); namely, its support for a lasting peace and long term stability in the region 
through the reconciliation of erstwhile enemies. Yet, penalisation tends to be 
counterproductive on both counts: the indictment and prosecution of civil and 
military leaders reduce the realistic prospects of a negotiated ceasefire and prompt 
settlement of the conflict (D’Amato 1994, 500–501), while the adversarial nature 
of criminal trials undermines the reconciliation process. In a nutshell, ‘peace 
through justice’ often leads to ‘peace versus justice’.
The ICTY considers that its mandate is ‘threefold: to do justice, to deter fur-
ther crimes and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace’, and 
identifies itself ‘as one of the measures designed gradually to promote the end 
of armed hostilities and a return to normality’.3 A supplementary purpose was 
eventually endorsed, that of rendering justice to the victims.4 The ICTY has also 
tried to clarify the ‘purposes and objectives’ of sentencing. In a misguided attempt 
at exhaustiveness, it has lumped together ‘retribution, protection of society, reha-
bilitation and deterrence’ of the accused (special deterrence) and other persons 
alike (general deterrence). Retribution has been renamed ‘just deserts’, while 
deterrence is sometimes mentioned under the label of ‘prevention’. In a compet-
ing account, the Tribunal emphasises ‘public reprobation and stigmatisation by 
the international community’; which partakes more of the classical symbolic vi-
sion of penalisation. It recurrently brings up the fight against impunity, the end 
of infractions to humanitarian rules, public information and the establishment 
of ‘truth’, redress, ‘appeasement’ for the victims and their relatives, reconciliation 
and contribution to the peace process.5 The goals enumerated vary from one 
3 ICTY, First Annual Report, 28 July 1994, UN Doc., A/49/342; S/1994/1007, §§ 11–14.
4 ICTY, Ninth Annual Report, 14 Aug. 2002, UN Doc., A/57/379; S/2002/985, § 328.
5 ICTY, Tadić (Prijedor), IT-94–1-Tbis- R117, Sentencing Judgement, 11  Nov.  1999, 
§§ 7–9.
 ICTY, Karadžić (Bosnia and Herzegovina), IT-95–5/18-AR73.4, Decision on Karadžić’s 
Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement, 12 Oct. 2009, § 52.
 ICTY, Jelisić (Brčko), IT-95–10-T, Judgement, 14 Dec. 1999, §§ 116–117.
 ICTY, Blaškić (Lašva Valley), IT-95–14-T, Judgement, 3 Mar. 2000, §§ 761–764.
 ICTY, Aleksovski (Lašva Valley), IT-95–14/1-A, Judgement, 24 Mar. 2000, § 185.
 ICTY, Furundžija (Lašva Valley), IT-95–17/1-T, Judgement, 10 Dec. 1998, §§ 288–291.
 ICTY, Delalić et al. (Čelebići Camp), IT-96–21-T, Judgement, 16 Nov. 1998, §§ 1231–1234.
 ICTY, Erdemović (Pilica Farm), IT-96–22-T, Sentencing Judgement, 29  Nov.  1996, 
§§ 58–60, 64–66.
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judgement to the next and none refers to this list in its entirety. The exaggerated 
ambitiousness, irreconcilability and lack of ranking of the professed objectives 
are striking.
Interestingly, the ICTY appears to be aware of the mutually exclusive character 
of some of its self- appointed missions. Convictions handed on retributive prem-
ises risk disrupting the peace process,6 while invoking other classical justifications 
for the prosecution of ordinary crimes in times of peace hardly makes sense in 
the context of wartime violence. The deterrent power of international criminal 
justice is doubtful: the ICTY was created before the Dayton Peace Agreement and 
was already operational at the time of some of the most serious breaches of the 
ius in bello during the Yugoslav civil wars. The ICTY acknowledges that deter-
rence, social defence and rehabilitation are problematic targets of sentencing. The 
improbability of opportunities for recidivism renders the consideration of specific 
deterrence ‘unreasonable and unfair’ and reliance on general deterrence ignores 
that ‘a sentence should in principle be imposed on an offender for his culpable 
conduct’. Social protection cannot justify the preventive detention of first time 
offenders without criminal records, the very nature of international crimes means 
that they ‘can be committed only in certain contexts which may not arise again 
in the society where the convicted person, once released, may eventually settle’, 
and the ‘rehabilitative effect’ of imprisonment is controversial at best.7 Therefore, 
international justice cannot promote other traditional rationales for penalisation 
than retribution.
The success of international criminal tribunals essentially depends on their 
ability to respect the standards of conventional deontic justice, together with their 
capacity to answer the broader societal concerns that presided over their creation; 
to deliver redress to the victims and secure peace. Besides, effective justice cannot 
be attained if it is marred by unfairness or breaches the substantive and procedural 
rights of the accused. The ICTY was not meant to be only concerned with the 
punishment of atrocities but also to try the defendants in conformity with inter-
national human rights law.8 Proceedings in front of the ICTY have unfortunately 
 ICTY, Kunarac et al. (Foča), IT-96–23&23/1-T, Judgement, 22 Feb. 2001, §§ 836–842.
 ICTY, Plavšić (Bosnia and Herzegovina), IT-00–39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 
27 Feb. 2003, §§ 79–81.
6 ICTY, Delalić et al. (Čelebići Camp), IT-96–21-T, Judgement, 16 Nov. 1998, § 1231.
7 ICTY, Kunarac et al. (Foča), IT-96–23&23/1-T, Judgement, 22  Feb.  2001, §§  840, 
843–844.
8 ICTY, Tadić (Prijedor), IT-94–1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, §§ 4, 46.
Justice (Lost) in Transition: Assessing the ICTY Legacy 197
failed spectacularly in all three respects, by seriously infringing the basic rights of 
individual participants in the trials, denying adequate remedies to the victims and 
destabilising peace and reconciliation. They most usefully serve as a catalogue of 
judicial worst practices, illustrating the hazards of tempering with the rule of law 
through adjudication, and militate for a complete reform (voire the abolition) of 
the international criminal system.
Ordinary rules for extraordinary crimes
International crimes are tied to the specific circumstances of armed conflicts 
or situations of widespread societal violence. The transplantation of common 
(or harmonised) national rules for the prosecution and punishment of ordinary 
crimes in front of international tribunals creates deep tensions and irresolvable 
problems.
From a liberal (rights- based) perspective, the sole claim to legitimacy of pros-
ecution and penalisation is to be found in deontological ‘desert’-based considera-
tions (Hart 1957, 448–455). Since ‘punishment must respect the offender as an end 
in himself, as a responsible agent called to account for his wrongdoing’ (Fletcher 
1998, 43), the offence results from an intentional autonomous act of the accused, 
whose wrongfulness excuses society’s retaliation and encroachment upon her 
personal rights. This conception of the object of penal justice, entrenched in the 
general principle of personal culpability, is widely recognised by national systems 
of criminal law. Criminal responsibility requires an element of mens rea, the inten-
tion to commit the imputed infraction; the deed itself cannot be determinative of 
guilt in the absence of a blameworthy intent. The vast majority of national legal 
systems have adopted the concept and it most likely qualifies as a general principle 
of law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Pradel 
1995, 251–253; Schabas 2003, 1015). Criminal responsibility targets transgression 
from established norms and endeavours to rehabilitate and re- socialise estranged 
or maladjusted members of the community. Retributivism and associated expres-
sive goals are grounded in the idea that punishment is not meted solely to penalise 
breaches of the law but also to sanction a perceived moral wrong. This framework 
is structurally disconnected from the realities of wartime violence and the roots 
of international criminality.
Far from being deviant or in conflict with prevailing values, the perpetrators of 
international crimes are usually well- adjusted individuals with good social skills, 
 ICTY, Delalić et al. (Čelebići), IT-96–21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucić’s Motion for the 
Exclusion of Evidence, 2 Sept. 1997, § 60.
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characterised by a lack of criminal identity. During armed conflicts, individuals 
commit atrocious crimes out of survival instinct or patriotism, sometimes under 
the perception that they are defending their own people from ethnic cleansing 
and possible extermination (Gaynor and Harmon 2007, 693–695).9 They do not 
consider the offences morally wrong but acceptable or right. Whereas particular 
actors might act out of different motives and use their violent environment for 
personal purposes, most culprits are moved by loyalty, trust in authority, obedi-
ence or conformism. Others do not even act out of their own accord and only 
cooperate reluctantly under pressure, intimidation, force or coercion. Their crimes 
cannot be comprehended if divorced from the context of collective violence 
(Smeulers 2008a, 240–260).
The brutal conditions of warfare, coupled with usual socio- psychological 
mechanisms, transform many hitherto undisturbed people into willing executors 
or accomplices of mass scale offences. The limits of sanity are radically redefined; 
and so are social and moral norms and imperatives. Acts normally perceived as 
wrongdoings are now considered acceptable, if not commendable. This has a 
double effect on individual members of affected societies. First, they get progres-
sively and incrementally desensitised to human suffering and eventually to hor-
rendous cruelties. Secondly, they often feel compelled to participate in the spiral 
of violence. They frequently lose the rational capacity to tell right from wrong or 
they end up believing in the rightness of crimes (Arendt 1963; Smeulers 2008a, 
238–240, 263–264). The international rules that regulate the conduct of hostilities 
sanction some weighting of humanitarian concerns against military necessity. This 
aggravates people’s perception that anything will do if it serves the general war 
effort or belligerent imperatives. This situation is exacerbated in internal conflicts, 
characterised by a higher level of savagery, due to the proximity of the adversary. 
Civil wars are ‘designed to be criminal’ and are often accompanied by propaganda 
campaigns aimed at dehumanising and demonising antagonist groups before 
the actual start of ethnic cleansing operations (Fatić 2000, 21, 71–73). The entire 
opponent population becomes the enemy and no atrocity against this newly fab-
ricated enemy is considered barbaric enough.
International ‘crimes are manifestations of collective violence and are described 
by lawyers as structural or system criminality’. They purport to obtain or keep 
political power and states’ apparatuses usually sanction, if they do not encourage, 
9 ICTY, Independent Audit of the Detention Unit at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, 4 May 2006, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/PR_attachments/
DU-audit.pdf.
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the perpetration of international crimes. This casts the particular offenders in the 
part of simple executioners of ‘crimes of obedience’ (Drumbl 2007, 33; Smeul-
ers 2008b, 971, 973–980). Because of the banality of the evils committed under 
extreme circumstances (Arendt 1963; Smeulers and Werner 2010) and the collec-
tive dimension of international crimes, the attribution of responsibility for these 
offences to specific individuals is not easily reconciled with the retributive and 
expressive purposes traditionally associated with criminal justice. Collective pe-
nalisation contradicts any remotely liberal understanding of criminal justice and 
the core premises of human rights. Picking a few scapegoats to bear responsibility 
for the actions of an entire regime similarly contradicts the ethical underpinnings 
of deontic justice. On one hand, ‘it fails to hold accountable the full array of people 
who individually are responsible for the collectivisation of atrocity’ and contra-
dicts allegations to the effect that it will put an end to impunity (Drumbl 2007, 
37). On the other hand, the arbitrariness of such an indictment process vitiates 
the most basic conditions of fairness, giving rise to justified charges of partiality 
and undermining the legitimacy of the trials: ‘the need to select challenges the 
very concept of fair justice and retribution’ (Smeulers 2008b, 982).
‘International crimes can only be totally captured as state crimes’ or ‘organisa-
tional crimes’ (Chouliaras 2010, 548–549). First, they are committed or provoked 
by states. Secondly, they affect other states’ interests and interstate relations be-
cause of their interconnection with international peace and security and their 
negative impact on the consolidation of the international legal order. Thirdly, 
international organisations meant to represent the international community of 
states are responsible for their definition and the modalities of their penalisation 
(Alvarez 1999, 367–368). This supports an interstate mechanism to ascertain li-
ability for the wrongdoings, focusing both on states and international organisa-
tions directly responsible for the atrocities and on those causally responsible for 
the outbreak of the hostilities of which wartime violence is an intrinsic feature. 
Such a solution would strike straight at the roots of international crimes, take due 
account of their distinctiveness and help dispel the main concern of the ‘interna-
tional community’ (their effect on international peace and security), by tackling 
the whole phenomenon of wartime violence. Their penalisation in front of inter-
national criminal tribunals does not provide a remedy to the broader situation 
of collective violence and entrusts international lawyers with the difficult task of 
squaring the accountability circle in relation to individual offences that essen-
tially constitute acts of states. Ignoring the causal link between war and unspeak-
able crimes hinders any realistic possibility to curb the risks of their resurgence 
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and bring about effective justice. Regrettably, international responses to wartime 
criminality completely overlook its causes and underplay its distinctiveness.
Doing injustice
Supra- national courts adhere to policy considerations and forward extra- legal 
political or ideological goals, at the cost of negating peremptory legal rules, in the 
fashion of authoritarian models of criminal justice (Fichtelberg 2008; Robinson 
2008; Robinson 2010). This is largely due to a lack of insights into international 
criminology and the inadequacy of ordinary criminal law mechanisms to establish 
responsibility for mass atrocities. Due to the collective character of the crimes on 
trial, international prosecutors and courts have relied on unorthodox doctrines 
to attribute personal responsibility for these offences to actors other than their 
direct physical perpetrators by lowering the mens rea threshold required as an 
evidence of the criminal intent. They allow imputation of the crimes to people 
who neither committed nor intended them, on grounds of mere negligence or 
even on account of the foreseeable character of the infractions. Since they greatly 
facilitate the work of the prosecutor’s office, they have served as the central charge 
in many indictments; which poses serious legitimacy problems for the ensuing 
trials and casts doubts on the resulting convictions.
Shortcomings can be identified in the absence of fair labelling, expanding 
definitions of crimes, sweeping modes of liability, and reticence towards tradi-
tional means of defence and causes of exoneration. Denial of the possibility to 
invoke duress in relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity exemplifies 
this last point most compellingly.10 Traditional modes of liability have been con-
strued in an extravagantly extensive fashion and some of their customary consti-
tutive elements ignored, like the ‘specific direction’ requirement for complicity;11 
which conditions responsibility to a determination that the acts of the accused 
10 ICTY, Erdemović (Pilica Farm), IT-96–22-A, Judgement, 7 Oct. 1997, § 19.
 ICTY, Kvočka et al. (Omarska, Keraterm, Trnopolje), IT-98–30/1-T, Judgement, 
2 Nov. 2001, § 403.
11 ICTY, Mrkšić et al. (Vukovar Hospital), IT-95–13/1-A, Judgement, 5 May 2009, § 159.
 ICTY, Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić (Višegrad), IT-98–32/1-T, Judgement, 20 July 2009, 
§ 424.
 ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, IT-03–69-A, Judgement, 15 Dec. 2015, §§ 104–107.
 ICTY, Perišić, IT-04–81-T, Judgement, 6 Sept. 2011, §§ 1580–1648.
 ICTY, Šainović et al (Kosovo), IT-05–87-A, Judgement, 23 Jan. 2014, §§ 1617–1651.
 ICTY, Popović et al. (Srebrenica), IT-05–88-A, Judgement, 30 Jan. 2015, § 1758.
 Contra: ICTY, Perišić, IT-04–81-A, Judgement, 28 Feb. 2013, §§ 13–74.
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were specifically directed to assist the commission of crimes. The provision of 
logistic and personnel support to allied armies has led to convictions for aiding 
and abetting all crimes committed by these armies; criminalising the waging of 
war per se and creating a new crime beside those listed in the ICTY Statute.12 
The expansive interpretation of the doctrines of command responsibility and 
‘co- perpetratorship’ promotes a conception of criminal imputation more akin 
to absolute liability.
Command responsibility requires some correlation between the actions of 
the accused superior and the crimes committed by his underlings. The ICTY 
has interpreted this link in a much broader fashion than customarily accepted. 
The resulting offence combines an actus reus of omission with a mens rea of 
negligence or lack of diligence, on the basis of a ‘had reason to know’ standard. 
It permits condemning someone for genocide solely ‘as a result of his failure to 
carry out his duty as a superior to exercise control over his or her subordinates’, 
even though she did not share with them the specific intent or dolus specialis 
required as an integral part of the crime of genocide.13 It does not demand a 
causal relation between the conduct of the commander and the actual infrac-
tions, be it in cases of failure to prevent the culpable acts or punish their au-
thors.14 A clear- cut example of abusive use of the theory, ‘the responsibility of 
a superior for acts which were committed before he became the superior of the 
persons who committed them’, was seriously considered, with mixed results.15 
Accused have been convicted of murder for aiding and abetting by omission 
and superior responsibility for their failure to protect prisoners and prevent 
12 ICTY, Perišić, IT-04–81-T, Judgement, 6 Sept. 2011, B. Moloto, Dissenting Opinion 
Counts 1–4 and 9–12, § 3.
13 ICTY, Brđanin (Krajina), IT-99–36-T, Judgement, 1 Sept. 2004, §§ 711, 717–721.
14 ICTY, Kordić and Čerkez (Lašva Valley), IT-95–14/2-T, Judgement, 26 Feb. 2001, § 447.
 ICTY, Delalić et al. (Čelebići), IT-96–21-T, Judgement, 16 Nov. 1998, §§ 398–400.
 ICTY, Perišić, IT-04–81-T, Judgement, 6 Sept. 2011, §§ 138–140, 1653.
15 While this dangerous extension of the traditional customary norms was accepted by 
trial chambers, the majority of the Appeals Chamber ruled it out in an authoritative 
decision.
 Compare: ICTY, Kordić and Čerkez (Lašva Valley), IT-95–14/2-T, Judgement, 
26 Feb. 2001, § 446.
 ICTY, Hadžihasanović and Kubura (Central Bosnia), IT-01–47-PT, Decision on Joint 
Challenge to Jurisdiction, 12 Nov. 2002, §§ 180–202; IT-01–47-AR72, Decision on In-
terlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in relation to Command Responsibility, 
16 July 2003, §§ 37–57.
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their transfer to the custody of the perpetrator in principal;16 confusing the 
notions of ‘substantial effect on the crime’ and failure ‘to act in order to render 
those crimes substantially less likely’.17 The accused’s high rank, support to 
allied armies and payment of salaries and other benefits to re- subordinated 
military personnel were deemed sufficient evidence of his operational control 
over them,18 although this finding was quashed in appeals on grounds of ‘rea-
sonable doubt’.19 These extrapolations hint at collective responsibility handed 
on to randomly selected suspects and the ICTY definition effectively boils down 
to strict vicarious liability.
The concept of ‘joint criminal enterprise’, invented by the Appeals Chamber20 
and tellingly nicknamed ‘just convict everyone’ (Badar 2006; Schabas 2006, 429), 
provides an extreme example of guilt by association. Conjuring up the specific-
ity and collective character of international crimes, the ICTY simply created the 
doctrine by means of a purposive interpretation of its statute; contradicting the 
principle of legality and the obligation to strictly construe penal norms. The no-
tion of joint criminal enterprise is an over- inclusive catch- all concept, in the literal 
sense of the term. It permits convicting the author of an insignificant contribution 
to a single offence of all the crimes possibly somewhat connected to it, through 
the prosecutor’s invocation of a common plan. The accused might have neither 
committed the actus reus nor possessed the mens rea required for the infractions. 
She might even have had no knowledge of their occurrence. Here again, it has led 
to discarding the dolus specialis required for the commission of genocide.21 The 
theory knows of no geographical, structural or temporal limitations. It can apply 
to an entire region (voire a country) and to organisations comprised of thousands 
16 ICTY, Mrkšić et al. (Vukovar Hospital), IT-95–13/1-A, Judgement, 5  May  2009, 
§§ 45–103.
 ICTY, Popović et al. (Srebrenica), IT-05–88-T, Judgement, 10 June 2010, §§ 1981–1991; 
IT-05–88-A, Judgement, 30 Jan. 2015, §§ 1725–1765.
17 ICTY, Mrkšić et al. (Vukovar Hospital), IT-95–13/1-A, Judgement, 5 May 2009, A. Vaz, 
Partly Dissenting Opinion, especially §§ 10–11, note 28.
18 ICTY, Perišić, IT-04–81-T, Judgement, 6 Sept. 2011, §§ 1753–1769.
19 ICTY, Perišić, IT-04–81-A, Judgement, 28 Feb. 2013, §§ 77–79, 86–118.
20 ICTY, Tadić (Prijedor), IT-94–1-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999, §§ 187–220.
21 ICTY, Stakić (Prijedor), IT-97–24-A, Judgement, 22 Mar. 2006, § 38.
 ICTY, Krstić (Srebrenica- Drina Corps), IT-98–33-T, Judgement, 2 Aug. 2001, §§ 617–618.
 ICTY, Brđanin (Krajina), IT-99–36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, 19 Mar. 2004, 
§§ 5–10.
 ICTY, Đorđević (Kosovo), IT-05–87/1-A, Judgement, 27 Jan. 2014, §§ 73–84.
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of participants.22 All participants in the so- called ‘enterprise’ are deemed to have 
‘committed’ the abuses and considered to be ‘equally guilty of the crime regard-
less of the part each played in its commission’.23 At the limits, any member of 
an army or civilian institution could be held accountable for the whole range of 
offences perpetuated by this organisation nation- wide; a result which verges on 
the absurd. As a mode of liability, joint criminal enterprise clearly falls short of 
the slimmest pretence of respect for the principle of personal culpability. It proves 
equally wrong from a teleological perspective: it necessarily results in discounted 
convictions, which trivialise the guilt of the accused and do not vindicate the 
claims of the victims, and it risks generating further violence in the region; a fact 
the Tribunal is well aware of.24
The ICTY violates basic human rights of the accused to an unprecedented extent, 
only mirroring the grim precedent of the International Military Tribunals formed 
after the end of the Second World War. It has claimed a form of international ‘excep-
tionalism’ to bypass a stringent construing of the principle of legality and the ban 
on retroactive penalisation. It heavily resorts to ex post facto creation or specifica-
tion of penal offences and modes of liability, as well as to reasoning by analogy, in 
violation of the nullum crimen sine lege principle. It imposes heavier sentences than 
allowed under domestic law and possibly under general international law, in breach 
of the nulla poena sine lege rule and Article 24 § 1 of its statute. Clashing decisions 
concerning international customs and the constant modification and update of its 
rules of procedure and evidence generate further legal uncertainty, at the substan-
tive and procedural levels (Reiter 2013). The accused are deprived of their right to 
appeal in certain circumstances. In a case where a conviction for additional crimes 
was entered at the appellate level, the Appeals Chamber substantially increased 
the prison sentence instead of sending the case back to a lower level formation for 
22 ICTY, Kvočka et al. (Omarska, Keraterm, Trnopolje), IT-98–30/1-T, Judgement, 
2 Nov. 2001, § 307.
 ICTY, Brđanin (Krajina), IT-99–36-A, Judgement, 3 Apr. 2007, § 422.
23 ICTY, Stakić (Prijedor), IT-97–24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, § 435.
 ICTY, Krnojelac (Foča), IT-97–25-T, Judgement, 15 Mar. 2002, § 82.
 ICTY, Vasiljević (Višegrad), IT-98–32-T, Judgement, 29 Nov. 2002, § 67; IT-98–32-A, 
Judgement, 25 Feb. 2004, § 111.
 ICTY, Milan Milutinović et al. (Kosovo), IT-99–37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub 
Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, 
§ 20.
24 ICTY, Martić (RSK), IT-95–11-A, Judgement, 8 Oct. 2008, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Schomburg, §§ 2, 5.
 ICTY, First Annual Report, 28 July 1994, UN Doc., A/49/342; S/1994/1007, § 16.
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retrial and sentencing purposes.25 Likewise, it ratifies the introduction of alternate 
modes of liability during appeals proceedings.26 In addition, one must deplore the 
striking inequality of arms between the parties (Bachmann and Fatić 2015, 55–75); 
the admission of written summaries of witness statements drafted by prosecution 
investigators and adjudicated facts from previous trials;27 the erosion of the right 
to remain silent and the presumption of innocence by the introduction of a con-
dition of ‘reciprocal disclosure’ of the parties files and documents;28 the endorse-
ment of judgements taken on the basis of a single uncorroborated testimony;29 
the exclusion of some accused from the courtroom and the denial of their right to 
self- representation;30 the unusual length of the trials, the unacceptably long peri-
ods of detention on remand and the possibility of balancing human conditions of 
imprisonment against the imperatives of security and order.31 This complete denial 
of the defendants’ rights to personal liberty, fair trial and even physical integrity 
irremediably frustrates any pretention of the ICTY to deliver effective justice.
25 ICTY, Mrkšić et al. (Vukovar Hospital), IT-95–13/1-A, Judgement, 5 May 2009.
26 ICTY, Simić et al. (Bosanski Šamac), IT-95–9-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 Nov. 2006, §§ 75, 
301.
 ICTY, Dragomir Milošević (Sarajevo), IT-98–29/1-A, Judgement, 12  Nov.  2009, 
§§ 279–282.
 ICTY, Krstić (Srebrenica- Drina Corps), IT-98–33-A, Judgement, 19 Apr. 2004, 
§§ 138–139, 143–144.
27 ICTY, Slobodan Milošević (Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia), IT-02–54-AR73.5, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence in the Form of Written Statements, 
30 Sept. 2003.
 ICTY, Tolimir (Srebrenica), IT-05–88/2-A, Judgement, 8 Apr. 2015, §§ 16–40.
28 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Nos 66 (B), 67.
29 ICTY, Tadić (Prijedor), IT-94–1-T, Opinion and Judgement, 7  May  1997, §§  256, 
535–539.
30 ICTY, Karadžić (Bosnia and Herzegovina), IT-95–5/18-T, Decision on Appointment of 
Counsel and Order on Further Trial Proceedings, 5 Nov. 2009, §§ 14–16, 19–27.
 ICTY, Slobodan Milošević (Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia), IT-99–37 / IT-02–54-AR73.7, 
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of 
Defence Counsel, 1 Nov. 2004, §§ 11–14.
 ICTY, Šešelj Case, IT-03–67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing 
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defence, 9 May 2003, §§ 20–21; IT-03–67-
AR73.3, Decision on Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of 
Counsel, 20 Oct. 2006, § 8; IT-03–67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal against the Trial 
Chamber’s Decision (No 2) on Assignment of Counsel, 8 Dec. 2006, § 19.
31 ICTY, Blaškić (Lašva Valley), IT-95–14-PT, Decision on the Defence Motion Filed pursu-
ant to Rule 64, 6 Jan. 1997.
Justice (Lost) in Transition: Assessing the ICTY Legacy 205
Absence of redress and reconciliation
Whereas restorative justice facilitates reconciliation, retributivism hinders both. 
Criminal law looks backwards and largely ignores reconciliatory considerations. 
It is centred on the parties to the criminal trial (the prosecutor and the accused or 
the defence) and downsizes the role of victims to that of third parties in the pro-
ceedings. Since victims want to be heard and claim some ownership of the process, 
international criminal law endorses the aims of transitional justice mechanisms 
and human rights law. The ICTY Statute and its rules of procedure and evidence 
create a hybrid regime.
The rights of victims can be divided in two categories. The first group facilitates 
the victims’ participation in the proceedings and enables them to receive some 
form of satisfaction or reparation. Victims cannot claim any compensation in 
front of the ICTY, aside from the restitution of their property; which the ICTY 
has never ordered. If the accused are found guilty, they may bring an action before 
national courts or other competent bodies to obtain reparation for the damages, 
pursuant to the relevant national legislation.32 The second group of rights provides 
support to victims, through the creation of a victims and witnesses unit within 
the ICTY registry,33 and protects them against intimidation or aggravation of 
their traumas.34 International criminal tribunals encounter serious difficulties 
in securing the attendance of witnesses because of their inability to control any 
given territory and the risks involved for the personal safety of those willing to 
testify, dangers increased by the highly political context of the crimes and their 
close relation to unresolved ethnic tensions. International judges regularly discard 
the legitimate claims, motivations, allegiances and dramatic or traumatic experi-
ences of victims, when supervising their examination or cross- examination. On 
top of the serious mishandling, harsh questioning and victimisation of vulnerable 
persons, during what has been described as ‘silencing hearings’ (Dembour and 
Haslam 2004), they treat abjectly people unwilling to testify because of threats 
or out of personal loyalty and patriotism.35 Witnesses are meagrely reimbursed 
32 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Nos 105–106.
33 Ibid., No 34.
34 Ibid., Nos 69, 75, 79, 81–81 bis, 90, 92 bis- quinquies, 96.
35 See, for an example of the latter type: ICTY, Slobodan Milošević (Kosovo, Croatia 
and Bosnia), IT-99–37 / IT-02–54, Transcripts, 19–20 Apr. 2005, pp. 38592–38597, 
38605–38606, 38615–38617; IT-02–54-T, Order on Contempt concerning Witness Ko-
sta Bulatović, 20 Apr. 2005; IT-02–54-R77.4, Decision on Contempt of the Tribunal, 
13 May 2005; IT-02–54-AR77.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Kosta Bulatović 
Contempt Proceedings, 29 Aug. 2005.
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for their expenses and time spent and completely ‘abandoned’ post- trial (Stover 
2005, 96).
In drafting its rules of procedure and evidence, the ICTY has balanced two sets 
of objectives: the respect of the rights of the defence and the protection of victims 
and witnesses, in order to enable them to testify and facilitate the trial.36 The power 
to examine prosecution witnesses and the publicity of the trial are limited when 
they conflict with the safety or the rights of victims and witnesses. Specific provi-
sions are aimed at averting the worsening of the sufferings experienced by victims 
of sexual assaults and take into account their vulnerability when confronted with 
their aggressor or the memory of the attack. Unhappily, the measures adopted 
did not protect victims and witnesses from reprisals or further victimisation. 
Numerous witnesses have been killed before reaching the court, to prevent them 
from giving their testimony, or after they had testified, to take revenge on them, 
and the media sometimes exercises pressure to dissuade witnesses from testifying 
against ‘what the prevailing state of mind considers proper’. A solution would be 
to grant political asylum to endangered persons and their family but relocation 
and settlement in a third country is done only in rare instances and witnesses may 
refuse this protection (Humanitarian Law Centre 2000, 58–63, 69, 134; Stover 
2005, 113–114). The ICTY and the office of the prosecutor have actively contrib-
uted on several occasions to a serious aggravation of the already dire situation of 
insecurity facing victims and witnesses. The trial of leaders of the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army, where the climate of intimidation and terrorisation was so pervasive 
that a retrial was ordered,37 provides an emblematic illustration of the dangers 
raised by the prevailing unawareness of the international actors involved. The 
Trial Chamber disclosed sensitive confidential information, in breach of adopted 
protective measures,38 and initiated contempt proceedings against a witness who 
had refused to answer questions out of fear.39
The current fixation of the ‘international community’ on personal account-
ability and the fight against impunity hardly masks the confession of its power-
lessness to stop the commission of mass atrocities and hints at a greater concern 
36 ICTY Statute, Articles 15, 21–22.
37 ICTY, Haradinaj et al. (Kosovo), IT-04–84-A, Judgement, 19 July 2010, §§ 34, 37, 48–49.
38 ICTY, Haradinaj et al. (Kosovo), IT-04–84-PT, Order on Disclosure of Memorandum 
and on Interviews with a Prosecution Source and Witness, 13 Dec. 2006, pp.  1, 9; 
IT-04–84-T, Decision on Motion for Video- Link, 14 Sept. 2007, § 3; IT-04–84-A, Judge-
ment, 19 July 2010, §§ 41, 48, notes 130, 158.
39 ICTY, Haradinaj et al. (Kosovo), IT-04–84-R77.1, Order on Contempt concerning Shefqet 
Kabashi, 5 June 2007.
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for their punishment than their prevention. The consolidation of peace and the 
stabilisation of the security situation in post- conflict regions pass through a com-
prehensive process of catharsis, forgiveness and the rapprochement of the warring 
groups. Restorative justice achieves this by focusing on remedies to the injustice 
committed and reparation of the wrong done to the victims rather than on punish-
ment. International criminal trials do not normally serve reconciliatory objectives 
but partake in a vicious circle of war and penalisation. Their adversarial nature 
contributes to a widening of discords and divisiveness in the recipient societies 
and a continuation of the conflicts by legal means; ‘lawfare’ merely substituting 
warfare. This predicament also affects interstate trials attributing liability for war-
time violence, like the genocide cases introduced before the International Court 
of Justice. The selectivity and formalism of international criminal proceedings 
endanger the expressive capacity of punishment. Due process requirements may 
distort historical records (Damaška 2008, 336) and international tribunals can 
solely establish a judicial or legal ‘truth’ – not the (historical) ‘truth’.
Individuation masks the more structural and systematic causal responsibility 
for wartime violence. This might explain why the ‘international community’ ea-
gerly embraces international criminal justice. Reducing justice to the penalisation 
of a few individuals permits hiding discomforting realities and shields interna-
tional organisations and foreign states that intervene in civil wars from account-
ability for their role in the commission of international crimes. However, the 
reconciliatory potential (if any) of penalisation can only be achieved by bringing 
all responsible agents to answer for their culpable actions, independent of their na-
tionality. Obscuring the faults of the international actors destroys the credibility of 
the judicial process and any positive impact it might have in the affected societies. 
The ICTY record is particularly grim in this respect (Bachmann and Fatić 2015, 
36–44, 120–121, 236–237; Fatić 2000, 1–3, 9–19, 26–29, 45–56, 81–87, 103–105). 
The refusal to indict NATO officials for war crimes committed during the bomb-
ing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and summary dismissal of all evidences 
of the offences, provide the most egregious illustration of the prosecutor’s lack of 
independence and impartiality and of her inability to resist political pressures.40 
The unwillingness of the prosecutor to further investigate NATO’s crimes cor-
roborates accusations that the ICTY dispenses ‘victor’s justice’ (Benvenuti 2001; 
Colangelo 2003, 1425–1436; Darcy 2007, 393) and has been severely condemned 
40 ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, especially 
§§ 90–91.
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by the International Committee of the Red Cross, in a report that stigmatises the 
noticeable bias of the office of the prosecutor in favour of NATO member states 
and reliance on double standards (see for large extracts of the ICRC confidential 
report, Hazan 2000, 219–225). The flagrant disparity of treatment between the 
warring factions at the level of indictment, conviction and sentencing confirms 
this want of integrity (Bachmann and Fatić 2015, 80–92; Scharf 1997, 310–311).
The picture of the Tribunal as an instrument of realpolitik at the service of 
imperial powers widens the gap between the ICTY and the expectations of the 
SFRY population since ‘sincerity’ matters immensely for people to accept charges 
brought against their own leadership and national heroes (Fatić 2000, 28, 81). By 
opposition, ‘victor’s justice’ usually creates cynicism or reactionary nationalistic 
attitudes in the targeted population. The social perception of the ICTY is abys-
mal. According to public opinion surveys, only an extremely small percentage 
(less than a quarter and, in some areas, less than ten percent) of the population 
expressed a modest level of trust in the institution, with the exception of Kosovo* 
and the Bosnian Federation (where it barely amounted to half of the respond-
ents). The majority of the population in most areas overwhelmingly distrusts the 
Tribunal and sees it as politically motivated, partial and unfair. Local judges and 
prosecutors view it as a political court that is ‘biased and incapable of providing 
fair trials’ and they reject its factual findings and record of the war. Far from 
improving over time, the confidence in the appropriateness of the institution has 
substantially decreased after it had become fully operational and started to issue 
convictions. Victims’ surveys reveal that they question its legitimacy, neutral-
ity, procedural fairness and substantive fairness (the fairness of its decisions). In 
contrast, confidence in the national courts has largely increased over the years 
and most victims indicate it as the preferred jurisdiction for the remaining cases 
(Hagan and Kutnjak Ivković 2011, 6–8, 50, 144, 150–152; Stover 2005, 38).
Breaking the vicious circle of war and penalisation
To sum up, the punitive character of penal law and its focus on prosecution totally 
sidestep the rights of the victims and witnesses. Their participation in the proceed-
ings in front of the ICTY is purely ancillary to the interests of the prosecution 
and falls short of the slimmest pretence to address their concerns. The ICTY fares 
equally badly with respect to the peace process. This tainted legacy militates for the 
abandonment of international criminal justice and the adoption of alternative ad-
judication strategies. In addition to the possibility of prosecution and punishment 
before national courts, addressing the various concerns mentioned above might 
involve abandoning the criminal justice approach or developing parallel strate-
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gies. The specificities of wartime violence and reconciliatory imperatives argue for 
the endorsement of transitional justice mechanisms like truth commissions and 
restorative justice instruments. The transitional and restorative frameworks focus 
on shared values in the community and reparation of the harm done to promote 
reconciliation. Victims’ narratives have a central role in this inclusive process. 
Truth commissions investigate the wider patterns of crimes and address impunity 
at the collective level. Usually, they have quasi- judicial functions, including the 
possibility to make recommendations concerning reparations (Mc Gonigle Leyh 
2011, 51–52, 62). Besides, local civil courts and tribunals can order restitution or 
compensation.
Victims of international crimes have followed two promising approaches to 
obtain compensation in front of domestic or hybrid courts. First, internationally 
wrongful acts trigger state responsibility.41 In two cases brought up by relatives of 
people killed in Srebrenica, a national court judged the Netherlands liable for the 
fate of several individuals whom Dutchbat soldiers had evicted from their com-
pound after the fall of the enclave.42 The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina condemned Republika Srpska and ordered reparations on account of 
the fact that its ‘failure to make accessible and disclose information requested by 
the applicants about their missing loved ones constitutes a violation of its positive 
obligations to secure respect for their rights’.43 A second solution is to be found in 
more individuated compensatory and restorative mechanisms, grounded in tort 
law, contract and restitution (Drumbl 2007, 195–196). In this frame, a French 
tribunal found Radovan Karadžić and Biljana Plavšić guilty of wartime abuses 
against a Bosnian family, who had fled to France, and awarded some monetary 
compensation to the plaintiffs.44 Proceedings have also been introduced against 
Radovan Karadžić under the US Alien Torts Claims Act, which permits trials 
before American civil courts, for compensatory and punitive damages.45 State 
responsibility, civil liability and corrective justice offer avenues for bypassing the 
41 ILC, 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, UN Doc., A/CN.4/L.620/Rev.1.
42 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Mustafić, No  200.020.173/01,  & Nuhanović, 
No 200.020.174/01, 5 July 2011.
43 HR Chamber BiH, Selimović et al. v. Republika Srpska (Srebrenica), 7 Mar. 2003, 
§§ 202–203.
44 Tribunal of Great Instance of Paris, Kovac v. Karadžić and Plavšić, 14 Mar. 2011.
45 New York District Court, Doe v. Karadžić, Kadić v. Karadžić, 1994.
 US Second Circuit, Doe v. Karadžić, Kadić v. Karadžić, 1995.
 US Supreme Court, Doe v. Karadžić, Kadić v. Karadžić, 1996.
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insurmountable challenges raised by the ascription of personal responsibility 
for structural crimes and for adequately compensating the victims. Truth com-
missions and compensatory solutions, inherited from civil liability adjudication, 
give victims an important place in the process and the possibility to voice their 
concerns and grievances in a more appropriate forum than a penal trial. Finally, 
civil processes and remedies like restitution or compensation foster reconciliation 
and contribute positively to the consolidation of peace and security.
The sinister legacy of the ICTY and its inability to fulfil any of its core func-
tions commands scepticism towards the international prosecution and punish-
ment of individuals for wartime violence and militates for the adoption of higher 
standards or alternative solutions, which would satisfy the requirements of ef-
fective justice and the wider aspirations of the international community. While 
local courts are more legitimate and better equipped to deliver effective criminal 
justice, the intrinsic connection between international criminality and wartime 
violence supports reliance on a combination of judicial and quasi- judicial avenues 
to help in preventing the resurgence of violence by breaking the vicious circle of 
war and penalisation.
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Martin Belov
The Opening of the Constitutional Order 
of Democracy in Transition towards 
Supranational Constitutionalism:  
the Bulgarian case
Abstract: This paper is devoted to the complex issue of how a national constitution of post- 
communist democracy in transition performs its opening function to the supranational 
constitutionalism of the EU in a pluralist, multi- layered, globalised and post- Westphalian 
idea and institutional context. It tries to conceptualise the interrelation between the Eu-
ropean and the domestic legal order through the analysis of the opening function of the 
Constitution. The role of the national constitution for the constitutionalisation of the bond 
between the supranational and national constitutional orders will be exemplified by Bul-
garia as a case study. The paper is structured around several important issues – the need for 
the conceptualisation of the opening function of the national constitution, the problems 
for defining the rules of recognition of supranational constitutional standards, the broken 
pyramid of the national system of the sources of law and the role that the constitutional 
identity and the substantive, formal and procedural limits to the transfer of sovereignty 
may have in the maintenance of the functionality and the importance of the constitution 
of an EU member state which is at the same time a democracy in transition.
Introduction: The constitutionalisation of the bond between 
supranational and national legal orders – the opening function 
of the national constitution
The influence of supranational legal orders on the domestic legal order of the 
state is possible only if it is explicitly or implicitly allowed by the national legal 
system. Such recognition has to be based on rules which are contained in the 
national legislation, preferably at constitutional level. In fact, the opening of the 
domestic order and the establishment of the legal ground for the justification of 
the penetration of supranational law into the domestic legal order is one of the 
main tasks of state constitutions in the post- Westphalian age.
Recognition of the validity of supranational law in the domestic legal system 
through rules provided by the supranational law itself can be exceptional. It could 
be based on presumed or implicit recognition or tacit permissive consensus. Such 
recognition and consensus can be extracted and defined through the interpreta-
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tion of constitutional texts in combination with the analysis of the factual self- 
restraint of state institutions to prevent such influence of the supranational law on 
the domestic legal order. However, such implicit recognition does not possess suf-
ficient democratic legitimacy and is open to arbitrary interpretation. Thus, it has 
to be avoided, even though in some cases it might appear to be a suitable solution.
The explicit recognition of the penetration of the supranational in the domes-
tic legal order is typically grounded on provisions of the national constitution. 
The opening function of the constitution (see Bliznashki 2009, 184) towards the 
supranational legal order is legally based on this system of constitutional rules 
of recognition (see Hart 1997, 100 ff.). They explicitly connect the supranational 
legal orders with the national legal order and usually set the formal, procedural 
and substantive limits to both the transfer of sovereignty and the introduction of 
supranational constitutional standards in the domestic legal system.
The opening of the domestic constitutional and legal system towards the supra-
national law can be accomplished not only via explicit constitutional provisions 
but also through the activist jurisprudence of the constitutional courts. Thus, for 
example, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court pronounces in the motives to its 
Decision № 3 of 2004 the ‘opening of the Bulgarian state towards the international 
law’. Such jurisprudence of the constitutional courts may be adopted and devel-
oped with a view to specific national issues and as unilateral praxis but it is much 
more frequently part of ‘judicial dialogue’ (for the concept of judicial dialogue see 
Martinico and Pollicino 2012, 1–272) with other national or supranational courts.
Another form of influence of supranational constitutionalism on the domestic 
legal system consists in the adoption of behavioural standards by the domestic 
constitutional actors which are typically defined and shaped as ‘soft law’ (for 
the concept of “soft law” see Abbott and Snidal 2000, 421–456). Moreover, the 
implicit, tacit or indirect opening of the domestic legal order, apart from the 
compliance with “soft law” standards, may also consist in the adoption of ideas or 
institutions in the form of reception or transplantation (see Watson 1993) in the 
national or subnational legislation or in the case law of the domestic courts. The 
influence of legal standards set by non- state actors, which can be observed in the 
course of the development of the global governance, is also a form of opening of 
the national legal order towards standards with a supranational origin (see Good 
2016, 149–165).
All contemporary constitutions of the states belonging to the Western legal 
tradition preform an opening function. This function develops in three direc-
tions. The first direction consists in the establishment of a legal background for 
the direct or mediated validity of supranational sources of law in the domestic 
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legal order. An important prerequisite for that is the provision of a system and 
procedure for implementing international treaties and other supranational and 
international sources of law in the domestic legal system.
The second direction of the opening function of the constitution consists of the 
definition of formal, procedural and substantive limitations for the penetration 
of the supranational law in the domestic legal order and for the transfer of com-
petences stemming from the national constitutions to supranational institutions. 
The third direction results in synchronising the constitutional axiology of the 
state with the axiology of supranational systems and regimes. Hence, these three 
directions of the opening function can be defined as procedural, limit setting and 
axiology coordinating respectively.
The constitution is the instrument for both linking and dividing legal orders. It 
is the factor that establishes the general ground for the validity of the international 
and supranational sources of law and for the membership in international and 
supranational organisations, and vice versa, the constitution can define borders 
that cannot be infringed by the supranational legal orders. They can be structured 
as counter limits (see Martinico 2007, 205–230), as elements of constitutional 
identity and as unamendable or entrenched clauses (see von Bogdandy and Schill 
2011, 15–17). Thus the constitution usually defines or should define the sphere 
of preserved (substantive) sovereignty of the state and (formal) supremacy of its 
constitution.
From that point of view, the opening function of the constitution can also be 
defined as both linking and validating. The linking aspect of the opening func-
tion consists in the establishment of constitutional foundations for the state’s 
membership in international organisations and in the EU. The validating function 
results in the constitutional provision of rules of recognition for the validity of 
supranational sources of law.
The opening function of the constitution can be interpreted in a legal positivist 
sense as well as from the point of view of the socio- legal and political theories for 
the state and the statehood such as the ‘three- element theory’ of Georg Jellinek 
(see Jellinek 2010). From a legal positivist point of view the opening function 
concerns the principles for linking the domestic with the supranational legal or-
ders (monism, dualism or pluralism) (see Kalisz and Zalewska 2016, 115–129). 
Moreover it encompasses the (re)construction of the Kelsenian normative hierar-
chy and the safeguarding of the balance between the principle of supremacy of the 
constitution and the integration of the domestic legal order in the emerging global 
constitutionalism and global legal order. The opening function in its Hartian 
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interpretation highlights the constitutional provision of the rules for the validity 
and recognition of the supranational sources of law in the domestic legal system.
Moreover, with regard to the theory of Georg Jellinek, the opening function 
reflects the state’s ability to provide for, to construct and to reconstruct the match 
between the public power, the people and the territory. The post- Westphalian 
problem here is whether it is possible and necessary to preserve the state as a ‘ter-
ritorial container’ (see Brenner 1999, 55) and how the constitution should reflect 
and regulate the ‘decompression’ and the ‘leaking of the container’.
The opening function of the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution – 
recreating European identity in multi- layered and  
pluralist setting
The 1991 Bulgarian Constitution performs an opening function for the Bulgarian 
constitutional and legal system in two directions: first, with regard to the consti-
tutional and legal order of the EU and second, with view to the ‘classical’ interna-
tional law and international relations. One can suppose that the opening function 
of the Bulgarian Constitution towards the EU and the EU law is grounded in its 
article 4, paragraph 3 which contains its EU integration clause, whereas the open-
ing function towards the international law is based on its article 5, paragraph 4 that 
provides for the hierarchical status of the international treaties which are ratified 
by the Parliament, published and entered into force in the Bulgarian legal system. 
Moreover, article 85 of the Constitution clarifies which international treaties must 
be ratified by an act of Parliament and which can be introduced in the Bulgarian 
legal order through an act of the government.
This distinction is logical. However it is not absolutely valid in the Bulgarian 
legal order. The reason is the vagueness regarding the place of the EU law in the 
Bulgarian hierarchy of sources of law. This vagueness is produced by the lack of 
any concrete constitutional provision on that matter and the subsequent implicit 
and indirect, but not sufficiently consistent subsuming of EU law under the cat-
egory of the international treaties by the Constitutional Court.
The distinction of the constitutional ground for the dual opening of the Bulgar-
ian legal order towards the EU legal order and the international law is problematic 
in two additional aspects. First, international law is not a homogeneous category. 
Quite different phenomena coexist in the framework of the currently extremely 
broad and internally controversial concept of international law. Supranational 
quasi- federal constitutional regimes as the EU, international regimes with secto-
ral constitutionalisation, e.g. the WTO and the Council of Europe, institutional 
forms of global constitutionalism such as the UN and classical international or-
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ganisations are all elements of the international legal order. They are all based 
and produce in one form or another ‘international law’ in this broad and almost 
all- encompassing sense. The legal standard- setting activity of the non- state actors 
of global governance is also on the rise at the beginning of the XXI century (see 
Saporiti 2016, 97–115 and Good 2016, 149–165).
Consequently article 5, paragraph 4 and article 85 of the 1991 Constitution are 
devises for opening of the Bulgarian legal order and for its linking only with the 
classical sources of law and actors of international law – the international treaties 
and the states and the international organisations respectively. However, they do 
not have a regulative effect on the relations between the state and the actors of 
global governance which are not states or international organisations. Moreover, 
these constitutionally enshrined rules of recognition do not reflect the influence 
of the ‘soft law’ on the Bulgarian legal order.
Second, the opening of the national legal and constitutional system cannot be 
limited to rules of recognition of the validity of supranational sources of law. It 
concerns also the constitutional provision of the prerequisites and conditions for 
membership of Bulgaria in international and supranational organisations and for 
its representation in the international relations. Elements of the national constitu-
tional identity may also be components of these conditions. This is especially true 
for those parts of constitutional identity which establish substantive limitations for 
the transfer of the state sovereignty. Thus, the opening function of the constitution 
is the main manifestation of the external power of the state in the context of the 
supranational constitutionalism and the global governance.
The 1991 Constitution establishes the prerequisites for ‘open statehood’ (see 
Hobe 1996, 127–154) in Bulgaria. This is a post- communist constitution that was 
born in the epoch of optimistic globalisation and Europeanisation in the early 
1990s. This is one of the factors for its EU friendly attitude, for the adoption of 
the monistic system for implementation of international treaties, for the facili-
tated procedures for transfer of sovereignty to the EU and for the general lack of 
substantive limitations for the transfer of sovereignty to the EU.
Another determinant of the openness of the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution to the 
supranational legal order and more precisely to the EU is the fact that ‘Europe’ as 
normative ideology has served an important role in forming the Bulgarian legal 
and constitutional tradition. The inclusion of the code of European civilization in 
the Bulgarian constitutional identity prevents its use as substantive limitation to 
the transfer of sovereignty to the EU. Thus, the openness of the 1991 Constitution 
does not offer any coherent set of indicators for the axiological and institutional 
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core of Bulgarian constitutionalism that has to be safeguarded against the uncriti-
cal imposition of supranational standards.
Therefore, the opening function of the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution concretely 
aims at the reestablishment of the European identity of the post- communist Bul-
garian state and society and for the establishment of conditions for democracy 
and rule of law. The reintegration of Bulgaria into the European constitutional 
tradition, institutionalised in the form of EU and Council of Europe, has been 
accomplished in the multi- layered and pluralist setting of the late Westphalian 
and early post- Westphalian European civilization and in the context of emerging 
supranational constitutionalism and global governance.
However, several types of simultaneously existing crisis, experienced by Eu-
ropean societies in the early XXI century, are among the most important exter-
nal macro factors that serve as obstacles for the establishment of a fully- fledged 
democracy and rule of law in post- communist Bulgaria. These are the crisis of 
representative democracy, the crisis of territoriality, the crisis of authority and the 
crisis of hierarchy. By crisis of hierarchy I understand the increasing dysfunction-
ality of the hierarchy as an explanatory paradigm with a central place in modern 
Western statehood.
The combination of all these factors makes the Bulgarian post- communist 
constitutional project for the establishment of democracy and rule of law almost 
fully dependent on the destiny of the European political and constitutional project 
institutionalised in the form of the EU. In other words, the explicit and implicit 
EU friendliness of the Bulgarian Constitution, the lack of a national constitu-
tional identity which is inherently distinct from the European identity of the 1991 
Constitution and the creative importance of the European ideal for the establish-
ment of the Bulgarian legal and constitutional tradition both open the Bulgarian 
constitutional order to the influence of the supranational constitutionalism of the 
EU and expose it to the crisis phenomena which are developing at an EU level.
The existence of such complex interrelated factors for the EU friendliness and 
the European identity of the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution does not mean that 
there is no Bulgarian constitutional identity. It only serves as an impediment to the 
development of the Bulgarian constitutional identity in contrast to the constitu-
tional axiology and teleology as well as the constitutional design of the European 
supranational constitutionalism. By European supranational constitutionalism I 
understand both the developed and almost fully- fledged EU constitutionalism 
and the fragmented and sectoral human rights oriented constitutionalism of the 
Council of Europe. Consequently, the current Bulgarian constitutional identity 
has not been developed in contrast to the European supranational constitutional-
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ism but rather as a result of the adoption its basic principles as structural core of 
the post- communist Bulgarian legal order.
Naturally one can suppose that there are implicit and ad hoc limits to the influ-
ence of the supranational law in general and to the EU law in particular which 
also set the framework for the transfer of sovereign competences to the emerging 
supranational regimes and more precisely to the EU. Such limits may be extracted 
and defined, e.g. by the constitutional court, as the ultimate safeguard of the 
constitutional autonomy of the Bulgarian legal order. However such limits have 
not yet been determined by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court due to the above 
mentioned factors. Moreover, the framing function of the 1991 Constitution as 
general implicit limit to the EU integration based on its supremacy is rather inef-
fective because of its EU friendliness.
The unclear hierarchical status of the EU law in the Bulgarian 
legal order – ‘broken pyramid’ and crisis of hierarchy, implicit 
Euro- optimism or hidden protectionism of the national 
constitution?
The opening function of the 1991 Constitution towards the EU legal system is 
based, as it has already been mentioned, on the Bulgarian EU integration clause. 
It is enshrined in article 4, paragraph 3 of the Bulgarian Constitution according to 
which ‘the Republic of Bulgaria shall participate in the construction and develop-
ment of the European Union’. Obviously the Bulgarian EU integration clause is 
laconic. It is formulated much more as general political declaration of the will of 
Bulgaria to participate in the EU than as concrete legal rule (on the vagueness of 
this provision see Vatsov 2015, 1604).
This abstract political wording of the EU integration clause does not allow for 
the extraction of a concrete rule of recognition of the validity and the hierarchi-
cal status of the primary and secondary EU law in the Bulgarian legal order. No 
immediate conclusion can be made on the basis of the EU integration clause 
regarding the primacy, the direct effect and the direct applicability of the EU law 
in the domestic legal system.
What is particularly problematic is the lack of clarity regarding the relation-
ship between the EU law and the Bulgarian Constitution. A comparison between 
article 4, paragraph 3 of the Constitution which contains the EU integration clause 
and article 5, paragraph 1 and 4 of the Constitution providing for the constitu-
tional supremacy and the primacy of the international treaties over the Bulgarian 
sub- constitutional legislation shows the great difference which exists between the 
general political declaration of will for EU membership (article 4, paragraph 3) 
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and the concrete rules of recognition and hierarchy (article 5, paragraph 1 and 
4). Such comparison may lead to quite different conclusions regarding the place 
of the EU law in the Bulgarian normative hierarchy.
Indeed article 4, paragraph 3 does not provide for the hierarchical place of EU 
law in the Bulgarian system of sources of law. However, the primary EU law from a 
formal point of view is composed of a system of international treaties whereas the 
secondary EU law contains sources of law which are adopted on the basis of the 
primary EU law. Consequently, one possible hypothesis could be that the whole EU 
law – both primary and secondary – has sub- constitutional status in Bulgaria but 
enjoys primacy over the rest of the Bulgarian legislation apart from the Constitution. 
In that case, the rule of recognition of its validity will be article 5, paragraph 4 which 
provides for the validity and the hierarchical status of the international treaties.
Arguments in favour of the hypothesis of the sub- constitutional but supra- legal 
status of the EU law can be drawn also from the case law of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court has not 
yet directly pronounced on the hierarchical status of the EU law in the Bulgar-
ian legal order. More precisely, there is no decision of the Constitutional Court 
on the relationship between the EU law, the international law and the Bulgarian 
Constitution. This passiveness of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court and its full 
self- restraint from entering into judicial dialogue on the issues of the supremacy 
of the national constitution and the absolute or relative primacy of the EU law 
with view to the national constitutional identity (for the passiveness of the Con-
stitutional Court on EU matters and its self- restraint in entering into judicial 
dialogue see also Vatsov 2015, 1621–1622) is in contrast to its generally activist 
attitude in domestic matters.
At the same time, the Constitutional Court has accepted for consideration 
several demands for declaration of contravention of acts of Parliament to the 
EU law. The Bulgarian Constitution and the Constitutional Court Act authorise 
the Constitutional Court to accomplish control for the compliance of the acts 
of Parliament only with the Constitution and the international treaties. There is 
no explicit competence for such control with regard to the EU law. That is why 
the Constitutional Court implicitly and tacitly subsumes the EU law under the 
category of international treaties by taking them into consideration in the context 
of the above mentioned cases.
However, such subsuming is rather doubtful with regard to its constitutional-
ity. Moreover, it remains unclear what is the reason for such equalisation of the 
EU law to the international treaties. It can be driven by either the belief of the 
Constitutional Court’s judges in the sub- constitutional ranking of the EU law or 
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by their desire to defend the EU law from legislative violation by using the only 
existing constitutional procedure for that purpose.
In the motives to Decision № 3 of 2004 the Constitutional Court considers 
that: ‘the acts of the primary law of the EU are international treaties in the sense 
of article 5, paragraph 4 of the Constitution and they become part of the domestic 
law of Bulgaria after complying with its requirements’.
On the other hand, in the motives to the same decision the Constitutional 
Court explicitly admits that secondary EU law is not equivalent to the inter-
national treaties. Thus the Constitutional Court leaves open the question what 
exactly is the standing and the hierarchical rank of the secondary EU law in the 
constitutional order and the legal system of Bulgaria.
The thesis for the coequal hierarchical standing of the EU law and the inter-
national treaties has three main disadvantages. First, it contravenes the jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on the primacy and the direct 
effect of the EU law as an autonomous legal system.1 It is not in line with either 
the doctrine of absolute or that of the relative primacy of the EU law which are 
elaborated in the context of the judicial dialogue between the CJEU and the na-
tional constitutional courts.
The Bulgarian Constitutional Court does not engage in any judicial dialogue 
either with the CJEU or with the other EU member states’ constitutional courts 
on defining the Bulgarian constitutional identity. Thus, it seems that the Bulgarian 
Constitutional Court tacitly approves the absolute primacy of all provisions of the 
Bulgarian constitution over the EU law.2 This is a standing which might be correct 
from the viewpoint of the classical Westphalian absolute version of the sovereignty 
but it is irreconcilable with the current stage of the constitutionalisation of the EU.
Second, the equalisation of EU law to the international treaties is incorrect also 
because the international treaties themselves are not a coherent category. Thus, 
the different types of international treaties have different hierarchical standings 
in the Bulgarian legal system.
1 See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL (1964), Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten 
Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratis der Belastin-
gen(1963) and Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (1970).
2 According to M. Vatsov the Bulgarian Constitutional Court develops through Decision 
№3 of 2004 a kind of Bulgarian version of the ‘controlimiti’ doctrine. In his reading of 
this decision the Constitutional Court implicitly provides that the EU law has primacy 
to the Bulgarian Constitution ‘to the extent to which the Constitution of the Republic 
of Bulgaria explicitly allows it’. See Vatsov 2015, 1596–1597.
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Third, the equality in the hierarchical standing of the EU law and the inter-
national treaties raises the question how we can identify the principles and the 
criteria for the elimination of eventual collisions between them. The principle 
pacta sunt servanda and the obligation for loyal membership in the EU and in 
different international organisations require that the Bulgarian institutions must 
abide by both types of supranational legal acts.
Indeed article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that in the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. However, 
most of the international treaties do not contain such a provision. Moreover, even 
if they did provide for such safeguard for their preferred application its existence 
could have led to irreconcilable conflicts between provisions stemming from mu-
tually exclusive international treaties. This is one of the reasons why the supra-
national courts try to adjust the international and the supranational legal orders 
and their concrete provisions by applying a constitutional pluralist methodology 
of interpretative disregard of such rigid provisions. This is what the CJEU did in 
the Kadi case (Case 402/05) and what the European Court of Human Rights did 
in Nada v. Switzerland and Al Dulimi v. Switzerland3.
It is clear that the use of formal rules for the removal of normative collisions 
such as ‘the newer norm derogates the older one’ or ‘the special norm derogates 
the general one’ are not applicable here due to the risk of normative chaos that 
would endanger the legal predictability. The solution offered by the constitutional 
pluralism (see Krisch 2011, Stone Sweet 2009, 631 and Avbelj and Komarek 2012) 
might seem to be the most appropriate one in the context of the inexistence of a 
clear rule for the ascription of hierarchical superiority. It consists in differentiating 
the recognition of the supranational sources of law and in balancing of arguments 
stemming out of them in a manner which would allow the abidance to both the 
EU law and the international law. However, this solution generates conditions 
for arbitrariness and chaos as well. This is due to the lack of clear and universal 
criterion for giving precedence to either the EU law or the international law.
The Republic of Bulgaria may give principle preference to the EU law over the 
international treaties by denouncing such international treaties that contravene 
EU law. However, the option of denouncing such treaties is also not universal 
3 I am grateful to the anonymous peer reviewer of my paper for his or hers suggestions 
regarding the case law and the role of the supranational courts on relativising article 
103 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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solution to the problem and in some cases it is not solution at all. Article 56 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties clearly limits the power of the states 
to denounce international treaties. Moreover, even if the international treaty can 
be denounced because it meets the requirements provided by article 56 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the denouncement of the interna-
tional treaties is a result of the principle political preference by the Parliament 
and the government to one of the two above mentioned types of supranational 
acts. However, such political and discretionary choice which is applicable only 
to a limited number of cases anyway does not contain a sufficiently certain and 
practicable criterion for solving normative collisions between EU law and inter-
national treaties on pending cases in front of the domestic courts. The domestic 
courts cannot refuse to deliver justice and thus in many occasions they cannot 
wait for the denouncement of the international treaty.
It is not clear why the Bulgarian Constitution remains tacit on the issue of the 
hierarchical status of the EU law despite the fact that there have been five waves 
of constitutional reform and the predominant part of the constitutional amend-
ments are directly or indirectly related to the EU membership of Bulgaria and to 
the compliance with the standards of the EU law. One possible suggestion is that 
this is a form of implicit and tacit approval of the primacy of the EU law over the 
Bulgarian law including the Constitution. Such primacy could be justified through 
extensive teleological and systematic interpretation of the EU integration clause 
of the 1991 Constitution in conjunction with the jurisprudence of the CJEU.
Another explanation runs in the opposite direction. The lack of explicit consti-
tutional provision on the hierarchical status of the EU law may be considered as 
tacit subsuming of the EU law under the category of international treaties. That 
hypothesis is to some extent supported by the rather inconsistent and oblique 
jurisprudence of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court.
Anyway, the vagueness of the Bulgarian Constitution on this particular issue 
contrasts to a great extent with its rather clear standpoint on the other components 
and levels of the pyramid of sources of law in Bulgaria. Hence this pyramid seems 
to have been broken without being subsequently well repaired on its top with 
the EU accession on Bulgaria. Furthermore the lack of clarity on the issue of the 
relationship between the Constitution, the EU law and the international treaties 
is not produced by the constitutional legislator or the Constitutional Court being 
consciously involved in political or judicial dialogue on constitutional pluralism, 
multilevel constitutionalism or constitutional protectionism. It is much more a 
result of semi- conscious tactical evasion to take an explicit stance on the problem 
(see Vatsov 2015, 1621–1622).
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The transfer of sovereignty from Bulgaria to the EU – is it a 
‘carte blanche’ or there are some constitutional counter- limits 
to it?
The opening function of the 1991 Constitution consists not only in the just ana-
lysed issue of the opening of the national legal order to sources of law with supra-
national origin. It concerns also the opening of the statehood through the opening 
of the three elements of which it is composed according to the theory of Georg 
Jellinek – the state power, the territory and the people. Here the ‘opening’ consists 
of the influence of processes and phenomena related to globalisation, transna-
tionalisation, supranationalisation on the national legal order and on the society. 
This is due to the fact that the constitution is not only the supreme legal act in the 
national hierarchy of the sources of law which contains the rules of recognition for 
both the national and supranational sources of law but also a political document 
(see Tanchev 2003, 158–181) containing the fundamental political decision (see 
Schmitt 1970) or the social contract (see Locke 1988 and Rousseau1968). That is 
why the opening function of the constitution concerns not only the legal system 
but it also has a socio- political impact. Due to space constraints here I will dis-
cuss only the opening of state power and the influence of the above mentioned 
phenomena on the Bulgarian legal order.
The opening of the state power as a state building element is accomplished 
through the transfer of sovereign competences from the state to supranational 
regimes. The most feasible and intense form of such transfer concerns the EU. 
According to article 85, paragraph 1, point 9 of the 1991 Constitution the National 
Assembly (the Bulgarian Parliament) can concede to the EU competences which 
stem out of the Bulgarian Constitution. The constitution is simultaneously the 
product of sovereignty, the crystallisation core of sovereignty and the safeguard 
of sovereignty. That is why the competences provided by the constitution are 
also sovereign competences, because they are directly related to sovereignty. The 
constitutional competences are expressions of sovereignty and instruments for the 
accomplishment of sovereignty. Consequently, the Bulgarian Constitution permits 
not only transfer of constitutional competences but also transfer of Bulgarian 
sovereignty to the EU as a supranational constitutional system.
It has to be taken into account that the 1991 Constitution does not allow for 
transfer of sovereignty via transfer of constitutional competences to any other in-
ternational organisations or supranational regimes (see also Drumeva 2008, 138). 
This is additional evidence for the specific character of the EU and for the fact 
that the constitutional legislator realises that the procedure regulated in article 85, 
paragraph 2 provides for transfer of sovereignty to a supranational constitutional 
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system with its autonomous constitutionalism and not just for granting some 
competences to a classical international organisation.
It is possible that membership in a supranational organisation could contra-
vene the Bulgarian Constitution. In such a hypothesis the only possibility for 
Bulgaria to become or to remain a member of that organisation is to amend its 
own Constitution. This requirement is explicitly fixed in article 85, paragraph 4 
of the Bulgarian Constitution.
In the case of the EU membership the constitutional legislator provides also 
for the option for transfer of constitutional competences and thus of sovereign 
power to the Union. In that case it is not impossible that the mismatch between 
the Bulgarian Constitution and EU law would be adjusted not via the instruments 
of the constituent power, resulting in an explicit constitutional amendment, but 
through the combined application of two procedures. The first one is the proce-
dure provided by article 85, paragraph 2 of the Constitution for transfer of consti-
tutional competences to the EU. The second one is the judicial dialogue between 
the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria and the CJEU or through a ‘constitutional 
monologue’ of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court whereas the latter will be based 
most probably on decisions for abstract interpretation of the Constitution. In 
other words, the pro- European and pro- integration activist jurisprudence of the 
Bulgarian Constitutional Court can establish ‘creeping’ and informal constitu-
tional reform.
Such ‘hidden deconstitutionalisation’ of Bulgaria paralleled by transfer of 
sovereignty to the EU via legislative and jurisprudential means contravenes the 
concepts of the constituent power of the people and the people’s sovereignty en-
shrined in article 1, paragraph 2 and in Chapter IX of the Bulgarian Constitution. 
Such a practice will be doubtful with regard to its constitutionality insofar as these 
concepts are valid parts of the Bulgarian constitutional law.
Through the procedure for transfer of constitutional competences provided by 
its article 85, paragraph 2 the Bulgarian Constitution not only opens the power as 
a fundamental element of statehood but allows for the transfer of sovereignty to an 
upper governmental level. In that sense the sovereign limits himself by agreeing 
to give up some of its power in favour of the EU. Such self- denial of sovereignty 
is very problematic from a democratic viewpoint, if it is realised without the ac-
complishment of either referendum or an electoral campaign devoted especially 
to that issue. This is due to the fact that the transfer of sovereignty from the 
National Assembly to the EU, without any direct or indirect opportunity for the 
citizens to express their opinion on it, has the character of a pure elitist decision 
(see Tanchev and Belov 2017).
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The transfer of sovereign competences can be partial, restrained and it can be 
bound to some formal or substantive conditions and modalities. In fact one of 
the most popular theories in constitutional doctrine suggests that the transfer 
of sovereignty to the EU does not lead to loss of sovereignty but to ‘pooling of 
sovereignties’ (see MacCormick 1993, 1–18) which even enhances the capability 
of the state to respond to the global challenges and to adjust to the shifting global 
context. Something more, R. Toniatti believes that the traditional ‘sovereign sov-
ereignty’ in the context of the European constitutionalism is getting transformed 
into ‘participatory sovereignty’. Thus state sovereignty is not lost but just trans-
formed and the ‘non- sovereignty of the EU overshadows the sovereignty of the 
member states’ (see Toniatti 2013, 55 and 62).
The mechanism for transfer of sovereign competences from Bulgaria to the 
EU is very problematic in several aspects. The procedure provided by article 85, 
paragraph 2 of the Constitution is much more relaxed than the procedure for 
introduction of constitutional amendments. The National Assembly may decide 
to transfer constitutional competences to the EU on two reading with 2/3 major-
ity of all MPs whereas the adoption of constitutional amendment can be done 
either by a special covenant (the Grand National Assembly) in the case of the 
most important constitutional amendments or by the National Assembly on three 
readings with ¾ majority of all MPs with regards to the constitutional amend-
ments of secondary importance. Such approach is illogical from the point of view 
of the principles of state sovereignty, the people’s sovereignty and the separation 
between the constituent and the constituted powers (see Tanchev and Belov 2017).
Moreover, the 1991 Constitution does not provide for any concrete substantive 
limitations to the transfer of sovereignty to the EU. Actually article 85, paragraph 
4 of the Constitution provides for the need for the amendment of the Constitution 
prior to the conclusion of international treaties that require such an amendment. 
In addition article 158 of the Constitution contains several important issues such 
as the form of governance, the form of territorial distribution of power, the direct 
effect of the Constitution, the primacy of the international treaties etc. that have 
to be amended by the Grand National Assembly. The systematic interpretation of 
these constitutional provisions may lead to the conclusion that the issues enlisted 
in article 158 of the Constitution and reserved for amendment by the Grand Na-
tional Assembly are in fact substantive limitations to the transfer of sovereignty 
to the EU. This conclusion is not correct due to several reasons.
The most important and at a first glance formal reason is that transfer of sov-
ereignty related to the issues enlisted in article 158 of the Constitution is neither 
prohibited, nor impossible. It can be accomplished by the National Assembly after 
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constitutional amendment adopted by the Grand National Assembly. The provi-
sion of article 85, paragraph 1, point 9 in conjunction with article 85, paragraph 
2 is misleading. It may lead to the suggestion that transfer of competences related 
e.g. to the form of governance or the form of territorial distribution of power can 
be done also by the National Assembly without former constitutional amendment 
accomplished by the Grand National Assembly.
Actually with the provision in 2005 of the new paragraph 2 of article 85 of the 
Constitution the constitutional legislator has created a vicious circle and thus 
preconditions for serious misunderstandings on fundamental issues related to 
the constituent power and the transfer of sovereignty. On the one hand, he has 
tried to introduce practically functioning and efficient mechanism for transfer of 
sovereignty through ratification of an international treaty aiming at such transfer 
by the National Assembly. On the other hand, he could not make that in a logical 
and non- controversial way because this would have required the summoning of 
the Grand National Assembly which is the institution that can allow such transfer 
to be accomplished by the National Assembly. Moreover, even if such procedure 
has been correctly followed the doubt whether the distinct acts of Parliament 
transferring constitutional competences and sovereignty concern the form of 
governance and the form of territorial distribution of power will remain. Such acts 
need again the sanction of the Grand National Assembly, except if the exclusive 
competence of this covenant to amend the form of governance and the form of 
the territorial distribution of power is abolished through constitutional reform.
The main issue here consists in the rigidity and the complicatedness of the 
procedure for constitutional amendment by the institution of the Grand National 
Assembly. The very existence of this institution and its relatively wide competence 
according to article 158 of the Constitution creates the peril of unconstitutionality 
not only for the transfer of constitutional competences to the EU by the National 
Assembly but also for the participation of the Constitutional Court in judicial dia-
logue that might concern some of the issues falling into the scope of competence 
of the Grand National Assembly. Consequently, the very existence of the Grand 
National Assembly casts the shadow of latent and potential unconstitutionality of 
the activity of the state institutions related to the opening function of the constitu-
tion realised through transfer of constitutional competences, judicial dialogue and 
participation in different forms of supranational constitutionalism in case they are 
related to the broad scope of issues provided by article 158 of the Constitution.
The issue that has just been discussed is part of a broader conceptual problem 
namely whether the rigid constitutions, the procedures for difficult amendment 
of the constitutions and the entrenched clauses are compatible with the dynamics 
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and the compromise based character of the contemporary supranational consti-
tutionalism. According to E. Tanchev:
After the accession to EU rigid constitutions in some of the countries joining the EU dur-
ing the first decade of the new millennium might lead within the constitutional identity 
concept to malfunctioning in the EU membership by opposing EU law supremacy, direct, 
immediate and horizontal effect. This might pose a danger to EU legal integration by 
eroding the constitutional acquis communautaire. (see Tanchev 2014, 75).
The second reason why the entrenched clause provided by article 158 does not 
constitute substantive limitation of sovereignty is that the catalogue of exclusive 
competences of the Grand National Assembly is internally inconsistent. It includes 
constitutional amendments on a macro level (adoption of a new constitution), on 
a meso level (amendment of the form of governance and the form of territorial 
distribution of power) and on a micro level (amendments of some issues concern-
ing the human rights).
The issues enlisted in the catalogue of article 158 of the Constitution are neither 
substantive limitations to the transfer of sovereignty, nor elements of Bulgar-
ian constitutional identity. They are not substantive limitations to the transfer of 
sovereignty due to the fact that they do not constitute an unamendable clause. 
Moreover, there is the procedure provided by article 85, paragraph 2 of the Consti-
tution which does not make any distinction between the transfer of constitutional 
competences that can be amended by the National Assembly and constitutional 
competences reserved for amendment by the Grand National Assembly.
Hence the Bulgarian Constitution does not provide for substantive limitations 
for the transfer of sovereignty to the EU. It does not provide explicitly concrete 
substantive parameters and requirements with regard to the participation of the 
state in the international relations and the accession to international treaties. It 
is doubtful whether the ‘establishment of just international order’ stipulated as a 
principle of the participation of Bulgaria in the EU and in international relations 
by the Constitutional Court in the motives to Decision № 3 of 2004 can be inter-
preted as substantive limitation to the transfer of sovereignty to the EU.
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Ferenc Hörcher
The V4 Cooperation and the European schism 
over the migration crisis: The history of 
political thought in the service  
of political analysis
Abstract: This paper is interested in the methodological question of making sense of poli-
tics by referring to the discourses and practices of the past with the help of the history of 
political thought. It suggests that a proper understanding of the V4 countries’ common po-
litical stances on issues like the so- called “quota question” in the EU is better understood if 
we analyse them with the help of the toolkit of a historical and cultural translation formula. 
In order to show how to get this formula, the paper first looks at the aims behind the V4 
agreements in the transition period. Relying on the historical perspective, this agreement 
suggests that this region has a historically rooted self- identity which should be understood 
on its own, without a direct comparison with a supposed “ideal” western model. The paper 
itself makes an effort to show the relevance and content of this historical self- perception 
by referring to the concept of Central Europe in the works of by now classical Central 
European intellectuals in the late Communist period (the ‘70s and ‘80s) and in the works 
of young Central European historians from the early 21st century.
Introduction to the topic and its methodology
One of the unintended consequences of what came to be called the recent Euro-
pean migration crisis is a renewed interest in V4 cooperation among members 
of the group itself and also among other European countries. It might, therefore, 
be useful to try to explain this cooperation from a rather unusual perspective, 
i.e. on the basis of the history of political thought – with the background sup-
position that the history of political thought might be useful for the analysis of 
contemporary politics.1
1 For a description of the connections between political philosophy, contemporary poli-
tics and the history of political thought see Hörcher 2015. For the Cambridge school, 
see the present author’s Hungarian language collection: Hörcher 1997, which consists 
of selected papers of the Cambridge authors mentioned in the title, together with an 
explanatory introduction by the editor of the book. For an English language introduc-
tion to the topic, see Müller 2011.
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In what follows, therefore, the reader will find an interpretation of the possible 
reasons behind the political conflict over the recent European migration crisis 
from the point of view of the history of political thought. In order to prepare 
the analysis, this paper will first ask how to make sense of the geography of the 
continent, with an emphasis on the Central European region. With the help of the 
conclusions of such a spatial, geopolitical overview one can more or less reliably 
make an effort to define the concept of Central Europe for the present purposes 
by reviewing some of the recent scholarly achievements.
In search of the birth of the historical category of Central Europe, we shall rely 
on three recent efforts to reconstruct the region’s history as far back as its Medieval, 
Early Modern and 20th century past is concerned. From the perspective of this 
paper, when digging into the past one should be rather pragmatic and ask history’s 
help only for one’s own purposes. This programme might sound rather risky or 
even sacrilegious to a historian, but this paper is an exercise in the history of politi-
cal thought, viewed from the perspective of political philosophy and not from the 
discipline of history. This paper concentrates on the hypothesis that present- day 
political conflicts can be fruitfully analysed with the help of historical investiga-
tions. In this sense, this paper tries to avoid two pitfalls: the value- neutral discourse 
of some historians and the anachronism of some contemporary political analysts.
This procedure can be labelled applied historical enquiry: its aim is to com-
prehend the present rise of interest in the Visegrád region’s activities in recent 
European debates from a 500 years perspective. The proposal is that the divide 
between Old Europe and New Europe is not a contemporary development, it is 
based on longstanding differences of mentality and practice in the countries of 
the two regions. One can hardly hope to make sense of present- day European 
conflicts without looking into the long- term past of the issue.
The V4 cooperation and its historical antecedent
It was in the feverish political context of the migration crisis of 2015 that the V4 
countries got closer to each other and expressed and accepted a regional call for 
cooperation in the Europe- wide negotiation processes. The Visegrád cooperation 
is based partly on the fact of a longstanding historical connection (the inhabitants 
of these countries have lived on the same territory under the same, often rather 
unfriendly rule for centuries) and partly on the shared political vision of their 
political elites. They all seem to favour strong national defence along state borders 
and a hard- line position on issues like national sovereignty and national security, 
and they tend to refuse any quotas or other forms of European- level distribution 
of foreign subjects.
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The institutional origin and framework of the cooperation date back to a 1991 
agreement of the three (by now four) Visegrád countries. These states are obsessed 
by their once great but by now tragic history. This new- born cooperation was 
based on a historical antecedent. ‘The Congress of Visegrád, held in 1335, was 
one of the outstanding diplomatic events in Central Europe in the fourteenth 
century’ – as a recent historical account states (Rácz 2013, 261). Then, as now, 
the aim of the cooperation was regional conflict- resolution: the monarchs’ efforts 
aimed ‘at eliminating the political and territorial conflicts which opposed Poland 
and Bohemia on the one hand, and Poland and the Teutonic order on the other 
hand, through the mediation of Charles I of Hungary, the senior ranking ruler of 
the region’ (Rácz 2013, 261).
The new, late 20th century agreement also invoked the common historical 
background of the countries involved: ‘The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia have always been part of a single civilization sharing cultural and 
intellectual values and common roots in diverse religious traditions, which they 
wish to preserve and further strengthen.’ (About the Visegrad Group). It is this 
historical grounding that the present cooperation is expected to rely on: ‘to work 
together in a number of fields of common interest within the all- European inte-
gration’ (About the Visegrad Group). The treaty was clearly not an alternative to 
the all- European integration efforts, nor against any other political entities within 
or outside the EU. On the contrary. ‘It was meant optimum cooperation with all 
countries, in particular its neighbours, its ultimate interest being the democratic 
development in all parts of Europe.’ (About the Visegrad Group).
As a result of the unexpected political chaos caused by the migration crisis, 
together with the election of conservative or right wing candidates to government 
both in Hungary (in 2010) and in Poland (in 2015) and in the presidential election 
in Poland (2015), the Visegrád cooperation has also been enlivened, politicised, 
and has experienced a perhaps unexpected invigorating turn. In other words, step 
by step the V4 countries have reoriented their political maneuvering and showed a 
lively interest in becoming an alternative power centre within the European politi-
cal arena. They have got supporters in the Western world, too, who look at it as the 
promising example which should be followed by their own governments as well.2
This new self- definition of the V4 countries was signalled by Robert Fico, the 
left- wing Prime Minister of Slovakia, whose government filed a lawsuit at the 
European Court of Justice against the 22 September decision by the Interior Min-
2 Of course, there can be substantial differences between the V4 countries, as far as their 
self- perception is concerned, as agents in European power politics.
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isters of the EU which mandated that 120,000 migrants have to be divided, by 
quota, among member states in December 2015 (Slovakia v Council Case). This 
lawsuit was supported by the Hungarian government as well, also in December 
2015 (Hungary v Council Case). Poland, so far not particularly involved in the 
migrant crisis, also soon expressed their full support of Hungary’s lawsuit against 
the Council in April 2016 (Hungary and Poland…, 2016).
The story of the alliance of the V4 countries seems to have Europe- wide popu-
larity. As stated above, it is basically a story about national autonomy and inde-
pendence, self- defence and security issues. The reason behind the popularity of 
their cause is not simply the presence of large quantities of newly arrived, legally 
unidentified migrants in European cities, and the millions that are pushing them 
forward in Asia and Africa, but also the recent terrorist threat with the attacks 
in major European towns including Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Nizza, and Istanbul. 
Even the Merkel Government had to reshuffle its migration policy before the 
actual election campaign. The pressure on the European political elite is increas-
ing as elections in major European countries (namely Germany and France) are 
approaching. Elections mean the moment of truth in democracies: when the 
electorate can pronounce by their votes that the emperor is naked, i.e. they act as 
reality- checks on political parties. They can prevent politicians from going astray 
into utopian visions instead of confronting harsh realities. In this sense, 2017 
might be a year of political reality- checks in Europe.
Central Europe in the eyes of the West
Given all the differences of the experiential horizons, and the weight of political 
pressures, the two parts of Europe will not easily come closer. On the contrary, 
the conflict might deepen the division between them. This has been shown by an 
American observer of the recent European tensions. Anne Applebaum, a historian 
whose family roots can be traced back to this region, a Pulitzer Prize- winning 
journalist3 well versed in the recent past of the continent, including its totalitarian 
regimes, and the wife of Radosław Sikorski, foreign minister of Poland, she has a 
special vested interest in this region. Mrs. Applebaum was ready to say the follow-
ing in an interview published in the Hungarian digital political journal, Mandiner:
The Visegrád Four successfully identified themselves with one issue. They have 
no positive project for Europe, no ideas; they do not want to add anything to 
3 Anne Applebaum’s Gulag: A History (2003) won the 2004 Pulitzer Prize for General 
Non- Fiction writing. Her Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944–56 (2012) 
has also made substantial noise among the readers.
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Europe: their only message for the moment is that they want to stop the refugees. 
Even if someone – like me – would think that Merkel made a mistake when she 
opened the gates for the refugees, and that this gesture was not thoroughly consid-
ered. The message of Central Europeans is too simple: we hate Muslims, we detest 
Western Europe, which otherwise helped us in the last years of our integration, 
and we want to back out. This is what Western Europe hears as the message of 
Central Europe. (Applebaum 2016)
This is obviously a rather harsh criticism of the Visegrád countries’ position, 
and not simply a different political perspective. It is no less than a moral charge 
of dishonesty and ingratitude. Its edge is made sharper by the fact that it comes 
from a historian well- versed in the past of the region and from someone who is 
also personally tied to the region.
According to the hypothesis of the present paper, the reason behind this sharp 
conceptual antagonism between the American journalist and the V4 perception 
of the crisis might be the difference in the interpretation of recent and long- term 
history, which is based on the experiential horizon of someone labelled in this 
region as a ‘Western intellectual’4 compared to the views of a Central European 
survivor of Communism. The assumption is that if you were brought up in the 
second half of the 20th century in the Western hemisphere, your perception of 
reality is dramatically different from the one which is available to those who were 
brought up in the Soviet interest sphere. In what follows I would like to elaborate 
on this last point, showing the reasons for this discrepancy and after that, I shall 
offer thoughts about the East- West duality, relying on the historical reconstruc-
tions of young scholars originating from this part of Europe.
Historical demarcation lines in Europe
Europe is certainly not a homogeneous political, social and cultural entity. Just the 
opposite. This paper argues that no European level compromise can be achieved if 
we disregard the simple historical fact of the distance between the different politi-
cal cultures of a multicultural continent. Although Marxism promised to over-
come the past, the political reflexes of the people, which build up their political 
culture, can still differ and will still differ dramatically (for a historical overview of 
political culture in this region, see Manikowska, Pánek, and Holý 2005; and Plasser 
4 In the countries of the former Soviet zone, Western intellectuals are sometimes harshly 
criticised and charged with a sort of intellectual blindness, due to their different educa-
tional experience, and their lack of direct knowledge of the parts of the region, missing 
first- hand impressions during the Soviet period.
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and Pribersky 1996). Although the attempt to get rid of the shadows of the past 
after so much tragedy – on the part of the founders of the European Union – is 
perfectly understandable, no realistic political power should try to avoid making 
sense of the historical heritage of the people, including the wounds and traumas 
in the public mentalities of the citizens, they have to govern.
By now, the most obvious demarcation line within the mentalities of European 
nations is the one introduced after the end of WWII. This is due to a tragic di-
lemma of the past. When challenged by two totalitarian threats at the same time 
(German Nazism and Russian Communism), Western leaders decided to take 
on board one of them (Russian Communism) as an ally to overcome the more 
immediate (and closer) threat: Nazi Germany. Although from the perspective of 
the millions of victims of war crimes and of the battlefields, no doubt too late, 
the strategy led to the final victory of the allies against the Nazis, but it also led 
to an unprecedented division within Europe, as a result of the Soviet occupation 
of a portion of Europe.
The division, of course, was not accidental. It had been prepared by a number 
of historical factors: for example by the fact that the Western part of the continent 
developed much faster than the Eastern part. Economic success was soon trans-
lated into a centre- periphery political relationship. However, the Iron Curtain 
separated the two hemispheres in an unprecedented way, which allowed the Soviet 
power to exercise full control over those territories and their political communi-
ties to establish an unparalleled political (and, as this was a totalitarian regime, 
also mental landscape). To achieve this aim was made easier by the fact that, for 
historical reasons, this region had been accustomed to the rule of authoritarian 
regimes and had no high expectations for the establishment of more democratic 
political systems. Surprisingly, some countries could get out of the grip of Soviet 
Russia (Austria as a result of a deal, Yugoslavia and Albania thanks to their leaders’ 
political strategies). However, the group of countries that signed the Warsaw Pact 
was kept together by the combined effect of sheer military power (as was made 
obvious in the Hungarian uprising of 1956), ideology and geopolitical necessity – 
one cannot easily change the geographical location of a country, after all. The 
result of combined physical and mental oppression was a decline of political and 
civil manners in these countries. This is the cause of the first demarcation line in 
contemporary Europe, dividing, on the one side, Austria and Germany, and on the 
other side Poland, earlier Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Central Europe. Behind 
the former ones we find the ‘core Western European countries’, while behind the 
second ones we find the Russian sphere of influence.
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The difference in political manners is only one type of segmentation on the 
continent. A further one, a natural part of a post- colonial situation, separates 
the economically more developed regions from the less developed ones, even 
after their integration into the EU. The problem is that, except for some parts of 
Portugal and Southern Italy, inhabitants of the countries formerly west of the 
Iron Curtain are still much better off than those of the countries east of it. In 
other words, the unfortunate fact is that the political division follows the same 
pattern as the division in economic development. The political separation only 
reinforces and is itself reinforced by the economic divide. The long- term handicap 
(in economic development) is translated into a short- term disadvantage (in the 
European political arena) and the dynamics works the other way round as well. 
All in all, the development gap of the Central European region is due to its slow 
social adaptability to the changing environments of the modern or post- modern, 
globalised paradigm.
Central Europe as a conflict- zone
So far we have considered the conflicting relationship between these large blocks: 
to put it bluntly, the West as opposed to the Central- and Eastern European 
block. Both the political and the economic division have followed this pattern. 
The third issue of the regional stratification in Europe concerns, however, the 
question of intra- regional connections. Obviously, contemporary Western Eu-
rope is famous for different types of interstate cooperation, starting out from the 
coalition of the Benelux countries, and including also the cooperation among 
the Scandinavian countries or the Mediterranean initiative. Not to mention the 
Franco- German alliance after WWII, or the trio, when the two aforementioned 
were joined by Britain. In Central Europe, historically, the situation was charac-
teristically different. Although there is a historical sympathy between Hungary 
and Poland, before the establishment of the Visegrád Group no institutional 
cooperation existed, except for the ‘Little Entente’, the anti- Hungarian coalitions 
of the two world wars.5
In modern history, there were some very pronounced enmities between the 
neighbouring states of the region. Hungary, for example, always felt surrounded 
by hostile countries joining their powers during the world wars against Hungary. 
This was the ‘Little Entente’, a joint effort of neighbouring countries to keep 
Hungary under control, supported by French diplomacy which signed bilateral 
5 Of course, the newly formed, post WWII artificial state- conglomerates of Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia cannot be regarded as simple interstate cooperations.
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treaties with each of them. The aim of the group was to circumscribe and iso-
late Hungary diplomatically. The coalition was formed in 1920 and 1921 and 
consisted of the following countries: Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. 
As one can easily recognise from maps about the Trianon Treaty all three of 
them were winners of the new international settlement. Looking back from the 
21st century we can give an assessment of the issue in the following manner: 
Hungary had to give up certain parts of its territory and population, but the 
dictum of the treaty was clearly disproportionate (For a detailed and reliable 
recent account, see Romsics 2002.).
While from this historical angle Central Europe might look like a doomed 
conflict- zone, and this suspicion has a more or less historically solid basis, during 
the decades of Soviet rule this cultural area quite surprisingly witnessed the birth 
of an alternative narrative of the region.
The idea of Central Europe as a form of protest
After the Soviet invasion of the Central European region at the end of WWII, 
which was followed – after three years of transition – by 42 years of Soviet colo-
nisation, a new sensitivity was born among the intellectuals of the region, which 
produced the outlines of an alternative Central European identity. Soviet power 
did not distinguish between winners and losers of the world wars; it exercised the 
same inhuman, totalitarian oppression in the whole region. Communist power 
did not even differentiate between the Slavic and the non- Slavic elements in the 
population of the region. This ‘equality’ of oppression created a sense of solidar-
ity among the oppressed nations and – as soon as the oppression was not as ag-
gressive as before – that led to the establishment of a network of underground 
cultural centres which was organised to oppose the ideological influence of the 
oppressors among the public intellectuals and the youth (Falk 2003). Also, the 
returning pattern of revolts and uprisings in the Soviet zone (in East Germany, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) was also helpful to wake up the elites of 
these countries, and even ordinary people could experience a sense of solidarity 
beyond the national borders.
But historians and political theorists tried to contribute to the rise of a dis-
course about an independent regional identity between the West and the East. 
In Hungary, the example in this respect is a pair of authors: István Bibó and Jenő 
Szűcs. Bibó was, for a short time, a politician: his iconic role was his participation 
in the last government of the revolutionary party leader Imre Nagy, during the last 
days of the 1956 revolution against Soviet rule, and his lonely stay in the houses 
of Parliament during the Soviet attack. He suffered long years of imprisonment 
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for that. But, somewhat independently from that experience, as a thinker he was 
quite critical of the democratically underdeveloped small states of Eastern Eu-
rope. Because of his critical stance, his theory was permissive towards a kind of 
regional identity (Bibó 1946). Jenő Szűcs, taking inspiration from Bibó but tracing 
his ideas back to their historical roots, first in a long article and later in a com-
plete book, defended the historiographic position that Europe has three different, 
well- distinguishable long- term cultural-, social- and political- historical traditions: 
the West, the East and the region in between the German and the Russian areas 
of influence: Central Europe (or in the German- language context Mitteleuropa) 
(Szűcs 1981; 1983 and 1983b).
Intellectuals, mainly writers and artists, were also helpful in other parts of 
the region to create the new image of Central Europe. One of them was Milan 
Kundera, the Czech writer, who went into exile after the brutal suppression of the 
Prague spring and became a Parisian. In a rather influential essay in the eight-
ies, he presented the new myth of Central Europe as the opposite of the myth of 
mother Russia. His Tragedy of Central Europe is a characteristic piece, which 
presents powerful arguments and mobilises an emotional rhetoric to show that 
the region has a common interest and shares the same tragic fate in the second 
half of the 20th century – for which he partly blamed the Western powers, who 
simply sold Central Europe to Stalin and his successors. (Kundera, just as Bibó, 
was also self- critical: an important part of this historical fabrication is a reflection 
on the failures of the states and civic societies of Central Europe, too.) (Kundera 
1984, 33–34)6
Let us turn finally to another fictional vision of a (past or future?) Central- 
Europe. Miklós Mészöly, one of the path breaking novelists of the new Hungarian 
prose, and one of the most open rebels against the social realist canon, collected 
some of his short pieces under the title Once there was a Central Europe, with 
the subtitle Variations on beautiful hopelessness (Mészöly 1989 and 1997). The 
English- language collection under this title brought together nine short stories, 
fifteen ‘video clips’, as the author called them, and five studies. None of them 
specifically addressed the geographic region’s history directly, but all of them 
contributed to describing a specific Central European cultural identity. On the 
cover of the book we read: ‘Central Europe – to put it in a simplified way – has 
not existed so far, but it could perhaps exist once, if roots would grow out of its 
sole. What has existed so far? A question mark longs to be at the end of it.’ (ibid., 
back cover).
6 The present author recently gave a talk on Kundera’s essay, see Hörcher 2016.
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The idea of Central Europe as a historiographical toolkit
So far, we have seen the ways in which the idea of Central Europe was mobilised 
by Central European intellectuals in the 1980s to trump the official doctrines of 
the ideology of the Socialist state and to reconfigure the self- perception of the 
nations about their common geopolitical region. In what follows I would like to 
present three recent volumes by researchers whose careers are characteristically 
post-1990. This is a generation whose mindsets are rather different from those of 
Bibó, Szűcs, Kundera, Mészöly, or for that matter, of Anne Applebaum. In their 
case, there is no need to suppose the sort of political partisanship that we could 
sense (for better or worse) in the former authors’ writings. Rather, they seem to 
regard the concept of Central Europe as simply useful in their own history- writing 
practice for its own sake. I regard their pieces taken together as a concerted revi-
sionist effort in Central European historical scholarship, developing a common 
proposal through different periods of Christian Europe.7
Central Europe in the Middle Ages
Central Europe in the High Middle Ages by Nora Berend and her colleagues, 
Przemysław Urbańczyk and Przemysław Wiszewski, deals with the region (mean-
ing by the term Poland, the Czech lands and the Hungarian Kingdom) in a me-
dieval context. The relevance of the term Central Europe in a medieval context, 
however, is far from obvious. As William Chester Jordan admits: ‘present- day An-
glophone medievalists are woefully ignorant about the region’ (ibid., back cover). 
His comment obviously points at the relevance of Central Europe – he claims 
that the book provides an opportunity to other medievalists to ask questions 
‘involving comparisons between Western Europe […] and the Central European 
territories discussed by the authors’. The same conceptual pair is presented in a 
slightly different wording by a specialist of Central European past, Martyn Rady, 
who also claims that the book facilitates comparisons, but adds that it helps to 
redefine ‘Central Europe’s place within medieval European history as a whole’. 
(ibid., back cover) This is a slightly different scenario, where Central Europe seems 
to be a variant within a pool of different varieties of the European Middle Ages.
Nora Berend has written an introduction to the book in which she asks ques-
tions about the utility of the term itself in that period. He refers back to, beside 
7 For a Hungarian legal scholar from the late 20th century turning back to the histori-
cal idea of Central- Europe, relying on the authoritative voice of a predecessor see the 
writings of the late Professor László Péter. On him: Fekete 2015.
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Jenő Szűcs, two earlier scholarly achievements from the region, those by Francis 
Dvornik and Oskar Halecki, in order to distinguish her and her colleagues’ efforts 
from these predecessors (ibid., 24). In her view, the earlier efforts to uncover a 
Central European paradigm provided anachronistic, Whiggish8 interpretations of 
regional phenomena, in other words, they read history directly from the perspec-
tive of the present moment.9 The result of this methodology is that ‘none of these 
works were divorced from the current politics’ (ibid., 24). Her sympathetic sugges-
tion is a kind of strict historicism: ‘we should not look at medieval Central Europe 
as the predetermined cradle of undemocratic and economically backward modern 
states, nor try to prove that back then, the region was the same as “the West”; but 
try to understand medieval developments in their own context’ (ibid., 31).
Berend calls attention to a further danger besides anachronism: that we use 
Western standards to understand this region. The pitfall of this method is that we 
would always find these countries lagging behind a more developed West, point-
ing at signs ‘of backwardness and failure’ (ibid., 31).10 Only if we can get rid of these 
artificial and external standards might we hope for a deeper and more reliable 
understanding of the differentiae specificae of the region. In order to do so, she 
claims, we do not need a strong concept of the existence of a well- defined Central 
European region in medieval Europe. Rather, we need to look for something like 
a comparative history of the region, based on the assumption of the existence of 
a common benchmark. In her view, enough historical evidence is in our hand to 
suppose the existence of this common benchmark:
Although this book does not claim the existence of Central Europe as an essential unit 
of European history, let alone as a conscious identity of the countries in question in the 
Middle Ages, it does argue that, despite differences, enough significant similarities existed 
in political, socio- economic and cultural terms to warrant examining the early history of 
this region together, in a comparative perspective (ibid., 37).
In other words, in Berend’s view, their book on Central Europe in the Middle Ages 
is a proof that it is fruitful to examine this region ‘in a comparative perspective’ 
already in the High Middle Ages.
8 This term comes from Butterfield’s masterly historiographical criticism (Butterfield 
1931.)
9 Once again, this is exactly the aim of the present paper – the difference being that this 
paper does not claim to be a piece of historical scholarship, but more one in the history 
of political thought, viewed from the perspective of political philosophy.
10 Berend is specifically critical of German scholarship because they looked at the German 
invaders of this region as carriers of civilisation and culture.
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Central Europe in the early modern period
If we move one step further in history and look at the early modern period, 
another recent book might be of interest for us. Balázs Trencsényi and László 
Zászkaliczky (Trencsényi and Zászkaliczky 2010) edited a fine volume of scholar-
ship on this period in the history of political thought. The aim is to reconstruct 
the early modern discourses (mind you: the term is in the plural!) of patriotism 
available in the East Central European context. It is noteworthy that these scholars, 
who were close to the so- called Cambridge school of intellectual history during 
their doctoral research (Trencsényi 2004, Zászkaliczky 2004, and Zászkaliczky 
2013), are cautious enough to add the little modifying term East to the concept 
of Central Europe – presumably to avoid any misunderstanding of the term to 
include German territories or the German speaking inner Habsburg lands. They 
do not think that the term they have chosen is undebatable. However, they find 
it – when referring to Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, and Croatia – a construct which 
is useful as a comparative kit for the historian:
far from seeking to essentialise the region as such, the East Central European patterns 
could be used to show a specific dynamism which is markedly different from the West-
ern European developments but also can be clearly distinguished from, for instance, the 
evolution of Russian political discourse in the same period. (ibid., 44).
They are also brave enough to offer certain criteria which helped them to delineate 
this region. Their list of criteria includes the fact that the countries of this region 
had been ‘formed at the confines of the Latin- German imperial framework, pen-
etrated by Latin Christianity but retaining certain specificities linked to their spa-
tial and temporal birth condition’ (ibid., 44). They also find in the region ‘a rather 
similar evolution of the relationship of king, estates and the peasantry, producing 
among others a sizeable nobility by the eve of the early modern period’ (ibid., 44).
Of course, the logic of this argumentation is circular: our authors found enough 
historical parallels in order to establish a regional comparative methodology, 
which helps them to find even more phenomena in common. But this is the heu-
ristics of most historical research in the humanities: you have an intuitive grasp 
of comparable phenomena, which you investigate, and your investigation will 
help you to find more proof or leads you to the conclusion that the comparison 
does not hold. The scholarly reception of our authors’ approach seems to be quite 
positive: in her penetrating review of the collection of essays edited by Trencsényi 
and Zászkaliczky, Iva Manova (Manova 2011) emphasises, as the key strength of 
the book, the effort to ‘recontextualize from a comparative perspective’ classical 
texts of particular national patriotic traditions – and this might have been the 
most important aim of the editors.
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Central Europe in the modern context
Finally, the last epoch in this overview is modern (as opposed to postmodern, 
contemporary, etc.) political thought. It is again Balázs Trencsényi who, with an 
international team of similar- minded, young and ambitious scholars from the 
region (Trencsényi, Janowski, Baar, Falina, and Kopecek 2016), worked on a fine 
history of modern political thought in East Central Europe published by Oxford 
University Press. This is again a collective effort, an exercise in intellectual history 
which strives to reframe the narrative about the region we are talking about. With 
them, once again, the key term, the name of the region is East Central Europe, 
presumably in order to show that we are talking here about the less successful part 
of the region, both as far as their political and social achievements are concerned 
and as far as the roles played by them in major academic narratives are concerned.
Trencsényi and his co- authors have two aims with this enterprise. First of all, 
they think that the total neglect of the region in the grand narratives of the period 
is unacceptable and probably due to the short- sightedness of scholars who as a 
default case only deal with the Western and more developed part of Europe (ibid., 
2).11 This team wants to address the problem in a very brave manner. They have 
the following two aims with their work: ‘to globalise the history of East Central 
European political thought, while at the same time to “renegotiate” the European 
intellectual canon.’ To achieve this, however, they think a grand revisionist pro-
gramme is required. They think ‘we must go beyond the task of expanding the 
pool of “shared” references. We need to rethink the very categories in which the 
history of modern political ideas — and thus of political modernity, as such — has 
traditionally been formulated’ (ibid., 1).
They think that the silence and the misconceptions about this part of Europe 
in the secondary literature are partly due to the narrowness of the vocabulary of 
11 In the introduction, the examples of this returning ignorance include ‘the otherwise 
excellent Cambridge History of Twentieth- Century Political Thought’ and ‘the synthetic 
European Political Thought, 1815–1989’. It is claimed here that even ‘In the newly pub-
lished eight- volume Encyclopedia of Political Thought one can find only nine political 
thinkers from this part of the world…’ And where Trencsényi et al. seem to praise, 
like in the case of Jan- Werner Mueller’s, in fact, they do not find too much to praise. 
Mueller’s history of twentieth- century political thought ‘included Lukács, Bibó, and 
Patočka in his overview’, which is more than nothing. The introduction searches for 
an excuse why no more great names appear even in this volume from this region, and 
this is the somewhat unsatisfying reason offered: ‘obviously such a work could not aim 
at a more detailed and contextual analysis of the various intellectual traditions present 
in the region’. (ibid., 2)
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the available scholarly meta- narratives and the failures of the canon- constructors 
of modern Western European political thought. Therefore, they find that it is not 
enough to fill in the gaps of the narratives with a few names, a few book titles 
and a few basic concepts. What is required is a more- or- less total revision of the 
intellectual framework of the description of the political thinking of the age. ‘Ap-
proaching political questions from the semi- periphery has often meant that the 
paradigms originating in Western European contexts had to be “negotiated” in 
a setting marked by radically different local conditions.’ To do so, not only new 
concepts had to be introduced into the discussions, but also what was needed was 
‘testing the heuristic power of analytical concepts in our specific contexts’ (ibid., 
3). This testing led them to a reconfiguration of the narrative framework itself, 
giving a more pronounced voice to this region in the common European concert.
Conclusion: Rethinking historical Central Europe as a toolkit 
of political analysis
As we have seen, Central Europe was and remains a political arena where political 
ideas, patterns of political practice and institutional frameworks have historically 
developed autonomously, in other words differently from both the usual Western 
and Eastern European patterns. If a political analyst (intellectual historian or, for 
that matter, a political thinker) can accept this fact, she will certainly reshuffle 
her strategy to make sense of this political arena. This is an obvious and rational 
conclusion because, according to the recent historical scholarship of the region – 
as we have seen –, the usual reflexes of Western interpreters of Central Europe 
do not seem to work. Presumably, in crisis situations, these assumptions can be 
supposed to work even less than in ordinary ones. But how exactly can we arrive 
at a formula which would define for us how to engage in the interpretative work 
of a recent political situation in a historically correct manner in this region?
The suggestion of this paper is that although there are no a priori guarantees to 
find the suitable solutions, a key component of a workable historical and cultural 
translation formula is to work out a reliable (therefore testable) historiographic 
method of dealing with the past of this region. But the tricky thing is that to 
arrive at such a reliable reconstruction of the regional past (in order to histori-
cally legitimise your own present analysis) you had better avoid any references 
to present- day dilemmas. For, paradoxically, you can only expect an authentic 
interpretation of the present if you are first ready to abstract from it, then go back 
deep enough, but not too deep into the past of your region, in order to recollect 
the required historical experience which you will have to rely on in the next move, 
when you try to make sense of the present conditions with the help of this histori-
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cal background knowledge, which you gathered without falling into either of the 
two mistakes of anachronism and historical relativism. You are required to rely 
on a dual approach, combining the history of political thought with a normative 
contemporary political sensitivity. First, you gather the right vocabulary for the 
political analysis. Second, you try to apply, in a delicate manner, the historical 
background knowledge to the interpretation of the actual political situation. This 
method can provide clues to any phenomena of the Central European Sonderweg 
(this is again one of those region- specific concepts) if your analytical sensitivity 
and historical awareness form a good combination.
According to the main supposition of this paper, the phenomenon of a stub-
born Central European position in the debate on the ‘quota solution’ of the mi-
gration crisis can only make sense if we apply the methodology suggested above: 
combining a historical recovery of basic local concepts and their practical use with 
a refined application procedure whereby these concepts are utilised by the inter-
preter to enlighten the contemporary peculiarity of this region. To fully analyse 
the current political question, however, is already beyond the scope of this paper, 
which was more interested in the methodological question of making sense of 
politics by referring to the discourses and practices of the past.
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